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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's "Necessary Expense" Limitation-Four Recent
Developments
Article VII, section 61 of the North Carolina Constitution pro-
vides:
No county, city, or other municipal corporation shall contract
any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be
levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the neces-
sary expenses thereof, unless approved by a majority of those who
shall vote thereon in any election held for such purpose.
2
In two recent decisions,' the North Carolina Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret this constitutional limitation 4 in relation to
four problems of real significance to those charged with the financial
administration of North Carolina municipalities and counties,
The issues dealt with in these two decisions may be categorized as
follows: (1) Are funds derived from the sale of municipal or
county property subject to the limitations of article VII, section 6?
(2) Are intangibles tax funds, which are levied and collected by
the State and returned to the local governments, subject to the
,,necessary expense" limitation? (3) Are municipal and county
contracts imposing future obligations "debts" within the purview
of this constitutional provision? (4) Does a particular "necessary
I Prior to the constitutional amendment adopted by a vote of the people
in the general election held November 6, 1962, this section was section 7 of
article VII.
' This constitutional provision has no counterpart in other jurisdictions;
therefore, interpretative aid in the form of decisions from other states is
practically nonexistent. The supreme court has explained this uniqueness in
these terms:
In defining "necessary expenses" we derive practically no aid from
the cases decided in other States. We have examined a large number
of such cases apparently related to the subject and in each one we have
found some fact or feature or constitutional or statutory provision an-
tagonistic to or at variance with the section under consideration. We must
rely upon our own decisions.
Henderson v. City of Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 277, 132 S.E. 25, 29
(1926).
'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115
(1964); Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964).
'For a general discussion of the "necessary expense" limitation of article
VII, section 6, see Coats & Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses," 18 N.C.L.Rrv.
93 (1940); Note, 30 N.C.L.REv. 313 (1952).
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expense" lose its character as such when it is included, or pledged
to be included, within a category that, as an entity, is not a "neces-
sary expense," such as urban redevelopment?
I. FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE SALE OF PROPERTY
In Yokley v. Clark,5 the Town of Mount Airy and the County
of Surry had entered into a contract establishing a joint airport
authority.' The agreement provided for the construction of an
airport to be operated and maintained under the guidance of the
authority. The town and county agreed to make an initial financial
contribution and to provide such supplemental revenues as the
operation and maintenance of the facility might from time to time
require. As the construction and operation of an airport is not
a "necessary expense," 7 the town attempted to confine its initial
contribution to nontax funds. The Mount Airy Board of Commis-
sioners appropriated 25,000 dollars to the authority payable from
funds which were derived from the sale of old watershed property.
It was asserted that such funds were nontax revenues within the
purview of article VII, section 6.8
Taxpayers brought suit to restrain the town and county from
expending such funds because the proposal had not been submitted
to a referendum. From the lower court's decree validating the ap-
propriation, plaintiffs appealed.9
The supreme court held that the contract itself was a "debt"
and therefore a pledge of the faith and credit of both the town and
county contra to article VII, section 6.10 The court further con-
cluded that "in addition to the constitutional prohibition, there are
other serious questions involved." One of the serious questions
related to the lower court's finding that "money received from the
sale of watershed lands (paid for by taxes) becomes surplus funds
derived from a source other than [ad valorem] taxation." 2
-262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964).
* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-4 (1960) provides for the establishment of joint
airports by any city or town and county.
" Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945); Sing v.
City of Charlotte, 213 N.C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938); Goswick v. City of
Durham, 211 N.C. 687, 191 S.E. 728 (1937).
'Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 221, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).
° Ibid.
'OId. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567.
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
2" Ibid.
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Justice Higgins, writing for the court, stated that this par-
ticular question had never been directly presented because, in most
cases, it had been precluded by stipulation or admission. 8 He
then quoted from an opinion by Justice Barnhill, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in 1945,"4 wherein he made the following
observation:
Ordinarily cities obtain funds with which to buy property
through taxation. When tax money is used to purchase property
legal sense derived from taxation. The conversion and recon-
version do not change its essential character as tax money.
15
As the case was reversed on other grounds,'" there was no
necessity for expressly accepting or rejecting the Barnhill rule, and
the quotation from and reference to his opinion was the extent of
the court's consideration of this particular problem in Yokley.
Thus, in a true legal sense, all that can be surmised from the decision
is that the court is aware that a serious constitutional question exists
when funds derived from the sale of property are used for "non-
necessary expense" purposes without a vote.
In light of the court's past practice, this awareness alone is sig-
nificant. Prior to Yokley, the court had acquiesced in the use of
such funds for "nonnecessary expenses" without a vote. Two
reasons may explain why the use of revenues from the sale of
property for "nonnecessary expenses" had not been questioned by
the court earlier.
First, beginning in 192517 the court followed a rule of interpre-
tation that had the ultimate effect of excepting from article VII,
section 6, certain cash transactions effected from funds on hand.
As stated by the court: "[T] his provision ... has no application to
the facts of this record, where, as stated, the funds to be applied
are already on hand and the proposed expenditure will impose no
further liability on the municipality, nor involve the imposition
of further taxation upon it."' 8 The record, referred to by the
28 Ibid.
1 4Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945).
Id. at 18, 36 S.E.2d at 816. (Emphasis added.)
' The court reversed on the ground that the contract imposed future
obligations and therefore constituted a pledge of the faith and credit of the
two local governments. See section III of this text.
'Adams v. City of Durham, 189 N.C. 232, 126 S.E. 611 (1925).
118 Id. at 233, 126 S.E. at 612.
[Vol. 43
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court, reveals that the case involved the application of funds from
the sale of municipal property for a "nonnecessary expense."' 9
The result of this practice, which has been called the "surplus
fund rule,"20 was to prevent further inquiry into the nature of these
funds for purposes of determining the application of the constitu-
tional limitation. This was true not only in relation to funds derived
from the sale of property, but also those acquired directly from
taxation and which might have been carried over by the local govern-
ment as legitimate surplus from year to year.2 ' By 1960 the court
had stripped this practice of its glossing effect by taking a more
discriminating view of funds alleged to be surplus. The court
held that where an appropriation was for a "nonnecessary ex-
pense," payment could not be made from surplus funds derived from
taxation of any kind.22
The second factor, which had the effect of deferring considera-
tion of the constitutional status of conversion-reconversion funds,
was the court's acceptance of conclusory statements by local govern-
ments that funds derived from the sale of property were nontax
revenues. 23 Apparently, Justice Higgins had this in mind when he
9 The City of Durham applied funds derived from the sale of a municipal
building to the construction of a city auditorium, a "nonnecessary expense."
A taxpayer brought suit contesting the use of such funds on the grounds that
it was a violation of article VII, section 6. From an adverse decree in the
lower court, plaintiff appealed. The supreme court found no constitutional
issue on the asserted basis that such funds were surplus, and did not involve
the imposition of a debt or the levy of a tax. Adams v. City of Durham, 189
N.C. 232, 126 S.E. 611 (1925).
" Byrd, Dennis v. Raleigh, Popular Government, May 1961, pp. 1, 4.
For cases illustrating the effect of this rule, see Goswick v. City of Durham,
211 N.C. 687, 191 S.E. 728 (1937); Burleson v. Board of Aldermen, 200
N.C. 30, 156 S.E. 241 (1930); Mewborn v. City of Kinston, 199 N.C. 72,
154 S.E. 76 (1930); Nash v. City of Monroe, 198 N.C. 306, 151 S.E. 634
(1930); Holmes v. City of Fayetteville; 197 N.C. 740, 150 S.E. 624 (1929);
Hall v. Redd, 196 N.C. 622, 146 S.E. 583 (1929).21 Byrd, supra note 20, at 4 & n.19.
22Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960). For
a general discussion of the repercussions of Dennis on the "surplus
fund rule," see Byrd, supra note 20. Cf. Sing v. City of Charlotte, 213 N.C.
60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938).
"In Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945),
plaintiff airport authority brought an action for mandamus to compel the
defendants, the respective treasurers of the City of High Point and Guilford
County, to turn over to the authority certain appropriations made by their
governing bodies. The City of High Point had adopted a budget containing
an appropriation to the airport authority for the sum of $25,000, such funds
"derived from the sale of properties and unappropriated surplus revenues
from sources other than the levy of ad valorem taxes which are not pledged
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stated that stipulation and admission had, in the majority of the
cases, removed the question from controversy. Justice Barnhill,
in 1945, was the first to question the acceptance of such statements
as fact:
Is this a stipulation of fact that the property sold was not pur-
chased with tax money, or an erroneous conclusion that proceeds
from the sale of property which was acquired through taxation
are not derived from ad valorem taxes. It is not clear the parties
meant the first. It would seem to be the latter. In any event
it is left in serious doubt and for that reason plaintiff has not
shown a clear legal right to this appropriation.24
While this statement is not set out in Yokley, the court does allude
to the fact that Justice Barnhill considered such statements to be
mere conclusions of law.25
Prior to Yokley, these earlier decisions were susceptible to an
interpretation indicating that funds from the sale of property
were not subject to the constitutional limitation. Even when viewed
with hindsight, they seem to have obscured the question of the con-
stitution's application to such funds for officials who had to make
initial decisions concerning their expenditure. When viewed in this
context, the real significance of Yokley seems to be that for the first
time the court has displayed a willingness to cast off this subterfuge
and to recognize the existence of a real constitutional issue. Stand-
ing alone, Yokley is no authority for the proposition that the Barn-
hill test has been adopted as the law in North Carolina. It does,
however, furnish a strong inference that the court will closely
scrutinize any future expenditure of funds derived from the sale
of property for a "nonnecessary expense."
Fortunately, Yokley is not the final word on this "serious ques-
tion." In Horton v. Redevelopment Commn,26 decided only one
or otherwise applicable by law to the payment of the existing debt of the
City of High Point." Id. at 4, 36 S.E.2d at 806. Defendants appealed from
a judgment by the trial court for the airport authority. The court avoided
a decision on the question of funds derived from the sale of property by
relying on stipulations made by the parties: "It is within the stipulated
facts that the several appropriations made to the plaintiff are out of funds
now in their hands, in each case not derived from ad valorem taxes, but
mainly from the sale of property... ." Id. at 8, 36 S.E.2d at 808. (Emphasis
added.)
2,Id. at 19, 36 S.E.2d at 816.
' Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 223, 136 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1964).26262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115 (1964).
[Vol. 43-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
month subsequent to Yokley, the city proposed to donate certain
parcels of land to an urban redevelopment project. Urban redevelop-
ment has been held to be a "nonnecessary expense.""7 In terms of the
mechanical concept-conversion-reconversion-the donation of prop-
erty can be distinguished from a situation, such as that in Yokley,
where the funds from the sale of property are used for "nonneces-
sary expense" purposes. Moreover, there is no indication in Horton
that the land sought to be donated was surplus property, i.e., no
longer used for the purpose for which it was acquired. The court
seemingly attached no significance to the latter distinction. It held
that no decision could be made as to the validity of a financial plan
for an urban redevelopment project, unless and until it had been
ascertained whether the property proposed to be donated had been
acquired from tax money.28 The Horton decision is important
in that it relies on Yokley and uses languages strongly indicative
of the rule set out by Justice Barnhill: "The City is without authority
to donate the land referred to . . . for credit under the Redevelop-
ment Plan... unless that land was procured by the City from funds
other than from ad valorem taxation."29
The rule that has evolved through these two recent cases can
perhaps be stated as follows: The court will presume that municipal
and county property was acquired from tax funds. In any proposed
use of such property for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose, the local
government must first ascertain if such land was acquired from tax
money; if so, no use of the property can be made except in ac-
cordance with article VII, section 6. Furthermore, a "serious
question" exists as to the constitutionality of treating funds derived
from the sale of such property as nontax revenues.
Even as the law stands today, it would be wise for the munici-
palities and counties of North Carolina to treat funds derived
from the sale of property as tax revenues, rather than to rely on the
distinction between Yokley and Horton. Because the language in
Horton is strongly suggestive of the Barnhill test, it seems unlikely
that the court will distinguish between the use of the property itself
"'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464
(1963).8 Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 320-21, 137 S.E.2d
115, 125-26 (1964).20 Ibid.
19651
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for a "nonnecessary expense" and the use of the funds derived from
the sale thereof.
II. INTANGIBLES TAX FUNDS3O
In Yokley, the court dealt with another problem relating to the
general concept of nontax funds, or funds not subject to the
"necessary expense" limitation. As already stated, both the town
and county attempted to provide their initial contributions under
the joint contract from nontax funds in order to avoid a confronta-
tion with article VII, section 6. Along with the town's appropria-
tion of funds to the authority from the sale of watershed property,
the county appropriated 25,000 dollars " 'to be paid out of any non
Ad Valorem tax revenues available such [as] beer tax and wine
tax revenues or intangibles tax revenue due the General Fund ....' "31
The supreme court held: "The County may not treat intangibles
tax receipts as surplus funds, notwithstanding the fact that the
State collects the tax and makes distribution to the counties and
towns."3' The court relied on section 105-198 of the General
Statutes, which provides that intangibles taxes are levied "for and on
behalf of said political subdivisions of the State to the same extent and
manner as if said levies were made by the governing authorities of
said subdivisions for distribution therein."33 Therefore, since article
VII, section 6 applies to all local taxes, intangibles tax funds must
be expended only as tax revenues. 4
Yokley is the first decision to consider the intangibles personal
"O The Intangibles Personal Property Tax is levied and collected by the
State on bank deposits; money in safe deposit boxes, safes, and cash registers;
accounts receivable; bonds and notes; all evidences of debt; stocks and bene-
ficial interests in foreign trusts; and funds on deposit with insurance com-
panies. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-198 to -205 (1958, Supp. 1963). From the
total levy by the State, an amount is deducted, as determined by the State
Board of Assessments, sufficient to defray the cost of administration for the
fiscal year. The funds are then distributed to the counties and municipalities
in proportion to the total amount of ad valorem taxes levied by each during
the fiscal year preceding distribution. The amounts so allocated to each local
unit are apportioned in proportion to other property tax levies made for
the various funds of the taxing units receiving the funds from the State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-213 (1958). Through special enabling legislation,
the municipality or county may treat the intangibles revenues as part of
its general fund.
" Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 221, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).
32 Id. at 223, 136 S.E.2d at 568.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-198 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
S' Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960).
[Vol. 43
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property tax in relation to article VII, section 6.3' Prior to Yokley,
it had been said that the question of whether the "necessary ex-
pense" limitation would apply to such funds was debatable."8 The
holding in Yokley raises two very interesting questions. First,
was the intangibles tax intended and has it been treated by the
legislature as a local tax? Second, is the intangibles tax, in fact,
a local tax?
The original intangibles tax schedule was enacted as a part
of the Revenue Act of 19 3 7 ." Article VIII of this act included
the following declaration: "Intangible personal properties defined
and classified by this chapter . . . are hereby segregated for ex-
clusive State taxation after the year one thousand nine hundred
thirty-seven . . . ."s The act also declared that "taxes levied in
this article [are] for the maintenance of the public schools of the
'State, under authority of section six, Article V, of the Constitu-
tion." 9 In the only decision construing this original enactment, it
was said:
By this declaration the General Assembly apparently en-
deavored to avoid the suggestion of exceeding the general limita-
tion placed by ... [article V, section 6] upon its taxing power
upon property, and to levy the tax as one within the proviso
which excepts from the limitation taxes for the maintenance of
the public schools of the State for the constitutional period.40
Thus, both legislative and judicial declarations sustain the con-
clusion that the original tax schedule was a state levy. It was not
" The intangibles personal property article of the Revenue Act of 1937
was considered by the court in relation to another problem in Board of
Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1939). Cf. Town of
Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 362, 2 S.E.2d 463, 475 (1939)
(dissenting opinion).
" Byrd, supra note 20, at 3 & n.16.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, §§ 700-16.
38 N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 700.
38 Ibid.
"Board of Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 218, 1 S.E.2d 544,
545 (1939). Article V, section 6 provides:
The total of the State and county tax on property shall not exceed
twenty cents on the one hundred dollars value of property, except when
the county property tax is levied for a special purpose and with the
special approval of the General Assembly, which may be done by special
or general act: Provided, this limitation shall not apply to taxes levied for
the maintenance of the public schools of the State for the term required
by article nine, section three, of the Constitution: Provided, further, the
State tax shall not exceed five cents on the one hundred dollars value of
property. (Emphasis added.)
1965]
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until 1939 that article VIII of the Revenue Act of 1937 was
amended to include the language of what is now General Statutes
section 105-198.41 Consequently, the proper inquiry would seem
to be: did the legislature, by this amendment, intend to change
what was ordained as a state tax into a local one insofar as the
amounts returned to the local units were concerned?
The language of section 105-198 is clear. Ostensibly, it mani-
fests a clear intent that the tax should, for all intents and pur-
poses, be dealt with as though it were levied by the local units. In
addition to this declaration, there is another indication that the
funds returned to the local governments were intended by the legis-
lature to be treated as local tax funds. The original 1937 enact-
ment provided:
The amounts distributed to the counties and cities of the
state shall be used for the payment of principal or interest on
indebtedness or expenses incurred on account of providing facili-
ties and equipment necessary for the maintenance of the constitu-
tional six months public school term.42
This requirement was consistent with the design of the tax as
originally enacted. But in 1939, section 715 of the intangibles
tax schedule was amended to provide that "the amounts so allo-
cated to each county and municipality [shall be used] in proportion
to other property tax levies made for the various funds and ac-
tivities of the taxing unit receiving said allotment. 43 By removing
the former requirement that local units expend intangibles tax
funds only for public school purposes, the legislature gave sub-
stance to its earlier declaration. Beginning in 1939, the local gov-
ernments could apply such funds in the same manner as any other
locally levied and collected tax revenue.
The argument that the intangibles tax is really a state tax
appears to emanate from two facts. First, the intangibles tax is
actually levied and collected by the State.4 Second, the entire
amount collected was not returned to the political subdivisions until
1957.45 As initially enacted, the intangibles tax schedule required
that only fifty per cent of the total amount collected be returned to
"1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 700.
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 715.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 715.
"See note 30 supra.
,N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 9.
[Vol. 4;3
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the counties and municipalities.4" By a series of amendments, be-
ginning in 1939, the distribution ratio was changed with the local
units receiving more each time." In 1957, General Statutes section
105-213 was amended to require that the State return the total
amount of such revenues, less administrative costs, to the local gov-
ernments.48 Thus, from the standpoint of the total tax structure, it
could be argued that until 1957 the legislature had treated the tax
as a state levy. This argument would appear to have a good deal of
merit if it were not for the clear legislative intent, manifested by
the 1939 amendments, to sever the amount returned to the local
units from the total tax structure and to provide that it be utilized
as a local tax fund.
Regardless of the fact that the history of the intangibles per-
sonal property tax may provide some support for a contention that
it is a state tax, the question may be raised: at the time of Yokley,
was the intangibles tax, in fact, a local tax? The answer would
seem to be in the affirmative for two reasons. First, the tax is on
property that is within the local taxing unit and, in this sense, can-
not be distinguished from the real property tax. Second, it is
now completely refunded to such local units. In reality, the only
indicia of a state tax remaining is that the State levies and collects
the tax.
In conclusion, it would seem that the Yokley holding on the
intangibles tax question is sustainable both from the standpoint of
its legislative history and from the present reality of the tax struc-
ture. From the historical point of view, the 1939 legislation
demonstrates a clear intent that the funds be regarded as local
revenues. From the standpoint of practicality, there is no sub-
stantial distinction between the intangibles personal property tax
and any other locally levied and collected tax.
III. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS IMPOSING FUTURE OBLIGATIONS
The contract in Yokley, in addition to obligating the two gov-
ernmental units to make an initial contribution, also provided that
after revenues derived from the operation of the facility had been
applied "further expenses of operation and maintenance [would]
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 715.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 715 (60%-40%); N.C. Sess. Laws
1941, ch. 50, § 8 (75%-25%); N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 501, § 7 (80%-
20%).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 7.
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be on the basis of sixty ... per cent contributions by the Town...
and forty . per cent by the County . . . . 49 The supreme court
held the contract to be void as a pledge of the faith and credit of
both local governments for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose with-
out a vote. Justice Higgins laid down the following rule:
[T]he Constitution forbids contracting the debt or pledging
the credit of the Town and County without a vote. The making
of the pledge for future fulfillment is unauthorized. The method
by which payment was intended, whether by taxation or other-
wise, is immaterial, if for an unnecessary purpose.50
The facts in Yokley make two things clear. First, the future
obligations imposed by the contract were unlimited both as to time
and amount; moreover, there was no qualification that potential
obligations be restricted to nontax funds.5" Second, an application of
the standard definition of municipal indebtedness would have been
sufficient to hold the contract to be a pledge of the faith and credit
of both local units contra to article VII, section 6.52 This means,
in effect, that the part of the Yokley opinion that precludes the in-
currence of future obligations, no matter how they are to be dis-
charged, may be regarded as dictum.
Perhaps the most important question raised by the Yokley case
can be stated as follows: are the municipality and county precluded
from entering into a contract requiring future appropriations, with-
out first submitting the contract to a vote, when such appropriations
are expressly limited to nontax funds in general, or to a specific
and designated nontax fund? This question assumes that the ob-
jective of the contract is a "nonnecessary expense" purpose. It
"' Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 220, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).5o Id. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567. (Emphasis added.)
51 The town and county did make an abortive effort to confine their initial
obligations to nontax funds. The trial judge had made his determination
of the constitutional question only in relation to these purported nontax
revenues, apparently attaching no significance to the future obligations.
Noting this fact, Justice Higgins said: "The contract to build, and to operate
... is indivisible. The judge is without power to eliminate the objections
by confining the operating expenses to nontax receipts. In the first place,
the parties do not limit their commitment." Id. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567.
2 Municipal indebtedness has been defined by the court to mean the
following: "'An indebtedness within restrictions upon municipal indebted-
ness is an agreement of some kind by the municipality to pay money where
no suitable provision has been made for the prompt discharge of the obliga-
tion imposed by the agreement'." Williamson v. City of High Point, 213
N.C. 96, 104, 195 S.E. 90, 95 (1938); Brockenbrough v. Board of Water
Comm'rs, 134 N.C. 1, 11-12, 46 S.E. 28, 31. (1903).
[Vol. 43
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would seem that the Yokley rule envisions any contract imposing
future obligations regardless of the contemplated method of financ-
ing; but since the uncompromising language of the opinion could be
regarded as dictum, a legitimate question exists as to the potential
application of the rule.
Some light is shed upon the scope of the Yokley rule in Horton.
5 3
Here, taxpayers of the City of High Point brought suit to restrain
the institution of an urban redevelopment project54 on the grounds,
among others, that there was no valid financial plan as required by
law.55 Specifically, it was alleged that tax funds were to be ex-
pended, debts contracted, and the faith of the city pledged to finance
a project that was not a "necessary expense." 5 The financial plan
presented by the city consisted of a cooperation agreement between
the city and its redevelopment commission. 7 This agreement pro-
vided that the city was to effect certain capital improvements within
the project area over a period of years.5 s These improvements,
along with certain other contributions, were to constitute local
grants-in-aid pursuant to an arrangement with the federal govern-
ment, whereby it was to provide two-thirds of the net cost of the
project. Final payment of the federal government was contingent
upon the city's providing one-third of the net cost or making spe-
cific provision therefor.59
There is no evidence that the validity of the financial plan was
controverted on the grounds that the cooperation agreement itself
" Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115
(1964).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -496 provides a comprehensive scheme
whereby North Carolina cities can redevelop their blighted areas through
the institution of urban redevelopment projects. "Blighted area" is defined
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-456(2) (1964).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. 160-463(d) (7) (1964).
"° Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 309, 137 S.E.2d 115,
118 (1964).
"' Urban redevelopment commissions may be created by the governing
bodies of North Carolina cities as instruments for urban redevelopment
within the territorial limits of the city. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-457 (1964).
The powers of such commissions are set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-462
(1964).
"8 Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 318, 137 S.E.2d 115,
124 (1964). The improvements were to be made on or before December
31, 1967, and consisted of street improvements, traffic controls, water and
sewer lines, electric distribution lines, a series of parks, off-street parking
facilities, and a pedestrian plaza development. Ibid. For a discussion of these
improvements, see section IV.
1° Id. at 314, 137 S.E.2d at 121.
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
constituted a pledge of the faith and credit of the city as defined
by Yokley. There would seem to be some doubt as to whether
the agreement did, in fact, impose a legal obligation on the city."0
A majority of the court remanded the case for further findings."'
Justice Higgins, although concurring in the results, felt that the
cooperation agreement did constitute a debt and therefore a pledge
of the faith and credit of the city. He said:
The City ... plans to pay for said capital improvements by ap-
propriations made from year to year from currently available
non-tax revenues. The pledge is for payment out of future re-
ceipts and not from presently available funds. Article VII,
Section 6, of the State Constitution forbids the expenditure
of tax funds for unnecessary purposes without voter approval.
It likewise prevents a pledge of the City's faith and credit to be
fulfilled by future receipts, regardless of the source.0 2
In light of Justice Higgins's reliance on the Yokley rule, the
majority opinion is revealing. For whatever reason, the majority
did not follow Yokley in regard to the cooperation agreement. Chief
Justice Denny made the following observation concerning the agree-
ment: "It is apparent ... that the City is financially able to provide
the local grants-in-aid contemplated under the Plan and the Coopera-
tion Agreement from current nontax revenues of the City ap-
propriated from year to year through 31 December 1967 . . .
If the agreement imposed a legal obligation upon the city to make the
improvements agreed upon, it would certainly seem that Horton
presented a contractural situation squarely within the purview of
The agreement contained the following covenant:
[T]he obligation of the City .. .shall terminate and become null
and void to the extent that the City is unable to finance its participating
share by appropriations made from year to year from currently available
non-tax revenues, revenue bonds which do not pledge the faith and
credit of the City, and by credit for other expenditures from lawfully
available sources.
Record, p. 98, Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d
115 (1964).
" The court required additional findings of fact in relation to four
items which were part of the city's financial plan: (1) the donation of land
(see section I of this text) ; (2) off-street parking facilities; (3) proposed
school construction to be made within the project area by Guilford County;
(4) a pedestrian plaza development; (5) other items alleged by the city
to be "nonnecessary expenses" and public purposes. 262 N.C. at 321-23, 137
S.E.2d at 126-27.02 Id. at 327, 137 S.E.2d at 130.
011Id. at 323, 137 S.E.2d at 127.
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the Yokley rule. But if there was no legal obligation on the city
to make the improvements contemplated by the agreement, then
Justice Higgins would appear to have been wrong in his reliance
upon Yokley.
It is clear from Horton that Justice Higgins considers the Yokley
rule to be without exception where the contract imposes future
obligations for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose. If the majority
had chosen to follow the Yokley decision, it would have meant that
all other questions relating to the urban redevelopment project, and
its contemplated schemes of finance, would have become moot,
unless and until the cooperation agreement was submitted to a vote.
The language in Yokley, insofar as it prevents the incurrence
of future obligations regardless of how they are to be discharged,
calls to mind a well known exception to constitutional debt limita-
tions known as the "special fund doctrine."'  In a more limited
sense, it is called the "revenue bond exception." 65 In 1903, North
Carolina recognized a version of the special fund doctrine in relation
to certain proprietary undertakings by local governments., 6 The
court held that where a city issued revenue bonds, the proceeds of
which were to be used in expanding and improving the city's water
and sewer systems, with the principal and interest on such bonds
being payable solely from revenue derived from the operation of the
systems, then such bonds did not constitute "debts" within the
purview of article VII, section 6.67 North Carolina has not ex-
tended the special fund doctrine beyond proprietary undertakings of
municipalities. But it has been said that North Carolina recog-
nizes the "broad special fund doctrine" as contrasted to the restricted
view."'
""If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and the
municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally held that there is no in-
debtedness .. C.." McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2387 (2nd ed.
1928).
" The term "revenue bond" exception seems to be used primarily where
bonds are issued to pay for waterworks, light plants, and other proprietary
undertakings by a municipality when such bonds are payable solely from
the income of such works. See id. § 2390.
" Brockenbrough v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 134 N.C. 1, 46 S.E. 28(1903).
'
1 Ibid.
See Hoyt & Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions upon Public Debt
in North Carolina, 16 N.C.L.RIv. 329, 346-47 (1938). As defined in this
article, the "broad special fund doctrine" means that no debt is created where
the special fund is derived from the net non-tax revenues of a particular
municipal proprietary undertaking. On the other hand, the "restricted special
1965]
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It is conceivable that the supreme court, when faced with a
situation forcing the issue, could recognize the validity of contracts,
such as that in Horton, that impose future obligations limited to
nontax funds by relying on the analogy suggested by the special fund
doctrine. Admittedly, this would be quite an expansion of the doc-
trine as now recognized, but in both instances, it could be argued that
the municipality incurs no general liability and that the discharge of
future obligations is limited to a nontax source. In context of the
special fund doctrine, such a recognition would not seem to be
unduly subverting article VII, section 6.
Until the court has had occasion to properly delineate the area
covered by Yokley, no municipal or county official should, in good
conscience, disregard its broad implications. It is hoped that the
court will clarify the confusion that exists as a result of the Horton
case and the concurring opinion by Justice Higgins. It is suggested
that the "special fund" analogy provides at least a substantive
foundation on which to base a recognition of contracts imposing
future obligations for "nonnecessary expenses" without requiring
that they first be submitted to a referendum.
IV. NECESSARY ExPENSES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
In Horton the cooperation agreement between the city and its
redevelopment commission provided that certain improvements were
to be made within the project area on or before a certain date in
1967.69 Of these improvements, only traffic controls, water and
sewer lines, electric distribution facilities, and street improvements
were "necessary expenses." 70  Urban redevelopment, although a
valid public purpose, is not a "necessary expense" of the munici-
pality. 1 The taxpayers alleged that the financial plan promulgated
fund doctrine" means that the special fund must arise solely from the net
revenues of the specific properties paid for by the proceeds of the obliga-
tions. Ibid. See, e.g., State Ports Authority v. First Citizens Bank and
Trust Co., 242 N.C. 416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955); Williamson v. City of High
Point, 213 N.C. 96, 195 S.E. 90 (1938).
" See note 58 supra.
'0262 N.C. at 318, 137 S.E.2d at 124 (1964).
7'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464
(1963).
The ultimate result, which our Urban Redevelopment Law . . . seeks
to achieve, is to eliminate the injurious consequences caused by a blighted
area in a municipality and to substitute for them a use of the area
which it is hoped will render impossible future blight and its injurious
consequences. This is in its broad purpose a preventive measure. . ..
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by the commission was unconstitutional because certain proposed
expenditures had not been submitted to a vote in accordance with
article VII, section 6.72
The supreme court was confronted with this dilemma: do
"necessary expenses" forfeit their character as such from the mere
fact of their inclusion within an urban redevelopment project? The
court held that
the fact that a municipality constructs streets, lays water and
sewer lines, installs traffic controls and electric facilities within an
urban redevelopment area, will not change such construction and
installations front a necessary to an unnecessary expense of the
municipality.7 3
Conceivably, the court could have taken a much more restrictive
approach by holding that such improvements became absorbed in
the ultimate objective for which they were to be made and thus
should be regarded as any other expense incurred in putting into
effect an urban redevelopment plan.
The High Point project illustrates two important consequences
of the Horton decision. First, the process by which vital federal
funds can be obtained is greatly facilitated. The arrangement be-
tween the redevelopment commission and the federal government
provided that the latter would defray two-thirds of the net cost
of the project, with final payment being contingent upon the city's
providing one-third of such net cost, or making specific provision
therefor.74 Consequently, by making provision for a large portion
of the city's obligation to be discharged through "necessary ex-
pense" improvements, the city is able to present the federal govern-
[T]he expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by a municipality in putting
into effect an urban redevelopment plan, pursuant to the authority vested
in it by our Urban Redevelopment Law, are . . . not "necessary ex-
penses" within the purview of Article VII, section 7 [6 as amended],
of the North Carolina Constitution.
Id. at 611, 131 S.E.2d at 468.
" 262 N.C. at 319, 137 S.E.2d at 124 (1964).
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
' A written agreement was entered into, and the Government agreed to
provide two-thirds of the net cost of effecting the plan and it is provided
therein that the additional one-third of the net cost of effecting the plan
will be provided ed [sic] through local grants-in-aid. It is specifically
provided in the agreement that the Government will not make the final
payment on account of the Project Capital Grant until local Grants-in-aid
equalling one-third of the net project cost have been made or specific
provision therefor has been made.
Id. at 314, 137 S.E.2d at 121.
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ment with an incontestable financial plan, i.e., not open to the charge
that tax money will be expended without a vote.
Before any urban redevelopment project can be undertaken, the
redevelopment commission must prepare a complete and compre-
hensive plan.75 This plan must be submitted to and approved by the
governing body of the municipality wherein the project lies.70 One
of the vital requirements of such a plan is that it shall include a
"statement of the estimated cost and method of financing of ac-
quisition of the redevelopment area, and all other costs necessary
to prepare the area for redevelopment . . . . The court has held
that this requirement must be rigidly observed, even to the extent
that petitions for condemnation of property within the project area
must allege the existence of a valid financial plan.78 A city is now
assured of a valid method of financing its project insofar as its
obligations are to be in the form of grants-in-aid consisting of im-
provements, deemed "necessary expenses,"79 within the redevelop-
ment area. Likewise, the fact that such proposed expenditures have
not been submitted to a vote, and are to be effected from tax funds,
does not make the financial plan invalid.
The aforementioned consequences of Horton upon the immediate
concept of urban redevelopment are merely illustrative of the possi-
bilities inherent in the liberal rule. In the context of the court's
past attitude toward urban redevelopment, this decision could be
regarded as having a much broader significance. Although the
North Carolina Urban Redevelopment Law is of fairly recent
11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-463 (1964).
'N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160-463(g) (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-463(d)(7) (1964).
'S Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391
(1962).
The adoption of the plan is equivalent to a cease and desist order
preventing any development, rental, or sale of the property within the
area. In order that property owners may be protected against threatened
taking which is never consummated, the act wisely requires a showing
that the acquiring agency has a lawful plan by which, among other
things, it may lawfully finance the whole area. Each landowner has the
right to know that the taking agency has on hand the money to pay for
his property or, in lieu thereof, has present authority to obtain it.
Id. at 224, 128 S.E.2d at 394.
" For a summary of those municipal and county expenditures that have
been held by the court to be "necessary expenses," see Coates & Mitchell,
"Necessary Expenses," 18 N.C.L.Rv. 93 (1940). The decisions are sum-
marized and brought up to date in Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259
N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963).
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origin, and the decisions construing it relatively few,80 it cannot be
said that the court has taken a hostile attitude toward the idea; nor
can it be said that the court has tendered a hand of guidance. It
would seem that the Horton decision represents a more positive
approach to urban redevelopment in that a constitutional provision,
admitting of a strict construction, is liberally construed to allow a
wide lattitude in financing redevelopment projects.
In Horton, the interpretation of the "necessary expense" limi-
tation was confined to the area of urban redevelopment, and it re-
mains to be seen what application the rule will have outside of that
immediate area. If it is followed without discretion, it could become
a virulent means of circumventing article VII, section 6.81 Loosely
defined categories are not hard to find, and public projects are not
often divisible into one expenditure or even one "necessary expense."
There should be some point at which the court will look to the sub-
stance and not the label, thus preventing a direct evasion of the con-
stitutional limitation.
RONALD W. HOWELL
80Exclusive of the case considered in this comment, the North Carolina
Urban Redevelopment Law has been interpreted only three times. The
constitutionality of the law was first challenged in Redevelopment Comm'n
v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960). Here it
was held that the taking of land for urban redevelopment was a valid exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain for a public purpose, and not in con-
travention of article I, section 1. It was also held that the law did not
permit an unlawful delegation of legislative power to municipalities and
their redevelopment commissions. In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258
N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962), the court reaffirmed the principles set out
in Security Nat'l Bank, but held that the standards and requirements set
out in the urban redevelopment law must be strictly adhered to. The question
of whether urban redevelopment constituted a "necessary expense" was
expressly reserved for future decision. In Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n,
259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963), the court resolved the issue raised in
Hagins, by holding that urban redevelopment, although a valid public pur-
pose, did not constitute a "necessary expense." See note 72 supra.
"A simple example illustrates conceivable application of this rule.
Parks and playgrounds and other recreational facilities are not "necessary
expense" purposes. But if the situation is envisioned wherein a munici-
pality proposes to establish a park and recreational area consisting primarily
of streets, water fountains, rest room facilities, lighting, and police pro-
tection, such projects being "necessary expenses," then it would seem
inevitable that the city could finance such an area from tax funds without
submitting the proposal to a vote. This could be accomplished simply by
strategically allocating such improvements in such a manner that they
fall within the desired area.
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Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Decisions of the Comptroller
of the Currency
In First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. First Nat'l Bank of Eastern
North Carolina,1 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina was faced with the issue of the avail-
ability of judicial review of decisions of the Comptroller of the
Currency in passing on applications for the establishment of branch
banks under the provisions of the National Banking Act.2 Acting
under this statute, the Comptroller decided to approve the applica-
tion of defendant Bank of Eastern North Carolina for permission
to establish a branch bank in Smithfield, North Carolina, in which
city Bank of Smithfield was then engaged in banking operations.
Plaintiff Bank of Smithfield asked the court to enjoin the Comp-
troller from issuing a certificate of approval and to enjoin the de-
fendant bank from establishing and operating such branch, claim-
ing that the Comptroller had made the decision to approve the ap-
plication of Bank of Eastern North Carolina without providing
Bank of Smithfield with a hearing as it had requested., Bank of
Smithfield contended that this action of the Comptroller was within
the purview of the judicial review provisions of section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act4 and that denial of a hearing in this
action was violative of procedural due process and hence subject
'232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
' ,.v. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1958),
which provides in part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within
the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is sit-
uated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly
authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2)
at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks
by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically grant-
ing such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recog-
nition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law
of the State on State banks.
'232 F. Supp. at 727.
'60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958), which provides:
(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof .... (c) Every
agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be
subject to judicial review.
[Vol. 43
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to judicial correction under that act.5 The court reviewed the de-
cision as requested and held that the Comptroller must, in passing
on applications for permission to open branch banks, afford a hear-
ing to all interested parties.6
Under the opening sentence of section 10 of the act, judicial
review does not lie where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review
or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 7
Since the section of the National Banking Act under which the
Comptroller had acted in Bank of Smithfield is silent as to judicial
review,8 the court was concerned only with the second exception
to section 10-i.e., with agency discretion. The precise questions
presented to the court were: (1) Whether the actions of the Comp-
troller under the establishment of branch banks section of the Na-
tional Banking Act are committed by law to the discretion of the
Comptroller? (2) Whether, if they are so committed, the actions
of the Comptroller can be reviewed under section 10 at least to the
extent of assuring procedural due process? (3) Was the denial of a
hearing by the Comptroller violative of procedural due process?
'Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C
§ 1009(e) (1958), provides in part:
[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions .... It shall.., hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity; . . . [or] (4) without observance of procedure required by
law ....
'232 F. Supp. at 730-31.
7 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). These exceptions have
caused Professor Davis to comment: "Since these two reasons are the only
reasons why agency action could be unreviewable before the APA was
enacted, the law of reviewability remains unchanged." 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE. LAW TREATISE § 28.08, at 33 (1958). See also Luckenbach Steamship
Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D. Del. 1959). However, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly subscribed to the view expressed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), that the Administrative Procedure Act directs "that courts must now
assume more responsibility for the reasonableness [of] ... decisions than
some courts have shown in the past." Id. at 490. In Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 229 (1953), Mr. Justice Clark said for the majority of the Court:
"[T]he broadly remedial purposes of the Act counsel a judicial attitude of
hospitality towards the claim that § 10 greatly expanded the availability of
judicial review." Id. at 232.
'National Banking Act, REv. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12
U.S.C. 36(c) (1958), which says only that branch banks may be opened
with the "approval" of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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In the past, courts have been asked to review decisions of the
Comptroller for three general reasons: misinterpretation of law;'
misinterpretation of the facts of the particular case ;o and for abuse
of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness in the finding of fact.11
Although not always relying on the Administrative Procedure
Act for authority, courts have usually reviewed the Comptroller's
conclusions of law in proceedings under the establishment of branch
banks section of the National Banking Act. In Michigan Nat'l Bank
v. Gidney,'2 the court was asked to review a decision of the Comp-
troller interpreting an ambiguity in the Michigan Financial Insti-
tutions Act."3 Without referring to the "conclusiveness" of the
Comptroller's decision, the court sustained his decision, saying: "We
think .. . [the Comptroller's] action was based upon a proper con-
struction of applicable law."' 4 Although the court did not raise any
question as to its jurisdiction to review the interpretation of law
made by the Comptroller, it is evident that the court reached the
'merits of the issue in determining that the Comptroller had cor-
rectly interpreted the law.
The Comptroller's interpretation of the Michigan Financial
Institutions Act'5 as incorporated into the National Banking Act
and the Comptroller's interpretation of the language of the National
Banking Act itself were reviewed in National Bank v. Wayne Oak-
land Bank.' 6 In this case, the sixth circuit upheld a district court's
' Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank, 211 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
10 Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962).
"' Ibid.
2237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847 (1956).
1L Micn. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which provides: "[Any
bank may ... establish and operate a branch or branches within the limits
of the city ... in which said bank is located." Michigan Nat'l Bank arose
from the Comptroller's denying plaintiff bank's application for permission
to open a branch in a city in which plaintiff bank operated a branch but which
was not the city in which plaintiff maintained its main office. The Comp-
troller ruled that the statute contemplated the city in which the bank main-
tained its main office. Plaintiff asked the court to review this ruling.1,237 F.2d at 763.
" Micr. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which provides: "Any
bank having a capital of at least $50,000.00 may... [establish branch banks
provided that] no such branch bank shall be established in a city or village
in which a state or national bank or branch thereof is then in operation .... "
10252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958). In Wayne
Oakland Bank, the Comptroller notified a national bank of his approval of
their application to open a certain branch. Fourteen days later a state bank
opened a branch in the same town. The Comptroller and the national bank
contended that the national bank could still open its branch on the grounds
[Vol. 43
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declaratory judgment that it would be unlawful for defendant
national bank to open a certain branch, and upheld the district
court's restraining order directing the Comptroller not to issue a
certificate of approval to the defendant bank for the opening of the
branch. The court held that the "approval" contemplated by the
National Banking Act was a formal certificate and that, contrary
to the Comptroller's contention, a letter from the Office of the
Comptroller to the defendant national bank stating that its applica-
tion had been approved was insufficient "approval" as contemplated
by the statute.17 The court went on to say: "Whether the rights of
a party are infringed by unlawful action of an individual or by
exercise of unauthorized federal administrative power, it is entitled
to have such controversy adjudicated."'" This statement clearly
indicates that the courts will review an interpretation of law made
by the Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks section
of the National Banking Act.
A district court, in Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank,-' re-
viewed the Comptroller's interpretation of a New Jersey banking
statute" as incorporated by reference into the National Banking Act
by saying: "We agree with defendant that the courts may not re-
view discretionary action of the Comptroller. . . . However, it is
not true that he may act contrary to the law as the complaints in the
that approval by letter is sufficient "approval" as contemplated by the Na-
tional Banking Act, and hence the national bank was "established" as con-
templated by the Michigan statute before the state branch was in "opera-
tion." The state bank asked the court to prevent the issuance of the certifi-
cate of "approval" and the opening of the branch.1 7 Id. at 543.
18Id. at 544.
211 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
'0 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:19A-19 (1963), which provides:
B. No bank or savings bank shall establish or maintain a branch office
which is located outside the municipality in which it maintains its princi-
pal office; except that a bank or savings bank may establish and maintain
a branch office or offices anywhere in the same county as that in which
it maintains its principal office . . . (3) when each proposed branch will
be established in a municipality in which no banking institution has its
principal office or a branch office.
In Suburban Trust Co., the Comptroller approved the application of a na-
tional bank for permission to open a branch in Mountainside, N.J., and the
national bank had opened its branch pursuant to the approval. A state bank
which had an earlier approval for a branch in Mountainside but which
had not then opened the branch, asked the court to review the Comptroller's
interpretation of the statutory phrase, "has its principal office or branch
office."
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cases at bar assert, and not have such action reviewable by the
courts."
2 1
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the courts will review
conclusions of law made by the Comptroller acting under the estab-
lishment of branch banks section of the National Banking Act. 2
Faced with a request to review a question of mixed law and fact,23
the district court in Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney24 held that
it was without jurisdiction to order the Comptroller to produce
documents on which his decision was based.25 When requested by
plaintiff, the Comptroller had refused to produce these documents.
The district court based its holding on the view that action by the
Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks section of the
National Banking Act was "by law committed to agency discre-
tion" and therefore within the second exception to the judicial re-
view section of the Administrative Procedure Act, which, in the
opinion of this court, precludes review even for abuse of discretion.20
On appeal,27 the sixth circuit, which had decided Wayne Oakland
Bank, affirmed the decision of the district court, but found that the
district court had modified its holding to the extent of ruling that
decisions of the Comptroller under the establishment of branch
banks section were reviewable as to whether the Comptroller's de-
cision " 'was arbitrary or capricious.' ",2' This modification, said the
court of appeals, 9 was made by the district court in ruling on motions
other than that ruled on in the reported opinion."0 The court of ap-
21211 F. Supp. at 699.
22 ational Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 237 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 847 (1956); Suburban Trust Co. v.
National Bank, 211 F.Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1962).
3Defendant national bank's application for permission to establish a
branch bank in an unincorporated but populous area was approved by the
Comptroller on the basis of his determination that the area was a "village"
as contemplated by MicHr. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 23.762 (1957), which pro-
vides in part: "Any bank .. .may ... establish and operate a branch or
branches within a village or city other than that in which it was originally
chartered . . . ." Plaintiff national bank asked the court to review the
Comptroller's determination that the area was a "village."
2"192 F.Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).2
r Id. at 519.
26 Ibid.
2' Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962).
28 Id. at 225.
20 Ibid.
so The modification was not in the opinion as reported in Community
Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F.Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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peals then held that the issue in controversy" was essentially a
question of fact 32 and that the Comptroller's findings of fact "are
conclusive if reasonably supported by substantial evidence. ' 3 The
court of appeals went on to confirm the district court's modified
opinion that, even under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
courts can review determinations of fact made by the Comptroller
under the establishment of branch banks section of the National
Banking Act only to the extent of determining if the decisions are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 31
A comparison of the district court opinion in Community Nat'l
Bank with the opinion of the court of appeals raises another and
perhaps the most important question involving the availability of
review under the Administrative Procedure Act: to what extent will
the courts limit the discretion of the Comptroller in order to assure
due process? There is an inconsistency between the decisions of
the district and circuit courts in Community Nat'l Bank in that the
circuit court seemed unaware of the full implication of the district
court's denial of plaintiff's motion for production of documents.3 5
This denial rested only on the district court's initial view that a de-
cision of the Comptroller under the establishment of branch banks
section was unreviewable even for abuse of discretion.3 6 The district
court, however, stated that if review had been available, "it would be
anomalous to permit a plaintiff to attack the discretionary act of
the Comptroller because of alleged abuse of discretion and arbi-
trariness and at the same time prevent such plaintiff from discover-
ing the basis for the Comptroller's action." 37 Although the circuit
court stated that the district court's initial view to the effect that
review of the Comptroller's decision was unavailable even for abuse
of discretion was later modified by the district court, and although
the circuit court itself held that acts of the Comptroller alleged to
be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion were reviewable,
" The issue, whether a certain unincorporated area was a village within
the meaning of a state statute, is discussed in note 23 supra.
Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 226 (6th Cir. 1962).
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
" Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514, 519 (E.D. Mich.
1961).
Ibid.
"Ibid. The court continued: "The court is therefore, of the opinion that
a limited production of the documents in issue would not be barred . . . if
the issue of abuse of discretion were properly before the court." Ibid.
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it did not discuss the production of documents. Apparently the mo-
tion to produce was not reconsidered, causing the very thing the
district court had said would be anomalous-i.e., allowing review
for alleged abuse of discretion in the making of a decision and at the
same time preventing the plaintiff from seeing the documents on
which the decision was based. Apparently, the circuit court in Com-
munity Nat'l Bank held that the Comptroller's decision was not
aribtrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, but did not concern
itself with the procedure through which the decision was reached.
Prior to the decision in Bank of Smithfield, courts had held
that interpretations of law made by the Comptroller under au-
thority of the establishment of branch banks section were reviewable
and that the Comptroller's findings of fact were reviewable if al-
leged to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. How-
ever, until the decision in Bank of Smithfield, the courts had not
reviewed the procedures used by the Comptroller in reaching his
decisions. Thus, the extension made by Bank of Smithfield was not
of the availability of review to be afforded parties adversely affected
by decisions of the Comptroller, but rather was an extension of the
scope of this review to the extent that the Comptroller must "pre-
serve the fundamental fairness characteristic of our system" 8 in
the procedure followed by him in reaching his decisions. In Bank
of Smithfield, the court held that even if the Comptroller's decision
was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court
would enjoin the issuance of a certificate of "approval" and enjoin
the opening of the branch until the "approval" was based on a de-
liberative process in which all parties would be afforded procedural
due process of law. 9 In the words of the court:
[A] dministrative procedure.., must conform to the requirements
of procedural due process of law which requires at least a hearing
after notice and that the findings are supported by substantial
evidence and that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.40
With this statement in mind, the court declared:
Any provisions of the National Banking Act that would deny
procedural due process would raise a serious constitutional ques-
tion. . . . Since an act should be construed as to preserve its
" 232 F.Supp. at 730.
30 Id. at 729.
'Old. at 730.
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constitutionality, it becomes imperative ... to hold that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act is applicable to the Comptroller of
the Currency in proceedings under § 36 of the National Banking
Act.41
As the court expressed it, the Administrative Procedure Act "is suffi-
ciently elastic to provide procedural due process in the administra-
tion of the National Banking Act."4 By this ruling, the court in
Bank of Smithfield adopted the doctrine that the Administrative
Procedure Act has remedial purposes which "greatly expanded the
availability of judicial review,"" and implicitly rejected the view
suggested by Professor Davis4 4 and judicially expressed in Lucken-
bach S.S. Co. v. United States45 that the Administrative Procedure
Act made no change in the availability of judicial review of admin-
istrative decisions. In answer to the Comptroller's contention that
the requirement of a hearing in proceedings under the establishment
of branch banks section " 'would place an impossible administrative
burden on the Comptroller's office as it is now constituted,' "46 the
court said that
any administrative burden incident to due process cannot be
deemed sufficient grounds to deprive parties of constitutional
rights. The Administrative Procedure Act provides a solution.
Section 11 of the Act authorizes the appointment of as many ex-
aminers as may be necessary for proceedings incident to the
hearings and initial decisions. 47
The decision in Bank of Smithfield reduces the importance of
the question of whether action by the Comptroller is "by law com-
mitted to agency discretion" in that the court said: "If the use of
the word 'approval' is deemed to commit agency action to agency
discretion within the meaning of the second exception to § 10,
nevertheless it must be a sound discretion exercised in a manner
that is not violative of procedural due process. '48 With these words,
the court has said that it will not only review decisions reached by
Comptroller under the branch banks section of the National Bank-
'Id. at 731.
"Ibid.
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
"4 DAvis, ADMINISATIVW LAW TRATisE § 28.08, at 33 (1958).
"179 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D. Del. 1959).
"232 F. Supp. at 731.
"Ibid.
"8232 F. Supp. at 729-30.
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ing Act to assure that the decisions are not illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion, but has gone further to say
that it will assure that the process through which these decisions
are formulated affords all parties procedural due process of law.
The extension of the scope of review made by Bank of Smithfield
seems desirable in that conformance to procedural due process, in-
cluding notice, hearing, and an opportunity for all parties to intro-
duce and examine evidence, is necessary to formulate a complete
record of the Comptroller's deliberations; and a complete record is
the only adequate basis on which a court can subsequently review
the decisions for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of dis-
cretion. By using the Administrative Procedure Act as authority
for granting this new remedy to those deprived of procedural due
process in proceedings of the Comptroller, the court seems to be
applying the act in the spirit in which the United States Supreme
Court has said it should be applied.4"
RALPH JACOBS
Constitutional Law-Dismissal of Jury after judge Coerces Guilty
Plea Constitutes Reversible Error-Retrial thereafter Is
Not Double jeopardy
Tateo was brought to trial before a jury in a federal court on
four counts of bank robbery and one of kidnaping. On the fourth
day of the trial, the judge informed Tateo's counsel that if Tateo
insisted on continuing with the trial through the jury verdict and
was convicted, sentencing would be arranged so that Tateo would be
imprisoned for the rest of his life.1 Tateo was notified of these
statements and warned by his counsel that the probability of con-
viction was high. Accordingly, he changed his plea to guilty. The
plea was accepted, and the jury dismissed. The judge then sentenced
Tateo to twenty-two years and six months in prison.2
" See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
1 Tateo's attorney later testified, unchallenged by the Government, that
the trial judge had stated: "I think I ought to tell you this. If you finish the
trial and your clients are found guilty, I'm going to start off by imposing
a life sentence on the kidnapping charge and then I'm going to add con-
secutive maximum sentences on the other counts on which they are found
guilty." United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). At
this later hearing, Tateo testified that he was unaware that the judge was un-
able to impose consecutive sentences. Ibid.
'At the time the sentence was imposed the prosecution agreed to de-
fendant's motion of dismissal of the kidnaping count. Id. at 562.
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Seven years later Tateo made a motion before another judge
asking that the judgment of conviction be vacated. The judgment
of conviction was set aside, and a new trial was granted3 on the
grounds that his guilty plea had not been freely rendered. At the
new trial, a third judge found that Tateo's only consent to the
dismissal of the jury by the original trial judge had been in the
form of a coerced plea. No "exceptional circumstances" such as
would permit a retrial were found to have motivated the jury release.
Therefore, all counts against Tateo were dismissed.4 The Govern-
ment appealed,' and in United States v. Tateo,8 the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court held that the dismissal of the jury before ver-
dict after coercion of a guilty plea constituted error and that retrial
of the defendant under such circumstances did not amount to double
jeopardy.
The concept of former, or double, jeopardy was recognized in
the common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict,7
which were, said Blackstone, "grounded on this universal maxim
of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence."' These
'Ibid. At this hearing the judge said:
No matter how heinous the offense charged, how overwhelming the
proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless the defense, a defendant's
right to continue with his trial may not be violated. His constitutional
right to require the Government to proceed to a conclusion of the trial
and to establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exercised
under the shadow of a penalty.
Id. at 567.
' United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 63 COLUm.
L. Rnv. 1329, 16 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958) provides:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from
the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all
criminal cases in the following instances:
.... From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when
the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
The Government may not appeal a jury verdict of acquittal. Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). A defendant may appeal a verdict of
guilty, and if the conviction is set aside, the defendant may be tried again
for the same offense. At the new trial the defendant takes the chance of
receiving a more severe penalty. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
However, a charge more serious than the previous conviction cannot be
brought. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
8377 U.S. 463 (1964).
74 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36. See generally Sigler, A History
of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283 (1963); Kirk, "Jeopardy"
During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602 (1934).
84 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
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pleas did not lie unless the defendant had been either convicted or
acquitted by a jury, and they were usually available only in capital
felony cases.' However, a defendant who had once been before a
jury always had one of these pleas available because the juries at
early common law were never discharged until a verdict was ren-
dered.' ° By Blackstone's day, however, it was recognized that a
jury could be released before it had reached a verdict and that the
defendant could be retried again if the jury dismissal was for
reasons of "evident necessity.""
The common law concept of double jeopardy was carried over
and embodied in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which
provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . -"' Jeopardy is held to
See id. at *335-36.
10 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTES *110: "To fpeak it here once for all, if any
person be indicted of treafon, or of felony, or larceny, and plead not guilty,
and thereupon a jury is retorned, and fworn, their verdict must be heard,
and they cannot be difcharged ....
" 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *360.
"
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. All state constitutions have provisions against
double jeopardy except those of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Vermont. In the states without a constitutional pro-
vision, the plea of double jeopardy is part of the common law. See ALI,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW § 6, comment (Proposed Final
Draft 1935). For a complete list of the state constitutional provisions, see
ibid.
It is imperative to note the distinction between the double jeopardy
protection provided in federal proceedings and that provided in state pro-
ceedings. Compare Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), where
retrial after a mistrial had been declared because of the unpreparedness of
the prosecution was held improper under the fifth amendment, with Brock
v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), where retrial after a mistrial had
been declared because of the unpreparedness of the prosecution was held
proper under the fourteenth amendment. Compare Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957), where the defendant's conviction of first degree
murder following his successful appeal from a conviction of second degree
murder was held to violate the fifth amendment, with Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937), where defendant's conviction of first degree murder
following the state's successful appeal from a conviction of second degree
murder was held proper under the fourteenth amendment.
State courts sometimes apply stricter standards of double jeopardy than
do federal courts. Compare Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), where
the Court held that the fifth amendment provided no protection against a
more severe sentence on retrial after a successful appeal from a former
conviction, with People v. Henderson, 29 Cal. 2d 297, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1963), where the court held that a defendant who had his prior
sentence of life imprisonment overturned on appeal could not be sentenced
to death for the same offense on retrial.
[Vol. 43
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attach when the jury is impaneled and sworn13 or, in a nonjury trial,
when the court commences to take evidence.14 The question of the
effect of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy on
retrial after the dismissal of a jury that has been impaneled and
sworn was first considered by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Perez.5 There, a judge discharged a jury because the jurors were
unable to agree on a verdict. The Court held that a jury dismissal
before verdict in this "hung jury" situation did not bar retrial.
Perez formulated the standard that a defendant's criminal trial
may be validly terminated short of a verdict, rendering retrial not
violative of the double jeopardy clause, where "'there is a manifest.
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise
be defeated."'6
Most of the cases involving jury dismissals before verdict since
Perez have been held to fall within one or the other of these ex-
ceptions to the retrial prohibition. Termination of the trial before
verdict has been held justified where the judge released the jury
because of an improper line of questions pursued by the prosecution
after warnings by the judge,'1 the illness of the judge,' the trial
'"E.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States
v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1931).
"E.g., Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916); McCarthy v.
Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936). The
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides
that jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn.
822 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
"Id. at 580. (Emphasis added.) Most of the states agreed that a
defendant's criminal trial may be terminated short of a verdict where there
is a "manifest necessity" or in the interests of "public justice." E.g., Baker
v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 165, 132 S.W.2d 766 (1939); State v. Tyson,
138 N.C. 627, 50 S.E. 456 (1905). North Carolina, which derives its
double jeopardy protection from the common law, classifies the types of
necessity warranting discharge of a jury into "physical necessity" and
"necessity of doing justice." "Physical necessity" has been defined as "physi-
cal and absolute," such as a juror's illness or insanity of the defendant
during the trial. State v. Wiseman, 68 N.C. 203, 205 (1873). "Necessity
of doing justice" has been defined as a duty of the court "to guard the
administration of justice from fraudulent practices; as in the case of tamper-
ing with the jury, or keeping back the witnesses on the part of the prosecu-
tion, by the prisoner." Id. at 205-06. Accord, State v. Crocker, 239 N.C.
446, 450, 80 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1954), 32 N.C.L. REv. 526. See generally 31
N.C.L. REv. 313 (1953).
'
7 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 730.
"Freeman v. United States, 237 Fed. 815 (2d Cir. 1916).
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judge's belief that his own remarks had been prejudicial,19 the ap-
parent insanity of a juror,2" the illness of a juror,21 a hung jury,2
the disqualification of a juror,23 a prejudiced juror,24 an erroneous
admission by counsel of the defendant and his subsequent with-
drawal from the case,25 the consent of the defendant 20 a military
movement during time of war,2 7 or prejudicial articles in news-
papers.28 Thus, where the judge discharges the jury to protect the
interests of the defendant or under circumstances where the con-
tinuation of the trial would be likely to result in an unfair trial,
the jury release has been held proper.
On the other hand, dismissal of a jury has been held improper,
and a retrial has been barred where the jury dismissal is for reasons
other than to safeguard the interests of the defendant or the cir-
cumstances did not justify the conclusion that a continuation of
the trial would likely result in unfairness. Thus, discretionary
termination of a trial by a judge before a jury verdict has been
rendered has been held improper where the prosecution was unable
to continue because of the absence of its witnesses,20 the prosecutor
entered a zolle prosequi because his evidence appeared insufficient,3 0
"United States v. Giles, 19 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Okla. 1937).
"°Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 831 (1951).
"'United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
584 (1941).
" E.g., Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) ; Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579
(1824).
"E.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (member of
the grand jury).
"E.g., Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (letter written
by defendant's counsel could have influenced a juror); United States v.
Cimino, 224 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (juror stated he had
an opinion prejudicial to the accused).
2r Scott v. United States, 202 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952).
" Blair v. White, 24 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1928).
"
7 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
2' United States v. Montgomery, 42 F.2d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
2 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Cornero v. United
States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas.
499 (No. 16,651) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868). But see United States v. Coolidge,
25 Fed. Cas. 622 (No. 14,858) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), upholding retrial where
a mistrial was declared when a witnesses refused to testify on religious
grounds.
o Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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or the judge was under an erroneous belief that the defense counsel
had engaged in misconduct.3 1
The Perez standard applies only to termination-before-verdict
cases and has no application to cases of final judgment. If final
judgment has been rendered there can be no retrial, except where
the defendant's conviction has been reversed on appeal, for he is then
deemed to have waived his right not to be tried twice.2
A problem in Tateo is whether the case should be considered as a
termination-before-verdict case or as a case of final judgment. If
the guilty plea of the defendant is considered a conviction, then Tateo
can be viewed as a judgment case. At least one writer is of the
opinion that Tateo might be a case of final judgment because the
jury was discharged without the judge exercising his discretion.3
However, a consideration of Tateo as a judgment case disregards
the overbearing role played by the judge. It was the judge who
compelled the defendant to plead guilty. It was this same judge who
accepted the guilty plea. Thus, it is difficult to understand how the
actions of the judge-the prime mover in the events leading to the
dismissal of the jury-were not discretionary, thereby making Tateo
a mistrial case.
If Tateo is a case which can be classified as a mistrial, it would
still be necessary to appraise the circumstances under the Perez stan-
"'United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
" See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The majority in
Tateo equated the improprieties at the trial level to cases involving reversal
due to error. See also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1959)
(conviction overthrown due to erroneous instructions concerning the statute
of limitations); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) (conviction
overthrown on grounds of insufficient evidence); United States v. Stroud,
251 U.S. 15 (1919) (conviction overthrown due to confession of error by
Solicitor General). A second theory justifying retrial of a defendant after
he is successful in an appeal from a conviction is that the first trial is a
nullity. See Flynn v. United States, 217 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 930 (1955). A third theory, advocated by Mr. justice
Holmes but never accepted by the Supreme Court, is that the originaljeopardy extends to the appeal and the new trial. See Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1903) (dissenting opinion). See also Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962), where an erroneous directed verdict
was held to bar retrial, not because the trial was improperly terminated
before verdict, but because the case was considered one of final judgment.
" 16 STAiN. L. REv. 713, 718 (1964); accord, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1329,
1333-34 (1963). Both of these notes were written on the district court
opinion, which held that retrial was barred because the jury was improperly
discharged before verdict. United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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dard to determine whether the jury release was proper. The latest
decision applying the Perez standard, Downum v. United States,84
held that a jury dismissal due to unpreparedness of the prosecution
was improper and a bar to retrial because it did not fall within
the Perez exceptions. In Tateo, the Court was divided on the sig-
nificance of Downum. The majority distinguished jury discharges
due to prosecutorial negligence and jury discharges after coercion
of the defendant by the trial judge. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented
and stated that the majority unjustifiably limited Downm to its
particular facts. He was of the opinion that coercion by the trial
judge is an even more severe abuse of a defendant's rights than is
prosecutorial negligence.35 The majority, however, found support
for its decision to allow retrial on the questionable assumption that
granting Tateo immunity from retrial because a trial judge coerced
his guilty plea would necessarily result in similar immunity after all
trial reversals due to error.8 6
It is submitted that Tateo should be considered a mistrial case-
i.e., one where the judge improperly chose to exercise his discretion
and terminate the trial before the jury reached a verdict. The judge
himself coerced the plea that resulted in dismissal of the jury. Such
a termination before verdict is not within "manifest necessity" or
in the interests of "public justice," the only circumstances justifying
retrial under the Perez rule.
RAYMOND W. RUSSELL
Constitutional Law-jury Selection-Defendant Not a Member of
the Excluded Class
In Allen v. State,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals was faced with
the question of whether the constitutional rights of a white de-
fendant were violated by the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
-"372 U.S. 734 (1963).
" "If anything, Tateo's deprivation is more serious. The purpose of the
judicial coercion in his case was to deny him the right to have the impaneled
jury decide his fate, whereas this was merely the effect of prosecutorial
negligence in Downum." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 473 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 466. In England, unlike the United States, reversal due to
error means that the defendant goes free. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 § 4.
See generally KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND (1963).
'137 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964).
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the jury that indicted and convicted him. Defendant, a member of
the white race, was engaged in voter registration among Negroes.
He was indicted and brought to trial on a charge of assault with
intent to murder a police officer. Defendant entered a plea of not
guilty and followed this with a motion' to quash the indictment of
the grand jury. He also challenged the array of traverse jurors for
that term of court.' The motion and the challenge were made on the
ground that the systematic, arbitrary, and deliberate exclusion of
members of the Negro race from both the grand and traverse juries
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the four-
teenth amendment.4 The trial court overruled both the motion and
the challenge, and defendant was convicted.
On appeal,5 the court reversed and held that equal protection
and due process of law require that a defendant be indicted and con-
victed by a jury from which no class is systematically excluded.
The court said that when an accused is tried by a jury, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees him, re-
gardless of his race, a jury that is "impartially drawn from a cross-
section of the community."' Furthermore, the court said that due
process is denied when the procedures meant to insure trial by a
2 The motion alleged that of the population twenty-one years of age and
over residing in the county, 46.42% was Negro, and that of the listed tax-
payers, from whom the jury list was drawn, 27% were Negroes. The tax
returns, from which the tax list was composed, were segregated on the basis
of race and filed in separate volumes, with the tax returns of all Negroes
being on yellow sheets marked "colored" and the tax returns of Caucasians
on white sheets designated "white"; and that the tax digest from which
prospective jurors were selected was segregated, with the two races being
grouped on separate sheets headed by a racial designation. The defendant
further alleged that no Negro had been selected from the tax digest by jury
commissioners for over forty years and that no Negro had been called to
serve on either the grand or the traverse jury. 137 S.E.2d at 712.
'The procedural steps to be taken by a defendant in protecting his con-
stitutional rights with respect to jury formation often require meticulous
attention to detail. For a detailed analysis of the problems involved and the
proper procedure for raising the constitutional issues, see Jefferson, Race
Discrinination in Jury Service, 19 B.U.L. REv. 413, 432-47 (1939). See
also 33 N.C.L. Rtv. 262, 265-66 (1955).
'U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides that no state "shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
' Under Georgia law the state cannot appeal an adverse judgment in a
criminal action except in contempt cases. Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734,
740-47, 58 S.E.2d 534, 538-42 (1950). Therefore the decision of the Court
of Appeals was final as to the question which was before it in Allen.8 137 S.E.2d at 715.
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fair and impartial jury are not used, i.e., when the jury is not
selected in accordance with the constitutionally valid laws of the
state.7
It is settled constitutional law that the systematic exclusion of
Negroes from a state court jury before which a Negro is tried
violates either the equal protection' or due process clauses.0 This
rule of law has been extended to protect any member of any class
that has been systematically excluded from jury service.10 However,
7Id. at 717.
'E.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (per curiam);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948); Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Carter
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1948); 26 N.C.L. REV.
185 (1948). The intentional inclusion of Negroes on a Negro defendant's
jury is also grounds for finding a denial of equal protection. Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950) (dictum); Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEnlc 3169 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1964). In
Collins the jury commissioners deliberately included Negroes on the jury
list from which the jury panel that indicted the Negro defendant was
chosen. The defendant instituted a habeas corpus proceeding; in reversing
the indictment and conviction, the court of appeals said that a "Negro is
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, no less and no more. He stands
equal before the law, and is viewed by the law as a person, not as a Negro."
329 F.2d at 105.
'E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Although the
verbal vehicle used in cases on exclusion in jury selection is equal protection,
the technique is that invoked in cases formally based on due process. The
reason a Negro defendant is allowed to invoke the due process clause is that
a jury from which Negroes have been excluded will not give him a fair
trial. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-02 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
The equal protection foundation for reversing such convictions is that a
white defendant would get better treatment from an all-white jury than
would a Negro. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947). See Bittker,
The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experience in Race Relations,
71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1406-07 (1962); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control
Over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IowA L. Rv. 577, 584 (1949).
o Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), is the most significant case
pointing out that the equal protection clause is not limited in application to
members of the white and Negro race but extends to any class against whom
community prejudice exists. The Supreme Court therein stated that "com-
munity prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences
from the community norm may define other groups which need the same pro-
tection .... The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against dis-
crimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that is, based upon differences be-
tween 'white' and Negro." Id. at 478. Accord, United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 170 Fed. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1909) (court upheld challenge to a jury
comprised primarily of farmers); Commonwealth v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452
(E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Kentucky v. Powers, 201
U.S. 1 (1906) (discrimination against political groups); Searle v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909), and Juarez v. State,
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
a defendant is not entitled to demand that members of his race or
class be placed upon the jury before which he is tried," nor is he
entitled to demand any type of proportional representation of his
class on the jury.'" Rather, the fourteenth amendment requires that
an accused be indicted and tried "by a jury from which all members
of his class are not systematically excluded-juries selected from
among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or de-
scent."'" In order to have an indictment quashed or a petit jury
discharged on grounds of discrimination in selecting jurors, the de-
fendant must show that members of his class were excluded because
they belonged to that particular class, rather than because they
failed to qualify under state or federal law.' 4 However, a prima
facie case of discrimination against a race or class by the officers
in charge of jury selection is made out when there is (1) proof of
the exclusion of a racial group for a number of years, 5 or (2) an
undenied affidavit alleging discriminatory practices by jury of-
ficials,' 6 or (3) a failure to follow a procedure or a "course of con-
duct" that would prevent discrimination on the basis of race or
102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (discrimination against religious
groups).1 Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880).12Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278
(1909).18 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954).
"Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) ; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1(1944); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Tarrance v. Florida, 188
U.S. 519 (1903).
1 In Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), the Supreme Court
declared, in a unanimous opinion, that "when a jury selection plan, whatever
it is, operates in such way as always to result in the complete and long-
continued exclusion of any representative at all from a large group of
Negroes, or any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against
them by juries thus selected cannot stand." Id. at 469. Complainant had
shown that no Negro served on the grand jury for thirty years. Accord,
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) (in twenty-four years one
Negro served on grand jury); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958)
(only one as long as the clerk of court could remember); Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400 (1942) (none in sixteen years); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940) (five in seven years); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)
(none for a long number of years); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)
(none for at least ten years). Discrimination may also be established by
the admission of officials of intentional exclusions of a racial group. E.g.,
Eastling v. State, 69 Ark. 189, 62 S.W. 584 (1901); Washington v. State,
95 Fla. 289, 116 So. 470 (1928).
10 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938).
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class.' When the defendant is a member of the excluded class, he
is presumed to have been prejudiced by the exclusion," and a trial
under such conditions therefore constitutes a denial of equal pro-
tection or due process. But when the defendant is not a member of
the excluded class, it is uncertain as to whether he may successfully
challenge such discrimination in jury selection. State courts, other
than that in Allen, have been unanimous in holding that no consti-
tutional right of the defendant is violated in such an instance."
While the Supreme Court has never entertained the question, the
actions2" and language2" of the Court have indicated that the de-
" In Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953), evidence disclosed that white
and yellow tickets were used by the jury commissioners in drawing a jury
list. Only the names of white persons were on the white tickets, and only
the names of Negroes were on the yellow tickets. This, combined with the
fact that no Negro had been selected for jury service, was held to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. Accord, State v. Speller, 229 N.C. 67,
47 S.E.2d 537 (1948).
"
8E.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306
U.S. 354 (1939).
19 Alexander v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 460, 274 S.W.2d 81 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954), illustrates the position of state courts. De-
fendant, a white man, attacked his indictment, alleging systematic exclusion
of Negroes from the grand jury. The court refused to entertain defendant's
objection to exclusion of Negroes from the jury since he was not a member
of the excluded race. In Commonwealth v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22 (1880), the
Kentucky court, in affirming a white defendant's conviction, said that "it
cannot be true that one belonging to the race not excluded, but from which
the whole jury was required to be selected, can have been prejudiced by the
fact that another race was excluded." Id. at 24. Accord, Griffen v. State,
183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E. 2 (1937); State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So. 2d 169
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956); State v. Dierlamm, 189 La.
544, 180 So. 135 (1938) ; Petition of Salen, 231 Wis. 489, 286 N.W. 5 (1939).
Cf., State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 AUt. 553 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921);
State v. Trantham, 230 N.C. 641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949); State v. Sims, 213
N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938); Commonwealth v. Garletts, 81 Pa. Super. 271(1923). The Arkansas Supreme Court in Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 912,
159 S.W.2d 733, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 648 (1942), upheld the conviction of a
Negro defendant by an all-Negro jury. The defendant sought to overturn
the conviction on the ground of systematic exclusion of members of the
white race from the jury which convicted him. The court said that appellant
had no more right to complain than a white man would have for being con-
victed by an all-white jury, and that if there was any discrimination, it was
in appellant's favor.
"9 Compare State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 43 S.E.2d 77, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 768 (1947), with Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948)
(per curiam), which were companion cases and alike in every respect ex-
cept that Koritz was a member of the white race and Brunson a Negro.
Both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was granted
only in the case of Brunson and his conviction was reversed because of the
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury. The same jury tried and
convicted both men, and both had appealed on the grounds of systematic
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fendant in a state court must be a member of the excluded class in
order to object to the systematic exclusion of a class from jury
service.
In departing from the majority view and holding that equal
protection is denied when the jury panel is- not chosen from a
cross-section of the community, the Georgia court looked to Supreme
Court decisions dealing with federal proceedings. The position taken
by the court in Allen is best set forth in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,"
which arose out of a civil suit in a federal court and in which the
Supreme Court held that systematic exclusion of daily wage earners
was reason for striking the jury panel even though the petitioner
was not a member of that class. In Thiel, the Court said that the
American system of trial by jury contemplated "an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community. '23 The Court made
it clear that this did not mean that every jury should be representa-
tive of every class found in the community, but rather that juries
should be selected without systematic and intentional exclusion of
any class.24 The Georgia court also relied upon Supreme Court de-
cisions more directly on point, in which the convictions of male
defendants were reversed because of the exclusion of women from
the juries that indicted or convicted them. In these decisions, the
exclusion of Negroes. The Court has denied certiorari when defendant
was not a member of the excluded race in a number of instances. The cases
are collected in note 19 supra.
11In Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955), the Court said that the
"indictment of a defendant by a grand jury from which members of his
race have been systematically excluded is a denial of his rights to equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id. at 87. (Emphasis added.) In Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935), the Court said that excluding Negroes from serv-
ing as grand jurors in criminal proceedings against Negroes denies equal
protection to the Negro defendants. The Court, in Martin v. Texas, 200
U.S. 316 (1906), said that, "what an accused is entitled to demand, under
the Constitution of the United States, is that in organizing the grand jury
as well as in the empaneling of the petit jury, there shall be no exclusion of
his race ... because of race or color." Id. at 321. (Emphasis added.)
- 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
Id. at 220.
"Ibid.
"The court also cited Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Roemig, 52
F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Iowa 1943). In Glasser, the Court said that "democracy
itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the com-
munity,' and not the organ of any specific group or class." 315 U.S. at 86.
The court relied heavily upon Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), a
case appealed from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The conviction
of appellant, a Negro, was reversed by the Supreme Court on evidence that
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Court again emphasized that the jury panel should be truly repre-
sentative of the community. The attitude of the Supreme Court in
federal proceedings is best reflected by the following statement of
Mr. Justice Douglas in Ballard v. United States:
20
The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group
in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury
selection. The systematic and intentional exclusion of... a racial
group, ... deprives the jury system of the broad base it was de-
signed by Congress to have in our democratic society.27
However, the fact that these decisions arose out of federal pro-
ceedings detracts from their value as precedent because the Court
exercises a supervisory power over federal proceedings not ap-
plicable to the states.2" Under this supervisory power, a standard
of impartiality even more stringent than that required to date under
the sixth amendment29 is imposed upon federal jury selection
methods.30 Thus, the Court's disapproval of a particular procedure
there had been discrimination against Negroes in the selection of the grandjury that indicted him. In this case the Court first spoke in terms of a
jury being "truly representative of the community." Id. at 130. The sig-
nificance of Snith is that the Court seized upon this dicta in later cases, and
made of it a standard for federal jury selection to which standard the state
courts have not been held.
2 329 U.S. 187 (1946).27 Id. at 195.
28 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), where it was said:
[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought here from
the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional
validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason ....
Id. at 340. For an illustration of the effect of supervisory powers on state
and federal proceedings, compare Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310(1959), with Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See generally Note,
76 HARv. L. Rzv. 1656 (1963). For an exhaustive compilation of cases and
source materials relating to jury selection in federal and state judicial pro-
ceedings, see VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION 147-205 (1949).
"0 The sixth amendment guarantees that in all federal prosecutions the
accused "shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S.
CoNST. amend. VI.
"0 See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948), where the Court
found no denial of trial by an "impartial jury" in violation of the sixth
amendment when defendant was convicted of violating a federal statute by a
jury composed primarily of federal employees. Four justices dissented,
saying the Court should exercise its supervisory power over lower federal
courts and reverse the conviction. Id. at 514.
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in the federal courts does not mean such a procedure is unconsti-
tutional if practiced in the state courts.31
Although the Georgia court recognized that its authority con-
sisted of decisions dealing with federal proceedings, it deemed the
principles enunciated in those cases applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.32 However, the court did not discuss
more recent decisions by the Supreme Court rejecting the extension
of these principles to the states. Only one year after the Thiel de-
cision, the Court, in Fay v. New York,3 3 upheld a state statute which
provided for special "blue ribbon" juries.34 The petitioner in Fay
alleged that there had been systematic exclusion of women and wage
earners from the jury which convicted him and argued that the
principle of Thiel was applicable through the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 5 The Court rejected the argument and stated that prejudice
was not to be presumed merely because the jury was not represen-
tative of the community." Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the
Court, said that those decisions requiring a jury to be representative
of the community were not
constrained by any duty of deference to the authority of the State
over local administration of justice. They dealt only with juries in
federal courts. Over federal proceedings we may exert a super-
visory power with greater freedom to reflect our notions of good
policy than we may constitutionally exert over proceedings in
state courts .... 37
A year later the Court re-enforced Fay by again upholding the con-
stitutionality of a "blue ribbon" jury even in the face of allegations
" Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
32 137 S.E.2d at 715.
" 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
' A "blue ribbon" jury represents attempts to obtain jurors more highly
qualified than ordinary jurors-those of high business standing and broad
educational standing-while a special jury suggests those selected with a view
to obtaining expert qualifications in a given field. CALLENDER, SELECTION OF
JURORS 43-50 (1924).
"5 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 33-36, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
" In answer to complainant's objection to the systematic exclusion of
women, the Court said:
[W]omen jury service has not so become a part of the textural or
customary law of the land that one convicted of crime must be set free
by this court if his state has lagged behind what we personally may
regard as the most desirable practice in recognizing the rights and obli-
gations of womanhood.
332 U.S. at 290.
"Id. at 287.
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of systematic exclusion of Negroes 3 8 Another case rejecting the
application of the federal requirements to the states is Hoyt v.
Florida,39 in which a woman appealed a conviction and claimed that
she had been denied equal protection because the jury was selected
under a statute that effectively excluded women from jury service.
The statute accorded women absolute exemption from jury service
unless they volunteered for it by registering with the clerk of court.
40
The Court in upholding her conviction condoned that which it had
so forcefully condemned in federal proceedings, i.e., the exclusion of
a class from the jury list and the resulting impossibility that the
jury represent a cross-section of the community.
The requirement of a "cross-sectional" element recognizes that
inherent in the concept of trial by jury is the idea that "the verdict
of the jurors is not just the verdict of twelve men; it is the verdict
of a pays, a 'country,' a neighbourhood, a community." 4' When a
jury list fails to contain representatives of the entire community, the
judicial system is denied the very thing it seeks, i.e., the "opinion
of the community, '42 as opposed to the opinion of a particular race
or class. The fact that the Supreme Court has not imposed upon the
states the federal requirement that a jury be selected from a list
representing a "cross-section" of the community by no means for-
bids its adoption by a state court. Rather, the federal practice pro-
vides an example for the state courts that has the approval of the
Supreme Court.
4 3
Both state and federal courts have recognized that discrimination
in jury selection can exist against classes other than those dis-
tinguishable because of race or color, and that any class may need
protection from systematic exclusion, especially if there is a chance
of community prejudice.44 In an approach along this line, the
"8 Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948). Negro defendant challenged
his conviction by a panel of "blue ribbon" jurors on the basis of systematic
exclusion of Negroes and women. The Supreme Court found that the evi-
dence did not support a reversal and that Fay was applicable.28368 U.S. 57 (1961).
"Old. at 60-61.
412 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 624 (2d ed.
1923).
"' Ibid. A more complete analysis of this concept can be found in an ad-
dress by D. H. Chamberlain before The American Social Science Asocia-
tion at Saratoga, New York, in 43 DAWSON PAMPHLETS 18-21 (1887).
" Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
" See note 10 supra.
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Georgia court left open the possibility that defendant might be a
member of a class which had been systematically excluded in the
selection of the jury panel, i.e., those interested in advancing the
"civil rights" cause.45 As the court pointed out, "where prejudice
exists against the advocacy of the Negro's full privileges and duties
of citizenship, a white person active in promoting participation in
government by Negroes would be the object of as strong adverse
prejudice as would a Negro engaged in such activities . . . ."" In
light of recent activities in some Southern communities, the court
has put it mildly to say the least." If defendant proved, as a matter
of fact, that he was a member of a class of "civil rights workers"
discriminated against in jury selection, a violation of the traditional
constitutional right of trial by a jury from which members of de-
fendant's class have not been systematically excluded would be
established.4" Furthermore, proof of membership in a class dis-
criminated against would eliminate the problem of lack of standing
to raise the constitutional issue of discrimination, if there had been
no finding of a denial of a constitutional right.
4 9
" "Furthermore, we cannot say as a matter of law that this defendant,
who was active in voter registration among Negroes, was not a member of
a group systematically excluded in selecting the grand and traverse juries."
137 S.E.2d at 715.
'6 Ibid.
41 See, e.g., Anderson, That New-F angled Thing Called Voting, New
Republic, March 28, 1964, p. 8; Huie, The Untold Story of the Mississippi
Murders, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 5, 1964, p. 11; Mississippi Prepares
for War, Christian Century, April 22, 1964, p. 509.
4' See cases cited note 18 supra.
" The fact that neither the Supreme Court nor state courts have found a
denial of a constitutional right in the situation of the principle case makes
the standing question one of obvious importance. That standing is not an
absolute requirement of a petitioner was made evident in Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), where a white vendor was allowed to assert
the constitutional rights of Negroes as a defense in a suit for damages based
on her breach of a racially restricted covenant. Professor Sedler has
stated that there were several factors in Barrows that led the Court to by-
pass the general standing rule and allow the vendor to defend on the basis
of another's rights. These factors were: "(1) the interest of the.., petitioner,
(2) the nature of the right asserted, (3) the relationship between the ...
petitioner and third parties, and (4) the practicability of assertion of such
rights by third parties . . . ." Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 627 (1962). A comparison
of Barrows and Allen in light of these factors warrants the conclusion that
the Georgia court could have held that defendant was entitled to assert the
rights of a member of the race excluded from jury service. This conclusion
is buttressed by United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), where the
Court, in attempting to clarify the requirement of standing, reiterated the
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In holding that defendant's allegations of exclusion established
a denial of due process of law, the court stated that when a state
uses a jury trial the "accused is entitled to those procedures which
will insure, so far as possible, that the juries selected are fair and
impartial,"5 and that the constitutional requirement of a fair trial
is violated when "a criminal defendant is not accused and tried by a
jury selected .. in accordance with the law of the land-the law of
this State regulating the procedure for criminal justice."'" The
Supreme Court has stated in the past, even though subject to question
today, 2 that the sixth amendment's requirement of trial by jury
is "not picked up by the due process clause of the Fourteenth so as
to" limit the states.5 3 But if a state provides a jury trial, then there
is a requirement that the jury be impartial, in the sense of being
free from bias or prejudice. 4 The most significant point of the
general rule that a petitioner has no standing to assert the constitutional
rights of another, but recognized exceptions to the rule. One exception is
that when the constitutional rights of one not a party to the litigation are
threatened, and he has no way to preserve them himself, then the Court may
consider those rights as before it. Id. at 22. It is not denied that an individ-
ual excluded from jury service because of race or color has a statutory
remedy, 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1959). However, the value of this statute is at-
tested to by the fact that it has been used only two times in its eighty-nine
years of existence. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Brown v.
Rutter, 139 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Ky. 1956). Also, continuing discrimination
in selection of juries further illustrates that it has no deterrant effect. See
cases cited note 8 supra. Thus the application of this exception would seem
proper in the Allen situation.
50 137 S.E.2d at 716-17.
" Id. at 717.
2 Mr. Justice Brennan has expressed doubts that the Court would hold
that the fourteenth amendment does not require jury trials in state criminal
proceedings if it "is ever faced with a case in which a state has abolished
trial by jury for serious criminal offenses." Brennan, The Bill of Rights
and the States, in THaE GREAT RIGHTS 67, 80 (Cahn ed. 1963).
"Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947). Accord, Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
' In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the Court reversed a conviction
on the basis of a denial of a fair and impartial jury resulting from pre-trial
publicity. The Court stated that "in essence, the right to jury trial guarantees
to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors. . . . 'The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial."' Id. at 722. Accord, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963). Cf. In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). "There is
another fundamental requirement which is clearly of the essence of trial by
jury; the jury must be so selected and so constituted as to be an impartial
and fairly competent tribunal." ScOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 79
(1922). See Note, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 349, 353 (1960). But see 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 1000 (1963).
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Georgia decision is the court's willingness not only to find inherent
in due process the requirement of an impartial jury but also a
requirement that the jury be selected in strict accordance with the
relevant laws. The Supreme Court itself has said that if there is a
trial by jury, that jury shall be fairly and impartially chosen. 5 To
do otherwise is to violate the procedure which will insure a de-
fendant a trial by an impartially constituted jury. 6 The words of
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Fay v. New York, are particularly
applicable in pointing out why this requirement should be met: "We
can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from the
exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a jury panel.
Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes the ordinary
methods of proof."5 7 The very possibility of prejudice ought to be
sufficient reason for condemning any exclusion. This is not to say,
however, that a state may not exclude from jury service those
who do not meet valid statutory qualifications or whose exclusion
is for the good of the community.5" The Supreme Court's require-
ment through its supervisory power that prospective jurors be se-
lected without systematic or intentional exclusion of any race or
class59 takes on considerable significance for the states when con-
" That by the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of States in dealing
with crime within their borders are not limited, except that no State
can deprive particular persons, or classes of persons, of equal and im-
partial justice under the law; That law in its regular course of admin-
istration through courts of justice is due process, and when secured by the
law of the State the constitutional requirement is satisfied; and that due
process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting
the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government un-
restrained by the established principles of private right and distributive
justice.
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 467-68 (1891).
" Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). "An allegation of discriminatory
practices in selecting a grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial arm of government in dealing with persons charged with criminal
offenses." Id. at 400-01.
332 U.S. at 300.
8 1n Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906), the Court held that "if
the state law itself should exclude certain classes on the bona fide ground
that it was for the good of the community that their regular work should
not be interrupted, there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent
it." Id. at 640. See VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 172; Scott, The
Supreme Court's Control Over State and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IowA
L. REv. 577, 581-84 (1949).
"' Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
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sidered in light of the following statement by Mr. Justice Burton
in Bute v. Illinois:60
While such federal court practice does not establish a constitutional
minimum standard of due process which must be observed in each
state under the Fourteenth Amendment ... [it] does afford an
example approved by the courts of the United States. It thus
contributes something toward establishing a general standard of
due process currently and properly applicable to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6'
Applying this strict standard of impartial selection through the
due process clause to criminal proceedings insures to a defendant
those procedures that are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '0 2 The adop-
tion by all courts of this standard would do much to insure that all
people, regardless of class, receive the same treatment under the
same laws, an essential requirement of ordered liberty.
Established as the rules against discrimination are, violation of
these rules continues with alarming regularity. By adopting a rule
such as that applied by the Supreme Court to federal proceedings,
all convictions in which there was systematic exclusion of a race
or class contrary to statutory provisions would be subject to re-
versal. Under such circumstances a state would have no choice but
to eliminate discrimination or abolish trial by jury, the latter a
result which most state constitutions prohibit 3 and which public
conscience would not tolerate.
RALPH MALLOY MCKEITHEN
Contracts-Credit Cards-Liability of Holder for Unauthorized Use-
Issuer's and Merchants's Duty of Due Care in Accepting Charges
In The Diners' Club, Inc. v. Whited,' a California intermediate
appellate court discussed a problem on which there are few re-
-0 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
61 Id. at 659-60.
62 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13, which provides: "No person shall be
convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and
lawful persons in open court." For a compilation of state constitutional
requirements as to the necessity of a jury trial in criminal proceedings, see
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON SELECTION OF JURORs 33-35 (1942).
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
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ported cases: the liability of the holder of a credit card for the un-
authorized use of the card by another person.2 The usual three-
party credit card situation was present in Diners' Club. The issuer
furnished the card to the holder, and the merchants were to furnish
merchandise to the holder. Two contracts were involved: one be-
tween the issuer and the merchant, whereby the issuer agreed to
pay the merchant the amount of the holder's charges the merchant
accepted; and another between the issuer and the holder, in which
the holder agreed to repay the issuer and also to pay a small fee
for the privilege of using the card. The holder in Diners' Club
agreed' to the following liability provision, similar to provisions
used by most credit card issuers, printed on the back of his credit
card: "If this credit card is lost or stolen, original holder is liable
and responsible for all purchases charged through use of this card
until ... written notice [to the issuer] of its loss or theft."4
The holder's card was stolen while he was on vacation, and
charges of 1,622.99 dollars were made by the thief before the holder
For discussions of the problem, see Claflin, The Credit Card-A New
Instrument, 33 CONN. B.J. 1 (1959); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. R v. 459 (1960); 12 DEPAUI L.
REv. 150 (1962); 9 KAN. L. Rxv. 325 (1960); 8 KAN. L. Rv. 554 (1959);
22 LA. L. REv. 640 (1962); 18 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Ray. 47 (1962); 35 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 225 (1960) ; 13 STAN. L. REV. 150 (1960); 109 U. PA. L. REv.
266 (1960); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 754 (1945).
There was no question here of acceptance of the terms of the contract
by the holder. However, the problem has arisen in some cases as to whether
the holder has accepted the terms of his contract. The question is usually
one of consent, i.e., whether a reasonable person would have known that the
terms were a part of his contract. In the absence of actual consent to the
terms, it has been held, for example, that where the terms of an ex-
culpatory clause are on a separate instrument, or where the clause
is in cramped style, the contractual terms would not be binding. The
Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509 (2d Cir. 1906) (cramped style); Anaconda
Copper Mining Co. v. Houston, 107 Ill. App. 183 (1903) (separate instru-
ment). For a more complete discussion of this problem, see 22 LA. L. REv.
640 (1962).
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964. Other credit cards
have similar provisions. The Cities Service credit card provides: "Customer
named hereon agrees to pay all ... charges . . . and notify Company in
writing should card be lost or stolen." The customer's name and address
is on the card, but no signature is required. The Esso Standard Oil Com-
pany credit card has the following clause printed on its back: "The customer
assumes full responsibility for all purchases made by any person presenting
this credit card. The customer should promptly notify the issuing office in
writing if this card is stolen or lost and, if no such notification is received,
it shall be conclusively presumed that any holder of this credit card has the
customer's permission to use it." Again, the name of the customer is
printed on the face of the card, but no signature is necessary.
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discovered the theft and notified the issuer. The issuer brought
suit under the contract liability provision to require the holder to
pay for the unauthorized purchases made before written notice
was received by the issuer. The trial court held for the issuer, saying
the holder was absolutely bound by the liability provision.'
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that although
the terms of the issuer-holder contract seemed to call for absolute
liability for all purchases made with the card before notice, the
issuer and the merchants nevertheless owed a duty of reasonable
care to see that "irregular charges . . . [were] not unnecessarily
incurred."' The court found that there had been an actual assign-
ment of the merchants' claims to the issuer and therefore held under
general assignment law that the holder could assert any defenses
against the issuer-assignee that he could assert against the merchant-
assignor.' However, the court indicated that the assignment was
not essential to the decision and that it would have reached the
same result in the absence of the actual assignment.' Also, the
court indicated that the showing of due care on the part of the
issuer and the merchants was part of the issuer's case0 and said
that the issuer had not carried this affirmative burden of proof."
The early cases that dealt with the liability of the holder for
unauthorized purchases involved two-party situations in which
credit was extended directly from an issuer-merchant to a holder,
and no liability clauses were present." In each case, the issuer
claimed that the holder should be liable for unauthorized pur-
chases regardless of the absence of a liability provision. A conflict
of authority on this question developed. A Pennsylvania case,
Wanamaker v. Megary,"2 used the novel approach of treating the
credit card that the imposter had taken from the holder as a ne-
gotiable instrument. Under this theory, the issuer-merchant be-
came a holder in due course when he accepted the charges and could
enforce the charges against the credit card holder, who was viewed
'Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.0Id. at 3.
7Ibid.
'Id. at 4.9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
" Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931);
Lit Bros. v. Haines,, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Wana-
maker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1915).
1224 Pa. Dist. 778 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1915).
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as an indorser of a note."3 Cases from other jurisdictions strongly
criticized this approach, 4 and a later Pennsylvania case expressly
disapproved it.'5 The other view was that because there was no
contractual obligation to pay for unauthorized charges, the holder
could not be liable.' All courts, however, completely ignored the
question of negligence and did not discuss whether due care should
be required of either party. Rather, the courts were concerned
solely with whether an absolute contractual obligation on the part
of the holder to pay for unauthorized charges should be implied.
The first three-party case also involved a contract in which
there was no liability clause. That case, Gulf Refining Co. v. Plot-
nik,'7 held for the first time that there was an implied obligation
on each party in the credit card arrangement to use due care.',
But the court said that in the absence of any negligence, the holder
would not be liable because there was no liability clause.' In Plotnik,
however, the holder was held liable because the unauthorized charges
had been incurred as a result of his negligence.2°
In an attempt to shift liability for unauthorized purchases to
the holder, the issuers began to include liability provisions, similar
to the clause in the Diners' Club contract, 21 in their issuer-holder
contracts. Thcse clauses have been present in all reported cases
since Plotnik. The courts in these cases have been faced with the
problem of whether the clauses, which seemingly called for abso-
lute liability for all purchases made with the card, should be strictly
construed against the holder. A conflict of authority has arisen
on this question also. One view says that the issuer, after paying the
charges to the merchant, becomes an assignee of the merchant and
1 Id. at 779.
"'Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 AUt. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
"' Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnik, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
1Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
Accord, Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (1931).
In Kelly there was an agency question, and the court held that even though
the holder would not be liable for unauthorized charges, he would be liable
if he had authorized the charges. 36 S.W.2d at 683.
" 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
18 Id. at 151.10Ibid.10The holder received bills for some of the charges incurred after his
card was stolen, but he did not pay them, and did not notify the issuer until
a few weeks later of the fact that his card had been stolen.
21 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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that under general assignment law the holder can assert any defense
against the issuer that he can against the merchant." The courts
following this view hold that the issuer and the merchant are re-
quired to exercise due care in accepting credit charges.23 The same
courts have also regarded the holder as a guarantor, 4 one court
saying that the situation could be classified as one of "suretyship,
guaranty, or indemnity" 25 and that "it is immaterial which of these
terms would most accurately describe the relationship .... The
imposter who makes the unauthorized purchases is regarded as the
principal debtor, the merchants and the issuer are treated as the
creditors, and the holder is treated as a gratuitous guarantor, a
favorite of the law. Therefore, "it is necessarily implied from
this broad guaranty that the person extending credit [the merchant]
must do so in good faith .... 27 Thus, before Diners' Club, some
courts required due care by all parties to the credit card arrange-
ment, saying that an assignment or guaranty situation existed.
The other view is that the holder owes a direct contractual obli-
gation to the issuer to pay for all purchases made with his card.
Under this view, the contractual provision is decisive of liability,
and negligence on the part of the merchant in accepting charges is
unimportant. One case expounding this view is Texaco, Inc. v.
Goldstein.2 s The holder was held liable for all purchases made with
his card because of the terms of the liability clause of the issuer-
holder contract,2 9 which were "that of an original undertaking in
which the... [holder] made it his own responsibility for any use
" Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d
790 (1945) ; Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960). The
card in Union Oil provided: "The customer . . . guarantees payment ...
of price of products delivered or services rendered by anyone presenting
this card . . . until card is surrendered or written notice is received by the
company that it is lost or stolen." Id. at 416, 349 P.2d at 245.
.8 See cases cited note 22 supra.
" See cases cited note 22 supra.
2 Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 425, 349 P.2d 243, 249 (1960).
26Ibid.
22 Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 369, 186
S.W.2d 790, 794 (1945).
2834 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1962).
The Texaco card provided: "the person . . . whose name is embossed
on the reverse side thereof ... assumes full responsibility for all purchases
made hereunder by any one through the use of this credit card prior to sur-
rendering it to the company or to giving the company notice in writing that
the card has been lost or stolen." 229 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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of the card."30 The court said that they so held because there would
be an impairment of the credit card system if a "high duty of
diligence" was required of issuers and merchants."' The court in
Texaco distinguished the cases in which the holder was treated as
a guarantor because the word "guaranty," present in the issuer-
holder contracts in those cases, was absent from the Texaco card.
Therefore, said the court, good faith on the part of the issuers
and the merchants in accepting charges, implicit in the guaranty
situation, was not required under the Texaco contract.32 The court,
however, did not discuss the fact that the courts in the cases it
distinguished did not rely on the guaranty theory alone, but rather
would have reached the same result on the assignment theory.
Diners' Club, which rejected the Texaco approach, makes sig-
nificant additions to the growing body of credit card law. Although
the court approved the decisions requiring due care of issuers and
merchants on assignment and guaranty theories and found an actual
assignment, it indicated that it would have reached the same result
in the absence of the assignment. Thus, Diners' Club implies that
the issuer and the merchant have to use due care in accepting credit
card charges regardless of the contractual provisions and regardless
of whether there is present a guaranty or assignment situation.
If due care is used by the issuers and merchants, the holder will be
held liable under the contractual liability provision in the issuer-
holder contract.
The case is also significant because the court indicated that it
followed the rule, announced in Union Oil Co. v. Lull,3 that the
issuer suing a holder on the liability provision has the burden of
proving that both it and the merchant involved used due care in
30 Id. at 54.
" Id. at 55. Another case which seems to hold the same way is Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). The
Magnolia credit card provided that the "holder shall be responsible for all
purchases made by use of this card .. .whether or not such purchases are
made by the named holder . . . ." Ibid. The court seemed to hold that be-
cause of the terms of the issuer-holder contract, the holder was absolutely
liable for all purchases made with his card. The only defense the holder
had set up was that the charges had been made by an unauthorized person,
and the court held that this was not a valid defense; however, it was not
made clear from the decision whether there were other defenses which the
holder could have asserted.
82229 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
" 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
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accepting the charges. Lull has been criticized by one commentator,"4
who expressed fear that this requirement usually will result in the
issuer losing the case. This criticism is based on the fact that it
will often be impossible for the merchant to recall all his actions,
even if due care was in fact used, and also on the fact that costs in
locating the necessary witnesses and taking depositions will often
be prohibitive. 35 Granting that this rule may often be harsh on the
issuer, it would be even harsher to put this burden of proof on the
holder. The holder is not present when the charges are incurred,
and unlike the issuer, it would be impossible in most instances
for him to prove that due care was not used. The issuer can
require the merchants to develop methods of recording the details
of each transaction and also require them to develop a uniform
system of checking all charges. By following such a system, the
issuer can prevent many unauthorized charges and also more easily
meet his burden of proof.
The court in Diners' Club did not decide the question, raised in
the holder's brief,"0 of whether the holder would ever be liable in
the case of a forgery. A forgery occurs under the Diners' Club
contract when someone other than the authorized holder uses the
card. This is because the person making purchases must sign his
name to a sales slip, and a contractual provision in the issuer-holder
contract (incorporated by reference) provides: "The Credit Card
is not transferable and will be honored only when properly signed and
presented by the authorized holder."3 7 The reason the possibility
existed that the holder would never be liable in the case of a forgery
was because of an ambiguity between this clause and the issuer-
holder provision which seemingly called for absolute liability
for all unauthorized purchases. Obviously, when an imposter pre-
sents the card he is not an "authorized holder," and under this
provision the card should not be honored. Thus, the two contractual
provisions present the anomalous situation in which unauthorized
charges are not to be accepted, but if they are, the holder is abso-
lutely responsible for them. The holder urged that because of the
3,109 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 268 (1960).
3 Ibid.
35 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 12, Diners' Club v. Whited, Civil No.
A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964.
87 Civil No. A 10872, App. Dep't Cal., Aug. 6, 1964, at 2. (Emphasis
added.)
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uncertainty of these contradictory provisions, the ambiguity should
be resolved against the issuer and the holder should never be liable
for unauthorized purchases. 8 The court did not reach this problem
because there were other grounds on which to base the decision, but
it was indicated that "there is much merit to this argument . . .,39
However, it was also pointed out that this problem is not one of
general interest because "it can be avoided easily by properly draft-
ing the contract,"40 as has been done in some oil company contracts
where the card is not signed by the holder and is not restricted to
the holder's use.41
If the court had been faced only with the liability question in
Diners' Club, the case would have been reversed and remanded so as
to give the issuer an opportunity to allege and prove the use of due
care in accepting the unauthorized charges. However, the court
found that because of the terms of the issuer-merchant contract, the
issuer could never prove damages. The court pointed out that the
difficulty arose because the issuer-merchant contract was not worded
the same as the issuer-holder contract.42 The issuer-holder con-
tract provided that the holder was to pay the issuer for any charges
incurred with the holder's card. The issuer-merchant contract, how-
ever, provided that the issuer undertook "to purchase ... all valid
charges . .. " and that in order to be a valid charge "the signature
of the cardholder . . . must be the same as that appearing on the
face of the card."44 It is obvious that the charges accepted by the
merchants from the thief, whose signature was not the same as
the one appearing on the card, were not valid charges. Therefore,
when the issuer purchased the charges which were the basis of this
suit, it made the payments voluntarily "to promote its own good
will among merchants."45 The court said that such a "voluntary
payment is not damage."48 This decision will obviously result in
more careful draftsmanship of the issuer-merchants contracts in
the future, with the issuers being careful to provide that their pay-
ments to the merchants are not "voluntary."
38Id. at 4.
8° Id. at 4-5.
'old. at 5.
"' Ibid.
'2 Ibid.
Id. at 2. (Emphasis added.)
"Ibid.
"Id. at 6.
"Ibid.
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Because of the great amount of business done with credit cards,
it is vital that there be some definitive solution to the problem of
which of the two parties, the issuer or the holder, should be held
responsible for unauthorized purchases made with credit cards. It
appears that the result reached in Diners' Club is the fairest. If
neither the issuer, holder, nor merchant has been negligent, and if
the parties have used due care in carrying out their various duties,
or if only the holder has been negligent, the contractual liability
clause between the issuer and the holder should be given full force
and the holder should be liable for the unauthorized purchases.
However, as between the holder and the issuer, the issuer is
better in a position to prevent unauthorized charges. Therefore,
if the issuer or merchant has been negligent in accepting charges,
the issuer and not the holder should be the one to suffer. To
hold otherwise would be to encourage lax practices among the
merchants, for the merchants' examination of credit cards would
become even more perfunctory than at present if they knew they
would be repaid regardless of whether the charges were authorized.
Requiring due care by all parties in the three-party credit card sit-
uat-ion is the most equitable solution to the problem.
HOWARD S. IRVIN
Criminal Law-Statutory Rape-Mistake of Age-Me'ns Rea
Prior to People v. Hernandez,' all American jurisdictions faced
with an ignorance or mistake of age plea in statutory rape cases
have held it not to be a valid defense.' Upon facts showing that the
defendant and the prosecutrix were not married, that the prosecutrix
was under the statutory age of eighteen,3 and that the prosecutrix
139 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
' Ignorance of age is no defense even though based on a good faith
belief that the female was above the prohibited age. Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1895); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892). This is true even where there has been an exercise
of reasonable care to ascertain her age. Manning v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
302, 65 S.W. 920 (1901). It is also true where the defendant was misled
by her appearance or her misrepresentations. Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159,
74 Atl. 836 (7 Penn. 1909); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310
(1910); Harris v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 227, 28 S.W.2d 813 (1930).
See generally 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 241 (12th
ed. 1952).
' CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.
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voluntarily engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with the de-
fendant, the California Supreme Court in Hernandez departed
from the settled law and overruled its prior decisions4 on this issue.
The court applied two other sections of the California Penal Code,
both codifications of common law principles, and reversed the con-
viction of statutory rape, on the grounds that the trial court had
committed error in excluding evidence of the defendant's belief of
the prosecutrix's age. Although the sufficiency of the defendant's
belief was not at issue and thus not determined, the court held the
defendant's offer of this evidence "demonstrated a sufficient basis
upon which, when fully developed, the trier of fact might have
found in defendant's favor."5
The rationale of the court in deciding Hernandez followed three
logical steps. It first recognized the common law principle that there
can be no criminal offense without the element of mens rea,6 which
the California legislature had codified in section 20 of its Penal
Code by declaring that there must be a joint operation of act and
intent to constitute a crime.7 Secondly, the court decided that
statutory rape is not an offense made punishable without proof of
culpability. It viewed the legislative intent expressed in section 20
as controlling judicial interpretation of statutes that are not ex-
'People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897), and People v.
Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915 (1896), were overruled. People v. Sheffield,
9 Cal. App. 130, 98 Pac. 67 (1908) was disapproved. When Ratz was
decided, the statutory age was fourteen and it was contended
that, even though the child be shown to have been under the age of
fourteen years, yet that, if the defendant had reason to believe, and did
believe, that she was over the age of fourteen years, then there was an
absence of the necessary intent to constitute a crime, and that he should
be acquitted. He asked the court to give instruction to the jury embodying
this as a proposition of law.
People v. Ratz, supra at 134, 46 Pac. at 916. It was held no error to refuse
the proposed instruction.
39 Cal. Rptr. at 366, 393 P.2d at 678.
'At common law a guilty mind or intent was essential. United States
v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (D.C. Ky. 1939); State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio
App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 345 Pa. 456,
28 A.2d 894 (1942). For the purposes of this note, mens rea does not refer to
the awareness of wrong-doing related to a mistake of law but to the aware-
ness of the facts that give character to the act. "Ordinarily one is not guilty
of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make
his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that is meant by the mens rea,
the 'criminal intent', necessary to guilt ... " United States v. Crimmins,
123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941).
' "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint
operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
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plicit as to the element of intent. The court concluded that a strict
liability standard should not be imposed in the absence of a declara-
tion in the governing statute that this is the result deemed necessary.
In the final step, the court applied section 26 of the Penal Code,
which provides that a mistake of fact disproves criminal intent.'
Since awareness of age is one of the facts that give character to the
act, it concluded that, given the proper circumstances and proof, such
lack of knowledgeable conduct could be a proper defense in statutory
rape.9
Although Hernandez departs from the previously unanimous,
strict rule by allowing a mistake-of-age defense, its real importance
is that it is the first adequate treatment by a court of the necessity
of the mental element in statutory rape. For it is only by first hold-
ing that criminal intent is necessary that mistake of fact can become
an effective defense. Obviously, if knowledgeable conduct is not a
prerequisite, the lack of knowledgeable conduct will be immaterial.
As stated above, mens rea was a fundamental requirement of
common law offenses, but when the various legislatures codified com-
mon law crimes or created offenses by statute, the relevancy of the
mental element was often left for the courts to determine. Some
statutes, either by expressly requiring a specific intent'0 or by provid-
ing that the conduct be "knowingly" or "willfully" done," leave
little room for judicial construction. However, where the governing
statute is silent as to the requisite mental element, judicial interpre-
tation faces a problem. Criminal intent is either read into the
statute or, in effect, eliminated. The former generally applies to
common law crimes that have been codified 2 or crimes involving
I "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging
to the following classes: .... Persons who committed the act or made the
omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves
any criminal intent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 26.
' The California court had previously applied the same two sections to
bigamy and allowed a good faith belief that a former wife had obtained a
divorce as a valid defense. People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850
(1956).
10E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1963) (break and enter with
intent to commit a felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-90 (1953) (fraudulent
intent in embezzlement).
11 For judicial interpretation, see, e.g., Dearing v. United States, 167 F.2d
310 (10th Cir. 1948). For a state court's interpretation, see State v.
Whitener, 93 N.C. 590 (1885). But see United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp.
476 (D.C. Ark. 1950), stating that these are words of many meanings.
" Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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moral turpitude.'3 In this instance, the statute is viewed in the light
of the common law and it is assumed that if this element were to be
eliminated, the legislative intent would have been expressed. 4 The
latter interpretation is given to statutes or administrative regula-
tions called "public welfare offenses." 5 These statutes are designed
to increase the duties of those in control of particular industries,
trades, properties, or activities that affect public health, safety, or
welfare, and their breaches are not true crimes even though criminal
penalties are imposed.' 6 They are directed more at neglect or in-
action than the aggression or invasion dealt with by the common law.
A violation is regarded as an offense against the authority of the
state, because its "occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls
deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In
this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the
same . . . . "I Since the accused is the one best able to prevent the
violation by reasonable care, he acts at his peril to ascertain the true
nature of his act.' 8 Moreover, the penalties are generally light with
little if any threat to reputation. The vast number of such offenses' 9
3 "The general rule is that in all statutory crimes involving moral turpi-
tude criminal intent is an implied, necessary ingredient." Seaboard Oil Co. v.
Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1931). For a distinction between
inala in se and inala prohibita, see State v. Erlandson, 126 Mont. 316, 249
P.2d 794 (1952).
' Masters v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 350 (Ct. App. 1914).
15 Examples of public welfare offenses are illegal sales of liquor, sales
of impure food or drugs, sales of misbranded articles, violations of anti-
narcotic acts, criminal nuisances, traffic regulations, and motor vehicle laws.
See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
18 "Prosecutions for petty penalties have always constituted in our
law a class by themselves.... That is true though the prosecution is criminal
in form." Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168-69, 109
N.E. 88, 90 (1915).
' Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
18 "In these cases there is a voluntary act which the party does at his
peril, and he is not to be excused either by ignorance of the law or ignorance
of the fact. Either kind of ignorance implies a fault, and it must be assumed
that with due diligence the true character of the act could have been as-
certained." FREUND, POLICE POWER 635-36 (1904).
1" It is needless to point out that, swamped with such appalling inunda-
tions of cases of petty violations, the lower criminal courts would be
physically unable to examine the subjective intent of each defendant, even
were such determination desirable. As a matter of fact it is not; for the
penalty in such cases is so slight that the courts can afford to disregard
the individual in protecting the social interest.
The ready enforcement which is vital for effective petty regulation on
an extended scale can be gained only by a total disregard of the state of
mind.
Sayre, supra note 15, at 69-70.
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and the purpose of protecting the public2° make speedy enforcement
a matter of necessity. These considerations have led the courts to
construe the silence of the legislature as dispensing with intent and
as making the guilty act alone the crime.
However, statutory rape presents a striking exception to the
general rule of statutory construction. Statutes creating this offense,
which was a common law crime2' and which courts consider to in-
volve moral turpitude,22 are not viewed in the light of the common
law. Instead, whoever commits the offense is said to act at his peril,
at least as far as the girl's age is concerned; in other words, knowl-
edge of her age is not an element of the offense.2"
This felony falls within the category of crimes "in which, on
grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable with-
out proof that the defendant understands the facts that give char-
acter to his act," . . and proof of an intent is not indispensable
to conviction. . . . "The law makes the act the crime, and infers
a criminal intent from the act itself."'24
Although this inference, in effect, eliminates intent, the courts
continue to speak in terms of mens rea, the idea being that it
varies according to the nature of the offense. While murder re-
quires a mind equal to malice aforethought and theft an intention
2 An exception to the common law requirement of criminal intent is
recognized in statutes the nature of which are police regulations and the
purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). The owner of the car in People v. Harrison,
183 App. Div. 812, 37 N.Y. Crim. 20, 170 N.Y. Supp. 876 (1918), was
held for his chauffer's speeding. It was no defense that he was talking to
his wife and did not know how fast the car was going, because to allow
such a defense would allow all owners to escape the obligations of the law.
2 "Sir Matthew Hale is, indeed, of the opinion that such profligate actions
committed on an infant under the age of twelve years, the age of female dis-
cretion by common law, either with or without consent, amount to rape and
felony, as well since as before the statute of Queen Elizabeth; but that law
has in general been held only to extend to infants under ten.... ." 4 BLACK-
STONE, COmMENTA~iES *212.
"An alien guilty of statutory rape is guilty of a crime involving "moral
turpitude" so as to authorize deportation. Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719
(9th Cir. 1927). Moral turpitude "'is a vague term, its meaning depending
to some extent upon the state of public morals. It is defined as anything
that is done contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals ....
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact
whether it is punishable by law.'" United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer,
30 F. Supp. 767, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"3 Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 At. 836 (7 Penn. 1909).
"Simons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 782-83, 10 So. 2d 436, 438 (1942).
Accord, State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
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permanently to deprive the owner of his property, statutory rape
requires only that the defendant intend to do the act. It is reasoned
that intention is an element of voluntary action; all crimes except
omissions must be voluntary actions; therefore, intention is an ele-
ment of all criminal acts.25 Thus, when intercourse is voluntarily
engaged in, the male assumes a risk and the consequences that ensue.
It appears that this "at peril" doctrine arose because of an under-
lying notion that the conduct itself is "wrong," and statutory rape
has been distinguished from public welfare offenses on this basis.26
The biblical view27 that extramarital intercourse is "wrong" con-
tinues in the express language of the statutes28 and in the "laws of
morality."2 Since the defendant has wrongfully done the very thing
contemplated by the legislature, he cannot set up a legal defense
by merely proving that he thought he was committing a different
kind of "wrong" from that which he in fact committed.30 The con-
cept of "wrong" also draws support from the outrage to parental
and community feelings because "an 'unwise' disposition of a girl's
sexual 'treasure,' it is thought, harms both her and the social struc-
ture which anticipates certain patterned uses. Hence, the law of
statutory rape must intervene to prevent what is predicted will be
an unwise disposition."'" Another factor influencing the courts in
this respect is the fear that such conduct may jeopardize the female
child's later sexual adjustment as well as cause some physical
damage.32 Premarital intercourse has also been condemned because
it is thought to lead to the spread of venereal disease and unwanted
" Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 Atl. 836 (7 Penn. 1909).
"o PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 699 (1957).
27 Fornication is forbidden. 1 Corinthians 10:8; 1 Thessalonians 4:3.
" "[T]he act is intrinsically wrong; for the statute says if 'unlawfully'
done. The act done with a mens rea is unlawfully and carnally knowing
the girl, and the man doing that act does it at the risk of the child being
under the statutory age." Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 176
(1875). Accord, Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910).
"9 "His intent to violate the laws of morality and the good order of
society, though with the consent of the girl, and though in a case when he
supposes he shall escape punishment, satisfies the demands of the law, and
he must take the consequences." State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 661, 19 S.W.
35, 37 (1892).
" Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 177 (1875) (concurring
opinion).
"' Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1953).82 Ibid.
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pregnancies." Thus, the policy reasons of protecting society, family,
and infant demand the at-the-actor's-peril doctrine, and the courts
so construe the statutory rape laws.
North Carolina has two statutes pertaining to statutory rape.
Intercourse with a female under twelve is punishable by death or
life imprisonment." If the female is between twelve and sixteen
and a virgin, it is a felony punishable at the discretion of the court. 6
In both of these statutes intent is neither mentioned nor construed
to be an element. 6 Where the defense of mistake of age was raised,
it was held to be immaterial.
3 7
"' See sources listed in KINsEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHrAVIOR
IN TE HUMAN MALE 560 (1948).8 Every person who is convicted of ravishing and carnally knowing any
female of the age of twelve years or more by force and against her will,
or who is convicted of unlawfully and carnally knowing and abusing any
female child under the age of twelve years, shall suffer death: Provided,
if the jury shall so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's
prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
" "If any male person shall carnally know of abuse any female child,
over twelve and under sixteen years of age, who has never before had sexual
intercourse with any person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined
or imprisoned in the discretion of the court." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26
(1953).
" State v. Browder, 252 N.C. 35, 112 S.E.2d 728 (1960); State v. Jones,
249 N.C. 134, 105 S.E.2d 513 (1958); State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151,
126 S.E. 417 (1925) (by implication). Intent was not required even when
the statute provided for a mandatory death sentence. State v. Gibson,
221 N.C. 252, 20 S.E.2d 51 (1942).
" State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944). The court stated:
One who has carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of twelve
years is guilty of rape, and the fact that the offender may have believed
the child was above the age of consent, will not mitigate the crime. The
statute does not require the State to charge or prove that a person in-
dicted thereunder must have known the female child to have been under
the age of consent; one having carnal knowledge of such a child, does
so at his peril, and his opinion as to her age, is immaterial.
Id. at 762, 32 S.E.2d at 315. The court also uses morality in varying de-
grees. In justifying a sentence of thirty years of hard labor for violation of
what is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953), the court said that "the
defendant, a man of 26 years of age, ensnares a 13 year old girl, innocent
and virtuous, and debauches her under circumstances that would make him
guilty at least of such turpitude as amounts in morals to rape. For legal
rape the penalty is death." State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 154, 126 S.E.
417, 418 (1925).
The "abusing" constructed with the "carnally knowing" means the im-
posing upon, deflowering, degrading, illtreating, debauching and ruining
socially, as well as morally, perhaps, of the virgin of such tender years,
who, when yielding willingly, does so in ignorance of the consequences
and of her right and power to resist.
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It is the opinion of the writer that the statutory rape laws need
to be reconsidered. The history of this offense reveals that it was
designed to protect the female child below the age of discretion."8
Children under ten or twelve were conclusively presumed to have no
understanding of the nature and consequences of the sexual act.
Thus their consent was immaterial. Slowly, the statutory age limits
have been raised to sixteen, eighteen, or higher until its original
purpose is obscured. At some point in their growth, children begin
to understand sex. It has been said that substantially all females
have completed the period of sexual awakening by the end of their
fifteenth year.3 9 In light of this finding, the present judicial con-
struction of statutory rape can only be justified by the "wrongful"
conduct theory and by its deterrent effect. But to continue to up-
hold convictions "on the grounds that what was done would not
be proper even if the facts had been as the defendant reasonably
supposed them to be"40 is to ignore social realities. "Pursuit of
females who appear to be over 16 betokens no abnormality but only
a defiance of religious and social conventions which appear to be
fairly widely disregarded."'" The biblical view that the immoral
are to be judged by God 42 seems to comport with sound contemporary
thought about the purposes of a criminal code:
The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to
enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem it inap-
propriate for the government to attempt to control behavior
that has no substantial significance except as to the morality
of the actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educa-
tional and other social influences. Apart from the question
of constitutionality which might be raised against legislation
State v. Monds, 130 N.C. 697, 700, 41 S.E. 789, 790 (1902). Justice Clark,
dissenting in State v. Hart, 186 N.C. 582, 605, 120 S.E. 345, 356 (1923),
advocated the conviction of an aider and abettor in a statutory rape case,
quoting an English Chancellor: "Morality comes in the cold abstract from
the pulpit, but men smart practically under its lessons when we lawyers
are the teachers." Id. at 608, 120 S.E. at 358.
" State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); State v. Bowman,
232 N.C. 374, 61 S.E.2d 107 (1950); State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209 (1877).
See also State v. Hart, 186 N.C. 582, 590, 120 S.E. 345, 349 (1923) (Clark-
son, J., dissenting). For Blackston's support of this statement, see note 21
supra. See generally PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THES LAw 178 (1951).
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment at 252 & n.134 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
' PmRins, op. cit. supra note 26, at 699.
' MODEL PENAL CODn § 207.4, comment at 253 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
"'Hebrews 13:4. Cf. John 8:4-11.
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avowedly commanding adherence to a particular religious or
moral tenet, it must be recognized, as a practical matter, that in
a heterogeneous community such as ours, different individuals
and groups have widely divergent views of the seriousness of
various moral derelictions.43
Moreover, the act of intercourse alone is not a "wrong" in the legal
sense of that word, for when discreetly done with a girl above the
statutory age and with her consent, it would go unpunished under
most fornication and adultery laws.4 4 Realizing that the act must
be punished as it was intended to be at its commission and not as it
was later found to be,45 the common law doctrine of mistake of fact
is pertinent. It should not be assumed that what the defendant did
was unlawful within the meaning of the statute, for that is the very
question to be determined. The courts, accordingly, must face
directly the issue of intent. To uphold the "at peril" interpretation
without the "wrongful" conduct theory would be an extention of the
rationale applied to a public welfare offense. This extention should
,' MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
For a related discussion, see Schwartz, Morals Offenses AWd The Model
Petal Code, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 669 (1963).
"At the present time 11 of the 48 states have no fornication statute,
and only 18 punish a single act of intercourse between unmarried persons
(four of these by fine alone). The rest of the states require either a con-
tinuous or an "open and notorious" relationship, or both. Fornication
is not criminal in England or, generally speaking, in the rest of the world.
Model Penal Code § 207.1, comment at 204-05 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
"Lewdly and lasciviously... cohabit" in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1953)
implies habitual intercourse, and the single act will not constitute fornication
and adultery. State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 148 (1954); State
v. Ivey, 230 N.C. 172, 52 S.E.2d 346 (1949); State v. Davenport, 225 N.C.
13, 33 S.E.2d 136 (1945). Quaere: Is "open" conduct necessary? It seems
to play a part, although not required, in State v. Davenport, supra. When is
requisite habitual intercourse, "in the manner of husband and wife," estab-
lished? In State v. McDuffie, 107 N.C. 885, 12 S.E. 83 (1890), an instruc-
tion that habitual illicit sexual intercourse for two weeks was sufficient
to constitute the offense was approved, but the facts reveal that the defendants
lived together in a one-room house during the period and that they were
seen together in a bunk at least four different times.
" To constitute a crime the personal volition or negligence of the actor
preceding the act is essential. Whether or not the exculpatory defense
that in so exercising his volition there was no criminal intent will
avail him depends upon whether the defense was at common law, where
the criminal intent is essential, or under a statute where it is not.
State v. American Agricultural Chem Co., 118 S.C. 333, 338, 110 S.E. 800, 802(1922). The intent and the act, at least, must concur. People v. Walrath,
279 App. Div. 56, 108 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1951).
"'Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 156 (1875) (dissenting
opinion).
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be rejected because statutory rape carries the stigma of a true crime,
severe penalties, prolonged loss of liberty, and substantial loss to
reputation. Faced with these consequences, a defendant must be
given an opportunity to litigate his guilt even though the purpose of
the law, a factor in the public welfare offense rationale, is slightly
hindered.
The theory of deterrence does not seem to support a strict lia-
bility standard where the age has been raised to such limits as are
now found in statutes. Dr. Kinsey's report shows a gap between
what men do and what the law assumes they do. His finding that
eighty-five per cent of the total male population has premarital in-
tercourse47 becomes important when considered with these findings:
late adolescence in males is the period of greatest sexual activity;4
most males have intercourse with girls of about their own age;49
and the number of persons participating and the frequency of the
act vary according to the educational and social level.5" Among
groups with no more than grade school education that were sur-
veyed in two or three lower level communities, the reporters were
"unable to find a solitary male who had not had sexual relations with
girls by the time he was 16 or 17 years of age."'" Thus, while there
may be public abhorrence attached to the commission of sexual
intercourse among unmarried persons, there is evidence of an
equally widespread practice which is privately regarded as normal
and expected. 52
Not only has the effectiveness of such statutes been placed in
doubt, but also the severe consequences of the present construction
"" KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 392.
,8 Id. at 219.
"Id. at 558.
"98% of the males with grade school education or less, 84% of those
with high school education, and 67% of those with college education have
premarital intercourse. Id. at 549-52.
"Id. at 381.
One complicating factor in this respect relates to the difference in
perspectives identified with culture and class between those who legislate
and those who enforce the law.
Anglo-American sex laws are a codification of the sexual mores of the
better educated portion of the population. . . . However, the enforce-
ment of the law is placed in the hands of police officials who come largely
from grade school and high school segments of the population. For that
reason, the laws against non-marital intercourse are rarely and only
capriciously enforced, and then most often when upper level individuals
demand such police action.
Id. at 389-90.
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of them can be shown by statistics compiled in New York. During
the period of 1930-1939 in New York City, eighty-two per cent of
all rape convictions and fifty-nine per cent of all convicted "sex
offenders" were statutory rape situations involving acts of sexual
intercourse with the consent of girls under eighteen.5 8 Thus, with
premarital intercourse on the increase 4 and with the lack of official
diligence or public clamor that is characteristic of forcible rape
cases, 5 5 a basic injustice against the male prevails under the present
statutes and their judicial construction. Considering the severe
penalty and the irreparable damage to character, one fails to see
justification to include the innocent in order to convict the guilty.
What is being advocated is not an elimination of statutory rape
laws but only a return to their original purpose and objectives. The
conflicting views of the protection of infants and chastity and of the
protection of an individual's rights could be reconciled with a
recognition of the mental element that is involved in statutory rape.
Such recognition would permit only the punishment for conscious vio-
lations of the law and would protect the child obviously or known to
be below the age of consent. But, because physical development and
sexual sophistication appear well before the present age limits,"0 bona
fide mistakes will occur and should be considered in the determina-
tion of guilt. Criminal intent could be made an element of statutory
rape by either of two methods. Courts could give judicial notice
to the statute's purpose and the present attitude of society and apply
their mens rea statute 7 to overrule past precedents, as California
did. In jurisdictions without such a statute, the common law prin-
ciple would be sufficient grounds for a different construction. The
abnormality of seeking out the very young5 8 and the practical diffi-
culties of reasonableness would take care of a groundless defense
of mistake of age. A better approach seems to be a clear declaration
" PLoSCOWE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 178; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 74
n.13 1 (1955).
"DRUMMOND, THE SEX PARADOX 321 (1953).
Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 55, 75 (1955).
=' MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, comment (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955).
E.g., Aniz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-131 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-1-1 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 18-114
(1948); MONT. REV. CODE § 94-117 (1949); Nrv. REV. STAT. § 193-190
(1957); UTAH CODE § 76-1-20 (1953).
"s"[A]n adult male's proclivity for sex relations with children is a
recognized symptom of mental aberration, called pedophilia." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.4, comment at 251-52 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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by the legislature of its purpose and intent within the governing
statute, much in the fashion of the Model Penal Code. There a
two step grading system was employed, providing that all inter-
course under ten to be rape59 and consensual intercourse with a
female less than sixteen is to be corruption of a minor. ° The
original purpose of the law is given effect by declaring that mistake
of age will not be a proper defense to the former but will be to the
latter. " '
The way is open in North Carolina for either approach. The
one case 2 denying a mistake of age defense upon the rationale of
other jurisdictions could be distinguished on its facts-the prose-
cutrix was nine, the defendant was twenty-three, and the record re-
veals serious doubts as to the reasonableness of his belief. Given
the proper case, the court could then properly deal with the criminal
intent involved by following the three logical steps of recognizing
the common law requirement of mens rea, of rejecting the "wrong-
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"° MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"With respect to sex offenses, MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) states:
(1) Mistake as to Age. Whenever in this Article the criminality of
conduct depends on a child's being below the age of 10, it is no defense
that the actor did not know the child's age, or reasonably believed the
child to be older than 10. When criminality depends on the child's being
below a critical age other than 10, it is a defense for the actor to prove
that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.
As another example of a legislative declaration, reference is made to the
present law in England: The Sexual Offenses Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69,
which provides in part as follows:
6. Intercourse with girl between 13 and 16.-(1) It is an offence, subject
to the exceptions mentioned in this section, for a man to have unlawful
sexual intercourse with a girl not under the age of thirteen but under
the age of sixteen.
(3) A man is not guilty of an offence under this section because he
has unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of sixteen, if he
is under the age of twenty-four and has not previously been charged with
a like offence, and he believes her to be of the age of sixteen or over and
has reasonable cause for the belief.
In the past, North Carolina has relied on the English law in shaping its
sex laws. The following are some examples of this reliance: the definition
of carnal knowledge, State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209 (1877); necessity of
proof of emission of seed as well as penetration for conviction, State v. Gray,
53 N.C. 170 (1860) [later changed by the legislature to a requirement of
only penetration, State v. Hodges, 61 N.C. 231 (1867)]; sufficient indict-
ment even without the words "female child," State v. Goings, 20 N.C. 289
(1838).
" State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944).
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ful" conduct theory and the analogy to public welfare offenses, and
of allowing the common law mistake of fact defense. In this
manner, past precedents on the issue of intent could be overruled.
The legislative approach is applicable because under the present
classification, the age limit of twelve reasonably corresponds to
the purpose of the law and a declaration by the legislature that mis-
take of age will not be given credence would be appropriate. During
the prohibited period of twelve to sixteen, the legislature has al-
ready recognized the consequences of the "at peril" doctrine and
tempered it by requiring that it must be the female's first inter-
course. This requirement will not always be sufficient to protect the
male from injustice. To alleviate any possible injustice, the legis-
lature could declare that intent is a necessary element or that mis-
take of age is to be a defense of this offense.
Punishment at the discretion of the court does not minimize the
fact that the defendant is branded a felon, which in many cases is
an unnecessary attribution of guilt to individual defendants and an
irrational response by a society which cannot realistically expect to
derive any general deterrence thereby.
DAVID A. IRVIN
Insurance-Insurer's Liability for Injuries Intentionally Inflicted by
Insured by Use of Automobile
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts,' the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a person injured by one insured under a
"compulsory" or "asigned risk" automobile liability insurance policy
issued under the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act of 19532 could recover from the insurer, not-
withstanding the fact that the insured had intentionally inflicted
the injury by assault and battery. The insurer disclaimed liability
on three bases: that the coverage extended only to those persons
injured as the result of an "accident ' 3 and that injuries resulting
1261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
3 The term "accident" has been defined as follows:
An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an
undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event .... Hence .... an undesigned
and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character; a
mishap resulting in injury to a person or damage to a thing; a casualty....
* . . an unexpected happening not due to any negligence or malfeasance
of the party concerned.
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
from an intentional tort are not "accidentally sustained" ;4 that an
exclusionary clause in the policy provided that an assault would be
considered an accident unless committed by or at the direction of
the insured; and that public policy precluded indemnifying an insured
against the consequences of his own intentional acts. The court
followed the decisions of other compulsory insurance states5 and
the more widely accepted view that an assault constitutes an "acci-
dent" within the coverage of automobile liability insurance.6
The assault was an accident, reasoned the court, from the view-
point of the injured person if not from that of the insured.' It thus
placed North Carolina in accord with the majority of jurisdictions
that have decided this issue.8 As the basis for this view, the court
WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959). The standard
liability policy usually defines it as an undesigned or unforeseen occurrence
of an afflictive or unfortunate character, resulting in bodily injury to a
person other than the insured. See, e.g., Raven Halls, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Misc. 454, 254 N.Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
'In Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956),
it was held that one injured as the result of assaulting or voluntarily entering
into a affray with another has not suffered an "accident" within the mean-
ing of an accident insurance policy. In order for an injury to have been an
accident it must have been unforeseen. E.g., Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428,
53 S.E.2d 668 (1949).
'Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E.2d 544 (1937); Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948).
'Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying
Louisiana law); Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d
117 (4th Cir. 1946) (applying West Virginia law); New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) (applying Michigan law);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Hart-
ford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948);
Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964);
Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53 N.W.2d 508 (1952); Wendell
v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331 (1963); Wisconsin
Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d 708 (1942).
"If looked at from the viewpoint of the insured, the obvious conclusion
would have been that there was no "accident" because the occurrence would
not have been unexpected or unforeseen, as is set out in the definition of
that term. See note 3 supra.
'The following jurisdictions have elected to look at the occurrence from
the viewpoint of the injured person: Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Louisiana law); Huntington Cab Co. v.
American Fid. & Cas. Co., 155 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1946) (applying West
Virginia law); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir.
1943) (applying Michigan law); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss.
853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H.
40, 57 A.2d 151 (1948); Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J.
220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C.
285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964); Haser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 78 N.D. 893, 53
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applied the provisions and underlying purpose of the North Caro-
lina compulsory act to the terms of the policy.' It found:
The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability in-
surance is to compensate innocent victims who have been injured
by financially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose is not, like
that of ordinary [voluntary] insurance, to save harmless the
torifeasor himself. Therefore, there is no reason why the victim's
right to recover from the insurance carrier should depend upon
whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or negligent.
In order to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective...
must be that of the victim and not ... the aggressor. 10
This rationale was also used by the court in deciding that the
"assault and battery" exclusionary clause" contained in the liability
policy did not control. It reasoned, in effect, that since the com-
pulsory act is in itself a declaration of the policy that innocent victims
should be compensated, any provision in a liability policy to the
contrary would contravene the purpose of the act and therefore be
invalid.'"
In order to resolve the question concerning public policy against
indemnifying an intentional tortfeasor, the court used the reasoning
as applied to the first question' 8 and also a specific provision of the
compulsory act.' 4 This section contains an authorization for a pro-
vision in each liability policy requiring the insured to reimburse the
N.W.2d 508 (1952); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294,
187 A.2d 331 (1963); Wisconsin Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241
Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d 708 (1942).
The following jurisdictions have elected to look at the occurrence from
the viewpoint of the insured: Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer,
177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950) (applying
Virginia law); Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932) (but
only as to voluntary insurance); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118
Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
123 Vt. 294, 187 A.2d 331 (1963) (but only as to voluntary insurance).
:N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
10261 N.C. at 290-91, 134 S.E.2d at 659.11The policy in Roberts provided that "an assault will be considered
an accident unless committed by or at the direction of the insured." Id. at
290, 134 S.E.2d at 658-59.2 Id. at 290, 134 S.E.2d at 659. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden
Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930); Howell v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
237 N.C. 227, 74 S.E.2d 610 (1953).
"8 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963), which provides that
"any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured shall reim-
burse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance carrier would
not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the
provisions of this article."
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insurer for any payment made by the latter for which it would not
have been obligated under the terms of the policy but were, never-
theless, required to be made because of the provisions of the act.
By this reasoning, assuming the insured is not insolvent, the argu-
ment against allowing recovery is at once shown to be ill founded15
as the ultimate burden of payment will remain on him and not the
insurer. 1'
As stated, Roberts followed the majority rule in allowing re-
covery under a compulsory policy." In regard to voluntary policies,
however, the court had previously placed North Carolina in the
minority by denying recovery for intentional injuries inflicted by the
insured.' 8 This result was reached in Jackson v. Maryland Cas.
Co.,'" which was decided before the enactment of the compulsory
liability insurance provisions and therefore was based on an entirely
voluntary policy. However, Jackson has been modified to some ex-
tent by the compulsory insurance provisions. After the adoption
of compulsory insurance, Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.20 an-
nounced the rule, which was reiterated in Roberts, that all policies
are compulsory up to the statutory requirements and only the ex-
cess is voluntary. 21
Thus, if an insured goes beyond compliance with the compulsory
"* This rationale was not heavily relied on by the court. If the insured
is obligated to reimburse the insurer and is in fact financially able to do so,
allowing initial recovery from the insurer results in a possible circuity
of action.
" Prior to the enactment of the compulsory liability insurance laws in
North Carolina, if the insured failed to cooperate, failed to give the insurer
notice of the accident, failed to aid the insurer in the manner provided for
by the policy, or was guilty of an intentional tort, neither the insured nor the
injured party would be allowed to recover. See, e.g., Peeler v. United States
Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929). After the enactment of the
compulsory law this result was overruled so that the injured party was no
longer bound by the provisions in the policy setting out the insured's duties
with respect to the insurer. The result today is that if the insured fails to
cooperate with the insurer, the insurer can seek reimbursement from him.
See, e.g., Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960).
1 See notes 5 & 6 supra.
18 For cases representative of the minority, see Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
914 (1950) (applying Virginia law); Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181
N.E. 182 (1932); Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429,
161 N.E. 278 (1928); Wendell v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 294,
187 A.2d 331 (1963).19212 N.C. 546, 193 S.E. 703 (1937).
"0253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
211d. at 127, 116 S.E.2d at 487 (1960).
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act and insures, for his own protection, in excess of the required
amount, the insurer would be liable under Roberts up to the amount
required by the compulsory act. But the Jackson rule would pre-
clude liability beyond that amount.22
The next logical step from Roberts may well be to hold an
insurer liable for punitive damages within the same limits. Gen-
erally, punitive damages are allowed when a tortfeasor is guilty
of gross negligence, of an intentional or deliberate tort, or of con-
duct evincing a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests
of others.23 Such conduct is usually described as willful, wanton,
reckless, or intentional-i.e., the type of conduct for which compen-
satory damages were held recoverable in Roberts. Punitive damages
are justified on the theories that they punish the wrongdoer as well
as deter him and others from similar wrongdoings.2 4
Using these general rules as a basis, the insurer may advance the
following argument in an attempt to avoid liability for punitive
damages: For such damages to deter, the burden of payment must
remain on the wrongdoer; by allowing recovery on the policy, the
burden would ultimately be shifted to the premium-paying public.
If a jurisdiction is committed to the general rule that punitive
damages are awarded to punish the tortfeasor, the argument set
out above for disallowing such damages would apparently have some
merit if the burden of payment would be borne by the insurer and
premium-paying public. This result, however, is not necessary in
North Carolina because of the provisions of the compulsory act.21
The North Carolina statute authorizes a provision in every liability
policy that the insured reimburse the insurer for payments made by
it as required by the act but not by the terms of the policy.20 By
this provision, assuming the insured was solvent, the ultimate burden
of payment would remain on the tortfeasor.
If this argument against the allowance of punitive damages is
"2Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.1(10) (Supp. 1963), the result
would be that the insurer is liable up to $5000 for injuries to one person;
up to $10,000 for injuries to two or more persons; and up to $5000 for
property damage.
" See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 87 (1897); Kirschbaum v.
Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 236, 206 N.W. 171, 173 (1925) ; Gostkowski v. Roman
Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 324-25, 186 N.E. 798, 800 (1933); Mc-
CoRmicIc, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
2' See PROSSER, TORTS § 2, at 9-12 (2d ed. 1955).
'See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963). See note 14 supra.
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overcome, an affirmative rationale may be found in the North Caro-
lina standard policy, which specifies that the insurer agrees to pay
"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
.. . for damages sustained by any person, caused by accident.""
Several courts have decided, without discussing the question of re-
imbursement, that such language is sufficient to permit the recovery
of punitive damages.28 Reimbursement, however, would appear
crucial to such a recovery in North Carolina because of its rule that
punitive damages are awarded solely as punishment.2" For the
burden of punishment to fall on the insured, a rationale for reim-
bursement must be found. It is doubtful that reimbursement could
occur if punitive damages were allowed under this clause of the
policy."0 While the court's liberal interpretation in Roberts could
possibly be extended to allow recovery of punitive damages, a
further argument against such recovery remains: Such recovery
has no bearing on making the injured party whole, which is the
purpose of the compulsory act.
Recovery of punitive damages up to the compulsory amount of
liability insurance may have three adverse results. First, if the in-
sured is solvent and reimburses the insurer, the former bears the
burden of the award-just as he would if he initially satisfied the
judgment. Since the insurer may have to take action to be reim-
bursed, a circuity of action is possible. Second, where the insured
is insolvent, the insurer and the premium-paying public must bear
the burden. Third, if the recovery is upon an assigned risk policy
and the insured is insolvent, an anomaly results: To enable the
insured to operate a vehicle on the public highways, he was assigned
to an insurer who in turn must pay damages designed to punish
the insured for his willful misuse of the highways. A greater
.7 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C.
285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
28 See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th
Cir. 1934) (applying Missouri law); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel,
230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky.
296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947).
20E.g., Waters v. Western Union Tel. Co., 194 N.C. 188, 196, 138 S.E.
608, 612 (1927).
"Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (Supp. 1963), a policy may
provide for reimbursement of "any payment the insurance carrier would not
have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy except for the
provisions of this article." Thus, for reimbursement to occur, an award of
punitive damages would have to be based on the act, not the policy itself.
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punishment would be achieved by denying such a person the use
of the highways and thus sparing innocent victims in the first
place. But, however desirable, such a law would be indeed difficult
to contrive.
RICHARD L. BURROWS
Investment Company Act-Procedure--Demand on Shareholders
The Investment Company Act of 1940' is a statutory attempt
to regulate the internal structure and business conduct of invest-
ment companies. It specifically authorizes the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to investigate violations,2 issue orders,3 and
seek injunctions.4 A private right of action by the shareholder is not
specifically authorized. The case of Levitt v. Johnson5 faced squarely
for the first time the problem of the source of the law to be applied
in a private suit under the act.
'54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80a (Supp. V, 1963).
2 54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).
54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-39 (1958).
' 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), reversing 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass.
1963). The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, brought a derivative suit under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, against the directors of the Fidelity
Capital Fund, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, on behalf of himself and
other stockholders. The allegations generally were that the directors had
paid excessive fees that constituted a waste of corporate assets. As to the
condition precedent of making a demand on shareholders, the plaintiff alleged
as excuse for failure to make demand that
the Fund has more than 48,000 stockholders scattered all over the United
States whose identity is subject to frequent changes. A demand upon
the stockholders to take action would cast an unconscionable financial
burden on the plaintiff in that the plaintiff would have to solicit proxies
from all of the stockholders residing in every State of the Union and
foreign countries. It would involve the conduct of a proxy fight, a proxy
fight which would entail prohibitive expenses and would cause undue loss
of time with the danger that the claims alleged might be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
222 F. Supp. at 807. The court then ruled that the Massachusetts law was to
be applied; it provides that it "is only when the complaint alleges that the
majority are corrupt or are otherwise incapable of acting in good faith that
the demand upon the body of stockholders may be excused." Id. at 812.
The circuit court reversed on the grounds that the application of the Massa-
chusetts rule "negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role
to be played by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory
legislation." 334 F.2d at 819.
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In prior decisions, the state and federal courts have construed
the statute where possible and have applied the law of the state
where the transaction arose to fill the interstices; they have not ques-
tioned the source of the law applied since there has been no conflict
between federal law and state law.6
In Levitt, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling
of the District Court of Massachusetts which had applied local law
imposing very strict requirements of demand on other shareholders
before bringing a derivative action.' The circuit court said that the
application of Massachusetts law would serve to substantially stiffen
the conditions precedent to bringing suit under the act. This would
contravene the intent of the act which "is directed to 'the national
public interest and the interest of investors * * * adversely affected,'
and its 'purposes * * * with which [its] provisions * * * shall be in-
terpreted, are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the
conditions enumerated.' "8.
In saying, "we do not see how it can be gainsaid that any sub-
stantial stiffening of the conditions precedent to the bringing of
stockholders' suits above normal requirements would conflict with
this broad declaration [of policy]," ' the court established a vague
precedent. Under the Levitt decision, is state law to be adopted as
long as it does not thwart the purposes of the act, or is the vast
repository of the federal common law to be the source of the sub-
stantive principles sought? What are the normal requirements of
conditions precedent to bringing a shareholder's derivative suit?
In the past, both state and federal courts have applied state law under
the act, thereby adopting, whether consciously or unconsciously, the
applicable state law as federal law.1" Up to now this has been ade-
I For examples of the treatment of the act in prior cases, see Taussig v.
Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Acampora v. Birkland, 220
F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381
(Del. Ch. 1961); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 170 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1961).
' See note 5 supra. The Massachusetts rule as construed by the district
court, 222 F. Supp. at 812, is not a majority rule, if it is followed by any
other jurisdiction at all. For a discussion of the function of demand on share-
holders and directors, and the status of the state law in regard to demand,
see Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746 (1960); Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 71(1958).
8 334 F.2d at 819, quoting 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1958).
'334 F.2d at 819. (Emphasis added.)
10 See note 6 supra.
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quate. In Levitt, however, at least one exception has arisen to the
blanket adoption of state law, bringing the validity of that practice
up for review. The following will be an attempt to evaluate the
merits of the approaches available, and to determine which approach
should be followed.
Some state11 and circuit court 12 decisions have interpreted the
act to give a private right of action by way of a derivative suit,13
and the courts in Levitt accepted that premise.' 4 But that issue has
not been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court,1 and
if certiorari is granted in this case,'" it will certainly be a key issue.
No attempt is made to discuss the merits of this issue, and for the
purposes of this note, the assumption is made that there is at least
a derivative right of action by shareholders under the statute.'
It should be noted at the outset that the Erie" rule is not directly
applicable 9 in Levitt because jurisdiction is not based on diversity
of citizenship, but is granted by the act.20 The court must construe
the act to determine the rights of the parties, making this a federal
" Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961).
" Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961).
" See 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-43 (1958). This section gives
concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal courts of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the act.
This lends weight to the idea that the intention was to give a private right of
action, but one decision, Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th
Cir. 1961), dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962), has specifically denied
any private right under the act. See also Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutuiat
Fund Litigation-New Frontiers of the Investment Company Act, 62 CoLum.
L. REv. 72, 91 (1962) ; Note, 1961 DuxE B.J. 421.1 222 F. Supp. at 807.
" Of the recent cases, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961),
was not appealed, and Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.
1961), was dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
1 Petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3123 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1964)(No. 559).
• See note 13 supra.
'SErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case established
that in diversity of citizenship cases, the law of the state in which the suit
arises is to be applied. The case has undergone some redefining. Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But the general proposition still
applies.
" For discussion of Erie rationale in non-diversity litigation, see Hill,
State Procedural Law in Federal Non-diversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. Rv.
66 (1955); Mishkin, The Variousness of Federal Law, 105 U. PA. L. Rtv.
797 (1957).
054 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958).
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question case, in which federal, not state law is applied.2 A problem
immediately arises because there are no decisions in the federal courts
to determine the substantive rights in a derivative suit under this
statute. Therefore, the decisions as to the law to be adopted under
the act is a policy decision based upon principles of congressional
intent, convenience and certainty of administration, and a proper
deference to state substantive principles.
The court of appeals was correct in reversing the adoption of
state law by the district court if it conflicted with the intention of the
statute. In federal question cases, the federal court may adopt
state law to fill the interstices, but they are not required to do so if
it is against reason or federal policy, and especially if it would
substantially negate the intendment of the act."
Where implementation of the statute is not definitely prescribed
in the statute, the procedure of the federal and state courts of adopt-
ing the state law enforcing rights under the statute has advantages
of relative simplicity of administration and relative certainty of
result. By adopting state law, the courts have a more or less es-
tablished body of law on which to draw, but in applying federal law
not based on the law of the state of jurisdiction, they must look to
the federal common law.2 3 If there are no prior decisions in point,
the end result is based on the declaration of policy in the statute,
a judge's interpretation of legislative intent, uncertain analogies, and
a declaration of what the "general" law is. In such cases the decision
may be just, but with all the undecided variables, an educated guess
of what the outcome will be is nearly impossible.
Added to simplicity of administration and certainty of result,
the adoption of state law would be in line with the idea of recog-
nizing state sovereignty and maximum deference to state substantive
law as in the rationale of Erie and its successors.24
Additional factors to be considered are the diversity of the law
1, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also
I BARRON & HoLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25 (Wright
ed. 1960); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (1963).
"2 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 21, at 367; Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939). See
also Mishkin, supra note 19, at 802.
"s The federal common law is that body of law that is built from con-
struction of the Constitution, legislation, or treaties of the United States.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
" See Hill, supra note 19, at 71; Mishkin, supra note 19, at 810.
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from state to state, the number of states that have settled the issue,
and whether or not the state law serves the purpose of the act. If
the law is uniform and well settled in most states there is no real
problem, since results would be predictable and uniform whether
the court adopted state law or established a uniform federal common
law based on the aggregate of the state laws. As the state laws be-
come more diverse, the argument for predictability would support
the application of state law while that for uniformity would not.
Where few states have settled the issue, the argument for uniformity
becomes stronger. There is very little uniformity in the require-
ments for demand on shareholders." This might indicate that there
is need for a uniform rule, but it also shows that there is little uni-
formity from which the courts can derive such a rule. It would
seem obvious that so long as federal legislation is being construed,
any state rule that negated the purpose of this act could not be ap-
plied.
As intimated above, and as the holding of Levitt points out,
the state law cannot be adopted in federal question cases where its
application would clearly block the purposes of the statute. Assum-
ing, but not yet admitting, that the adoption of the state law is the
correct policy, this restriction must be added to it. In simplest
terms, this policy would be that state law is to be adopted as far as it
does not thwart the purposes of the statute. All the preceding con-
siderations for and against the application of state law apply, but
here an additional problem arises. This problem is how to determine
just what state law serves the purposes of the statute, and what
impedes it.
In the context of Levitt, the district court determined that de-
mand on 48,000 shareholders was not to be excused, even where their
identity was subject to frequent change and they were spread all over
the United States and foreign countries, and which demand would
result in an extremely expensive proxy fight. Is the act thwarted by
this rule? Such a requirement in practice would certainly prevent
shareholders from going to the expense and trouble of trying to
enforce compliance with the fiduciary standards imposed on directors
by the act. Accepting the premise that a private right of action is
authorized, and that the intent of the act is to impose a more strin-
gent regulation over directors' actions than under common law,
" See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 747 (1960).
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then it would certainly appear that the Massachusetts rule would
severely limit the purpose of the act.
All conditions precedent to bringing a derivative suit more or
less restrict its availability. It is considered an extraordinary remedy
in that all intra-corporate remedies should first be exhausted; hence
the requirement of demand on directors and shareholders to bring
suit. -6 Levitt recognized the value of these restrictions by saying
that normal requirements of derivative suits do not thwart the act."
It is submitted that another factor, admittedly no less vague yet
distinguishable, is that the requirement must be a reasonable one.
A normal requirement is probably one that is generally accepted
among the states, whereas an unreasonable requirement would be
one that, in the light of modern corporate practice, the number of
shareholders, the evil sought to be corrected, and the validity of the
suit, is prohibitive beyond its usefulness in preventing frivolous or
strike suits. Some states require a bond by the plaintiff in a deriva-
tive suit to prevent frivolous or strike suits. It is submitted that
such a requirement is reasonable and normal within the meaning
of Levitt.
There is serious disagreement among states as to what are con-
ditions precedent for bringing derivative suits, and what constitutes
an adequate excuse for failure to perform them.2 1 It would be use-
less to speculate as to each requirement, but it is submitted that if the
principle under discussion is the one to be accepted by the courts,
only the most restrictive and unreasonable would not be normal
requirements under the act, especially in light of the fact that the
right to bring a private suit under the act is still arguable.29 Ob-
viously legislative intent does not show on the face of the act so
plainly that it can be said that any restriction on bringing suit under
the act contravenes its intent. Absent a broader and more authorita-
tive declaration of policy under the act, it is submitted that Levitt
should not be extended to any great degree, if at all, beyond its facts.
" Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See Note, 73 HARv. L. Rv.
746, 748 (1960).
27 334 F.2d at 819.
28 See Note, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 746, 754 (1960).
2' If it is not evident from the act that there is a private right, it follows
that it is not evident that all restrictions on bringing derivative suits are to
be abolished. Accepting the premise that there is a private right, however,
it is only logical that very restrictive conditions that amount to a denial of
that right should not be applied.
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Absent a change in policy brought about by the Supreme Court
or by remedial legislation, convenience and the weight of authority
will probably perpetuate the principle that the courts will adopt the
state conditions precedent for derivative suits brought under the act
unless they impose serious restrictions. Nevertheless, it may be
helpful to mention the other possible approaches.
Theoretically, the courts could accept the policy of adopting
those requirements for derivative suits that are common practice
among the states and that would not defeat the act. This is the
federal common law approach. Comparing this policy with that of
adopting state law except where it negates the purpose of the act,
the body of the common law would be built up from case to case
throughout all jurisdictions; and a case in one jurisdiction estab-
lishing a substantive principle would be strong authority in another
jurisdiction. But where the existing state law is adopted, the effect
is to subtract the necessary exceptions from the existing law; and
only those exceptions to state law would be authority from one
jurisdiction to another. It is clear that the better policy for the sake
of certainty and convenience of administration would be to adopt
the state law except where it thwarts the purpose of the act, rather
than to attempt to build a substantive federal common law of require-
ments for bringing a derivative suit.
In spite of the foregoing argument, there are cogent and self-
evident reasons3° for having a uniform national policy of admin-
"0 Uniformity under a federal statute is usually desirable so that results
will not vary with the accident of jurisdiction. However, by application of
state derivative requirements, it does not seem that the results will vary sig-
nificantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction although the plaintiff may be
faced with different qualifying requirements before bringing a derivative
suit. As seen in Levitt, if these requirements are not normal or reasonable
as suggested by this note, then the court may strike the offensive require-
ment. Once past the requirements to get into court by way of a derivative
suit, the construction of the statute as to the merits of the claim undoubtedly
should be derived from a judicially declared uniform federal rule. The fact
that Levitt is the first case since 1940 to raise the question of whether state
law of conditions precedent is to be applied shows that there is no pressing
need for a uniform policy covering this essentially procedural question, since
the application of state law has been sufficient in the past and has adequately
served to qualify shareholders to bring a derivative suit.
The adoption of state law in this instance is not primarily to protect state
sovereignty or a state interest, because the states probably do not have an
interest in securities regulation that is separate from or paramount to the
federal interest. The reason for adopting the state law is simply that there
is a body of law on which to draw that serves the purpose of the act except
in certain limited situations, such as the one in Levitt.
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istration under the Investment Company Act; but unless the policy
is created fully formed, the uncertainties during the growth period
outweigh the arguments for uniformity. An extensive and definitive
statement of policy from the Supreme Court could alleviate much
of the uncertainty; but it does not seem that this is the function of
the Court, notwithstanding the recent decision of J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak.3" Judicial legislation of this degree should be avoided,
especially when there is a reasonable alternative. It is suggested that
there is a reasonable alternative in the continuation of the policy
of adopting state law, thereby confining the power of the Court to a
declaration of policy of what substantive principles thwart the pur-
pose of the act.
The acceptable means for creating this uniform or certain policy
is by legislation.2 If Congress decides that a private right of action
was intended or is needed, that could be specifically stated and the
means established by which it is to be asserted. Congress could say
that the shareholder has only a derivative right of action, or that
he has a direct right, or both. It could then establish the law or
specify that the state law be applied. This would be the ideal solu-
tion to the problem, but it is unlikely that this will come about until
the law becomes hopelessly muddled or Congress decides that the
act, as interpreted by the courts, does not accomplish its purpose.
The Supreme Court could close out all speculation by declaring
that there is to be no private right of action. This cannot be relied
As an argument for the adoption of a uniform judge-made policy, the
argument in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
is persuasive; but it is not compelling because the need for a uniform federal
policy of conditions precedent for a derivative suit under the Investment
Company Act is not as pressing as that needed to be filled under the Taft-
Hartley Act, § 301(a). Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). As a practical matter, it is doubtful
whether the question decided in Levitt will arise again outside Massachusetts.
Accordingly, the opportunity to build a reliable body of judge-made law will
probably not present itself, thus leaving the state of the law in limbo.
s 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Court in this case gave a direct private right
of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 48 Stat.
895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1958). The act had not provided for one.
The Court said that it had the power to effectuate the purposes of the act
where Congress had not specifically done so.
. Congress at least has a hint that the act has not curbed the abuses at
which it was aimed, and it authorized a study of the effect of the act.
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
Doc. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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upon any more than Congressional clarification. Accordingly,
lawyers and judges must live with the situation as it stands.
The most probable and under the circumstances the most reason-
able approach is that taken by Levitt and the previous decisions under
the act. That approach is to adopt the law of the state in its entirety,
except where the requirement for demand on shareholders or other
conditions precedent to bringing of the derivative suit so seriously
and unreasonably burden the shareholder as to prevent him from
bringing an otherwise bona fide suit under the act.
Following this rationale, Levitt will probably have very little
effect outside of Massachusetts, but it will have a substantial effect
in Massachusetts, the home of many investment companies. The
effect will be to make the Investment Company Act available to
shareholders who wish to attempt to enforce its provisions against
directors without having to make a demand on the multitude of
shareholders who are generally not interested in the internal opera-
tion of the company.
WILLIAM H. CANNON
Procedural Rules-Emergency--Judge's Discretion
The recent case of Application of President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.' tests the powers of a judge to violate
usual procedural rules in an emergency situation. A patient, who had
voluntarily submitted herself for treatment at Georgetown Hospital,
refused to authorize blood transfusions which the doctors believed
necessary to save her life. After the patient's husband had also re-
fused to authorize the transfusions, the hospital's attorneys pre-
sented to a federal district judge an order authorizing transfusions
"necessary to save her life,"2 and requested him to sign it. The
judge denied the order without comment, and the attorneys then
orally petitioned a single judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Judge Skelly Wright, in chambers to sign the order.
Judge Wright went to the hospital, talked with the patient and her
husband, and discovered them adamant in their conviction that blood
transfusions amount to "drinking blood," a practice strongly con-
dened by their religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses. He advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel, but after making a telephone
1331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
2 Id. at 1001 n.1.
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call, the husband informed Judge Wright that he had discussed the
matter with his church and had decided he did not want counsel.
Judge Wright then, in the presence of members of the hospital staff,
the hospital's counsel, and the patient's husband, signed the order
just one hour and twenty minutes after it had been first presented
to him. The transfusions were administered, and the patient there-
after recovered and left the hospital.
Judge Wright's action was affirmed by the court en banc with-
out explanation in a per curiam decision,' accompanied by four
concurring and dissenting opinions.4
While this case raises a multitude of questions, both constitu-
tional5 and procedural,6 the scope of this note is confined to the
questions of whether the basic rules of procedure were violated in
this case and, if so, whether the violations were justified by the
emergency situation. For present purposes it is assumed that Judge
Wright had authority to act as a judge of original jurisdiction in
this matter.
Judge Wright's action can be attacked on the grounds that no
complaint was filed, 7 so that no action was commenced under Federal
Rule 3,3 and the jurisdiction of the court therefore never invoked.9
Judge Wright treated the order itself as sufficient, since it sub-
stantively met all the requirements of a complaint, particularly in
view of the fact that under Federal Rule 5 (e) "the judge may per-
'Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
'Judge Washington concurred on grounds that the order had expired by
its own terms and was therefore moot. Ibid. Judge Danaher "would dismiss
for lack of a case or controversy." Id. at 1011. Judge Miller, strongly dis-
senting, argued that the jurisdiction of the district court had never been
invoked since there had been no complaint as required by Federal Rule 3,
so that an appellate judge could not act, there being nothing to appeal from
the district court. He further maintained that a single judge had no authority
to hear an appeal. Ibid. Judge Berger asserted that the petition should be
dismissed on grounds that there was no justiciable controversy, since the
hospital had no standing to sue. Id. at 1015.
' For discussions of constitutional questions, see Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
706 (1964); Comment, 9 UTAH L. REv. 161 (1964).
'For a discussion of the validity of Judge Wright's actions in his capacity
as a single appellate judge, see Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1964).
'Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
8 "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
o Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
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mit the papers to be filed with him"'1 rather than with the clerk.
This argument is supported by the general proposition that a plead-
ing shall be construed by its contents rather than by its caption.,
Judge Wright alternatively asserted that "the lack of a com-
plaint is not jurisdictional and . . .when there has been no timely
objection, a valid judgment may properly be entered in such an in-
formal litigation."' 2 While there are cases in accord with this argu-
ment,"3 it should be observed that in each of these cases there was
either express waiver of the complaint by agreement of the parties,' 4
waiver by failure of the defendant to answer after he had been duly
served,' 5 or waiver by the defendant's failure to object to the form
of the complaint in his answer.' 6 There is no evidence that the
patient or her husband waived objection in Georgetown unless it can
be said that a general appearance was made.' 7 Some state cases have
held that a judgment is void without proper commencement of the
action by the filing of a complaint, even when the defendant appears
and argues the case on the merits,'8 or when the parties have ex-
pressly agreed to waive the pleadings.'0
But, even assuming that the order is acceptable as a complaint
or that the lack of a complaint can be waived, there was no service
1 Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1001 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoting from FED. R. Civ. P.
5(e). For a case applying the rule, see Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 51 (D.N.J. 1947), aff'd on rehearing. 8 F.R.D. 155 (D.N.J. 1948).
"E.g., Harris v. Embrey, 105 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Russell v.
Bovard, 153 Kan. 729, 113 P.2d 1064 (1941); State ex rel. Gay v. District
Court of St. Louis County, 200 Minn. 207, 273 N.W. 701 (1937).
" Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000, 1001 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964), quoting 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 3.04, at 719 (2d ed. 1964).
1 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957)(applying the federal rules); Vider v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. App. 595,
aff'd, 164 Ill. 354, 45 N.E. 720 (1896); Leach v. Western North Carolina
R.R., 65 N.C. 486 (1871). Cf. Hall v. Law, 102 U.S. 461 (1880).
"Vider v. City of Chicago, supra note 13. See also N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 250 (1953).
' Leach v. Western North Carolina R.R., 65 N.C. 486 (1871).
10 Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1957).
1 See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
' Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441, 109 So. 179 (1926).
' New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisbach, 104 Conn. 322, 133 At. 99(1926). See dictum in Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 283 (1876), which
states "the decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written
pleadings, would be an idle act. .. "
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of process 20 upon the proper parties in this action, and indeed, it is
not clear who the proper parties are. However, assuming that the
hospital is a proper party to bring the action,2 ' then presumably the
patient would be the proper defendant, since only she, or her personal
representative, would have the right to bring an action against the
hospital for malpractice. 22 If so, the service requirement was clearly
violated, since the patient was neither served with process, nor did she
make an appearance at the "hearing. 21 3 However, Judge Wright
suggested that the patient was obviously incompetent at the time2 '
and thus seemed to assume her husband to be the proper party to the
action.
It is commonly accepted that a husband can, in an emergency and
when his wife is incapable of doing so, authorize medical treat-
ment for her.25 Whether he is, in such a situation, her guardian for
all purposes has apparently never been decided. Perhaps he can
be considered a proper "representative" under Federal Rule 17(c).26
20While under the Federal Rules filing of a complaint is the proper
manner of commencing an action (see note 8 supra), service of process
generally commences an action in the "code" states. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-14, -88 (1953). The Federal Rules require service of process to follow
the filing of the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 5.
" Judge Wright contended that the hospital was a proper party to bring
a declaratory judgment action (he described the action as "in the nature
of an injunction and declaratory judgment," 331 F.2d at 1002), since it
faced possible civil and criminal liability if the patient died due to lack of
proper treatment. Id. at 1009. Judge Berger challenged this contention on
grounds that the patient and her husband consented to sign a release. 331
F.2d at 1015. Judge Wright argued that a release could not relieve the hos-
pital's criminal liability. 331 F.2d at 1009 n.18. Quaere: What criminal
liability could arise under these circumstances?
2"FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). A husband has no right of action against a
surgeon for malpractice against his wife. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79
N.E. 562 (1906).
"Judge Wright termed the gathering of hospital officials, their attorneys,
and the patient's husband at which he signed the order a "hearing." 331
F.2d at 1002 n.4.
" There is a serious question as to whether a judge can decide incom-
petency without a hearing. See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
" However, it should be noted that the authority commonly given for
this statement, while implying a husband has such authority, expressly does
not decide the point. Pratt v. Davis, 224 IIl. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). See
41 Am. JuR. Physician and Surgeons § 111 (1942).
"Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such
as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incom-
petent person. If an infant orrincompetent person does not have a duly
appointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
1965]
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It has been held that this rule does not make the appointment of a
guardian ad litem mandatory," if the incompetent person is ably
represented otherwise.2" However, failure to appoint a guardian
must be the result of the court's considering all the circumstances,
and, if such failure is merely an oversight of the judge,2 or if the
representation is inadequate, 30 then it is reversible error. The in-
terest of the court in all cases is whether or not the infant or incom-
petent is represented adequately at the trial.31 Hence, in Georgetown,
even though Judge Wright advised the patient's husband to secure
counsel and even though he presumably assumed the husband to be
his wife's representative, perhaps the fact that the patient's husband
did not obtain counsel invalidated a potentially valid representation
of the patient at the hearing. For, despite the opportunity the hus-
band was given, the fact that he did not avail himself of that oppor-
tunity resulted in the patient's interests not being adequately repre-
sented, thus defeating the primary purpose of the rule.32 Rule 17 (c)
apparently gives a court no authority over the incapacitated person,
other than in his capacity as a party.33
Any standing the patient's husband may have as a party to the
action must be based upon the assumption that Judge Wright could,
on the basis of his brief encounter with the patient at the hospital,
declare her legally incompetent. The validity of such an assumption
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant
or incompetent person.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
27Westcott v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.
1946).
" A representative may be considered sufficient, even though not duly
appointed by the court. Westcott v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra
note 27; Rutland v. Sikes, 203 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.S.C. 1962); Russick v.
Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949). See also Tart v. Register, 257
N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962).
"' Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
" Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1948).
" See Narron v. Musgrave, 236 N.C. 388, 73 S.E.2d 6 (1952).
8We spell out the rule to mean: (1) as a matter of proper procedure,
the court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem; (2) but the Court
may, after weighing all the circumstances, issue such order as will pro-
tect the minor in lieu of appointment of a guardian ad litem; (3) and may
even decide that such appointment is unnecessary, though only after the
Court has considered the matter and made a judicial determination that
the infant is protected without a guardian.
Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958). (Emphasis
added.)88 In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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is very doubtful. Under the District of Columbia Code equity has
jurisdiction over insane persons,34 but this has been construed to
mean after an adjudication of insanity has been made.3" Such ad-
judication requires investigations by the Commission of Mental
Health,3 service upon the party to be adjudged,3 7 counsel for the
alleged incompetent person,38 and a jury trial if the alleged incom-
petent person demands it.39 Implicit in all these safeguards is the
idea that a person's freedom to make his own decisions is not to be
disposed of lightly.40
Even if the adjudication procedure could be modified in a proper
case and even if Judge Wright is deemed to have appointed the
husband as his wife's guardian by implication, the problem of lack
of service of process persists.4 The only alternative to service of
process is a general appearance before the court by the person to be
served. 2 It could be argued that the patient's husband did make a
general appearance in Georgetown on the grounds that he must have
known Judge Wright's action was to have some legal significance,
since he had been informed to obtain counsel, and that he was present
at the "hearing" when the order was signed. The fact that he may
not have known the legal effect of his appearance is not fatal, as
long as the appearance was made.4
Even though the rules of procedure have been circumvented in
Georgetown, perhaps an emergency situation requires some deviation
from the normal rules. The emergency aspect of Georgetown is
analogous to situations that permit a temporary restraining order to
3121 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301 (1961).
" Cooper v. Burton, 127 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1942).1821 D.C. CODE ANN. § 308 (1961).
'721 D.C. CODE ANN. § 311 (1961).
" Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"021 D.C. CODE ANN. § 312 (1961). For similar requirements under
state statute, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1963).
"See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). The Court held that a
judge could not, during a criminal trial, declare the defendant insane and
commit him to an asylum without his having pleaded insane or his having
been adjudged insane by normal procedures. But see Moore v. Lewis, 250
N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959), where the court held that, in a case where a
guardian ad litem was appointed for a purpose other than that of representing
the incompetent at an insanity hearing, "an inquisition to determine the
sanity of the defendant is not a condition precedent to the appointment."
Id. at 80, 108 S.E.2d at 28.
" See note 20 supra.
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-103 (1958).
" Beardsley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 137 A.2d 752 (1957).
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issue without service of process.4 4 Judge Wright indicated that he
considered the order he signed a temporary restraining order, 4' and,
certainly, the compelling reasons for waiver of process in the more
conventional temporary-restraining-order situation are present-ur-
gency, and an alternative result of irreparable injury. Moreover,
Judge Wright's primary rationale for signing the order was the
classic purpose of any preliminary injunction-"to maintain the
status quo and prevent the issue respecting the rights of the parties
in the premises from becoming moot before full consideration was
possible."4 However, the order did not, in fact, preserve the status
quo; rather, it "completely changed the status quo ante by granting
fully and finally all of the relief sought, thus disposing of the matter
on its merits,"4 7 and leaving nothing more to litigate.48 But because
of the exigency of the situation, the status quo in this case could not
be preserved by any action, or inaction, of Judge Wright. He was
faced with the alternative of either saving the patient's life, with the
result that she would be forever "contaminated" by the blood she had
received, or allowing her to die, with the result that there is nothing
to litigate except the hospital's possible liability for her death.40
"FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"331 F.2d at 1003. Judge Wright calls his order a "temporary order,"
and cites Federal Rule 65(b).
" 331 F.2d at 1007. See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04-.05 (2d ed.
1964).
"' Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
" It is generally held that interlocutory injunctive relief will not be
given when the effect is to give plaintiff the relief he seeks without having a
trial. E.g., Kleins' Restaurant Corp. v. McLain, 293 Ill. App. 54, 11 N.E.2d
644 (1937) (where a temporary injunction against defendants' picketing
plaintiff's restaurant was set aside); Dallas Independent School Dist. v.
Daniel, 323 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (where a temporary restrain-
ing order reinstating a custodian who had been fired was held to be void).
"' Judge Wright's order is somewhat comparable to a preliminary manda-
tory injunction, and there are occasional dicta declaring that, in cases of ex-
treme hardship where plaintiff's right is clear and certain, a preliminary
mandatory injunction will issue, even though it in effect gives plaintiff all
the relief he seeks. Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F.2d 873 (6th Cir.
1962); City of Decatur v. Meadors, 235 Ala. 544, 180 So. 550 (1938); Moss
Indus., Inc. v. Irving Metals Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 484, 55 A.2d 30 (Ch. 1947).
Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 213, 224 (1951). At least one case so holds. Texas
Pipe Line Co. v. Burton Drilling Co., 54 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
In that case, plaintiff was granted a temporary injunction ordering defendant
to carry plaintiff's oil through defendant's pipe line. The court stressed
defendant's public duty and the fact that defendant's hardship was trivial
when compared with plaintiff's hardship. In Georgetown the petitioners'
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An analogy can be made between Georgetown and the "sick
child" decisions " that have upheld orders for medical treatment for
minor children in emergency situations, despite the religious ob-
jections of the parents. This analogy is especially pertinent in view
of Judge Wright's assumption that the patient was "in extremis and
hardly compos inentis at the time," making it "the duty of a court
of general jurisdiction... to assume the responsibility of guardian-
ship for her, as for a child, at least to the extent of authorizing treat-
ment to save her life."'" The relevancy of the sick child cases is
diminished, however, by the strong probability that Judge Wright
did not have jurisdiction over the patient as an incompetent.52 All
of the sick child decisions seem to have been decided by authority of
some type of statutory grant of jurisdiction over "neglected" chil-
dren under the doctrine of parens patria.13 Only one case suggests
that a court has other than statutory jurisdiction under the parens
patria doctrine. 4
The sick child cases, if relevant at all, would seem to be so not
so much for their sanctioning of emergency medical treatment as
for the procedure that they followed in an emergency situation. Most
of the cases follow standard rules of procedure culminating in a
hearing at which either a guardian is appointed for the purpose of
approving the treatment or the treatment is authorized by a direct
court order, as the statute involved dictates.5 However, two of the
right is by no means clear, and balancing hardships is extremely difficult and
produces no clear-cut conclusion.
" See, e.g., People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d
769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128,
263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Ohio 1962);
Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
331 F.2d at 1008.
' See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952)
(ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2006-07 (Supp. 1963)); State v. Perricone,
37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-9, 9:6-3 to -4,
9:6-11 (1960)) ; In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933)
(N.Y. CHILDREN'S COURT AcT §§ 1-28); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P.
Ohio 1962) (Onio REv. CODE § 2151.33 (1953)); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. §§ 2330-37
(1964)).
"' In re Clark, supra note 53 (dictum). The court was, however, acting
by authority of a statute.
" Guardians were appointed in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d
751 (1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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cases, State v. Perricone8 and In re Clark,5 7 represent a departure
from normal procedure. In Perricone the complaint was oral, and
both the formal pleadings and notice were waived."8 The procedure
followed in Clark strikingly resembles that of Georgetown. In Clark
the court received an oral application for authority to administer
blood transfusions to the three-year-old son of Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the court issued an order authorizing the transfusions before
any service was had upon the parents or a hearing was held. While
the court had extensive statutory authority,"0 it considered such ac-
tion within its "broad equitable jurisdiction" even without the
statute.6 0 The court was not concerned with the fact that the normal
rules of procedure had been circumvented, since
the law provides extraordinary remedies too; e.g., the temporary
restraining order, whereby, for cause shown, the court may act
first and inquire later.
Where a child's well-being, especially his life is concerned, it
would be precisely preposterous to withhold all measures in his
behalf until a time for hearing had been found (or made) in the
court's overflowing calendar; notices had been prepared; citations
had been served; and hearing held-at best a week or two later....
The court had not only the right but the duty to act in the
child's behalf first and give the parents their day in court later.01
The constitutional questions raised by the Georgetown case chal-
lenge Judge Wright's authority to act at all in this situation. But,
assuming his authority to act in some manner, the question of proper
Treatment was administered under direct court order in In re Vasko, 238
App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933); It re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128
(C.P. Ohio 1962). Assuming Judge Wright could get jurisdiction over the
patient under 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301 (1961), the broad language of that
statute would seem to permit either procedure.
"37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
"185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Ohio 1962).
"It is not clear from the report how the pleadings and notice were
waived. However, the parents were represented at the hearing by counsel,
who argued the case on the merits after his motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction was overruled. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751
(1962).
" Upon the certificate of one or more reputable practicing physicians, the
court may summarily provide for emergency medical and surgical treat-
ment which appears to be immediately necessary for any child concerning
whom a complaint or an application for care has been filed, pending the
service of a citation upon its parents, guardian, or custodian.
OHIO IZEV. CODE § 2151.33 (1953). Note that the court in Clark considered
an oral application sufficient to satisfy the statute.
" In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130 (C.P. Ohio 1962).
11 Id. at 130-31.
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procedure presents the dilemma of whether to preserve the basic con-
cepts of law through orderly process, on the one hand, or to act
decisively while it is still possible, on the other. Some procedure
must be preserved, and perhaps the best way to do that is through
the judge's own thought processes. In a recent federal decision6 2
concerning failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor, a judge
was reversed not because he had failed to appoint a guardian, but
because he had failed to give the matter careful consideration, so that
his decision was based on inadvertence. Not the decision itself, but
the mode of arriving at it seemed significant to the court. Perhaps
Judge Wright was on the right track when he gave the interested
parties actual notice of his intention to act and when he advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel. Perhaps he should have
gone further in actually explaining to the parties the legal sig-
nificance of what he might do and their rights with respect to it.
Of course, there is great virtue in the mechanics of service of
process and filing of pleadings, for such devices nurture the Ameri-
can ideal-law over man. But, in an emergency situation, perhaps the
best that can be done is to require the judge to adhere to the rules of
procedure as closely as possible, yet allow discretion to temper them.
DORis R. BRAY
Taxation-Estate Planningm-The Marital Deduction-Formula Be-
quests
The marital deduction was first introduced into the federal
estate tax law in 19481 to eliminate the inequities2 between tax
treatment of estates in common law states and those in community
property states. It allows a deduction of up to fifty per cent of the
adjusted gross estates for the value of any property interest, other
"2 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
"Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117, amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056).
For a discussion of the history of the marital deduction see, United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
2 LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 368-70 (2d ed.
1962).
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (1). The adjusted gross estate is
derived by subtracting from the gross estate expenses and deductions allowed
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2053, 2054. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056(c) (2) (A). It is a concept primarily designed for determining the
marital deduction. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 5 (1948).
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than community property, passing from the decedent to the sur-
viving spouse.4 Generally, property included in the decedent's
gross estate5 which passes to the surviving spouse in such a way as
to be taxed in her estate, assuming she still owns it at the time of
her death,' is eligible for the marital deduction. For many it is the
most important deduction in federal estate tax law.7
Since its enactment seventeen years ago, various methods have
evolved to express the size of the marital deduction. Among these
are nonformula s and formula9 bequests. The two most widely used
formulas are the fractional share0 formula and the pecuniary in-
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
' GRIswOLD, FEDERAL TAxATION 942 (5th ed. 1960).
7 ESTATE PLANNERS QuARTaRLY 272 (Huber ed. 1962); Sargent, A.B.C.
and D. of Marital Deductions, 7 TAX Couxs -oa's Q. 178, 180-81 (1963).
See 2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 7155 for a demonstration as to how much
it is possible to save in the first estate through use of the marital deduction
in estates of various sizes.
'The nonformula bequest is represented by a sum certain gift where
testator leaves "the sum of one hundred thousand dollars" to my beloved wife,
Jane, or by a fractional gift where testator leaves, "one-half of my residuary
estate" to my beloved wife, Jane. 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 792, 794
(3d ed. 1961). These two methods are employed when testator desires to
leave a definite amount, specific property, or a certain percentage of his estate
to his surviving spouse without being concerned with obtaining the exact
amount of the maximum allowable deduction.
'The formula marital bequest arose when lawyers were faced with a
client who wanted his wife to receive the exact amount of the maximum
marital deduction and not a cent more; a formula seemed to be the only
solution. Stevens, Fourteen Years of Marital Deduction, N.Y.U. 21ST INST.
ON FED. TAX 257, 271 (1963). A formula clause by definition seeks to de-
fine the property passing to the surviving spouse in terms such that regardless
of the size and nature of the decedent's estate, the surviving spouse will re-
ceive, from all sources combined, just sufficient property to fully utilize the
marital deduction. A formula clause serves no purpose if decedent desires
to leave his spouse more or less than the maximum marital deduction. Burch,
Use and Misuse of the Marital Deduction, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX INST. 609,
641. The formula provisions apply equally to outright gifts or gifts left in
trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
" The fractional share formula creates a gift of the designated fractional
share of each item in the fund to which the described fraction is to be applied.
Casner, Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 190 (1960). When
this formula appears in a will, the residuary estate normally will be the
fund against which the designated fraction is applied. 1 CASNER, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 798. Professor Casner suggests the following words to
create a fractional share formula:
If my said wife survives me, I give to ... the following described frac-
tional share of my residuary estate:
The numerator of the fraction shall be the maximum estate tax
marital deduction (allowable in determining the Federal estate tax payable
by reason of my death) minus the value for Federal estate tax purposes
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terest formula. The first of these to be developed was the pecuniary
interest formula which allocates an amount for the benefit of the
marital distributee equal to one-half of testator's adjusted gross
estate." The next step in the formula's development was to add a
clause to the governing instrument giving the executor power to
satisfy the bequest in kind so that the assets of the estate would not
have to be liquidated for distribution in cash.'2 However, when the
of all items in my gross estate which qualify for said deductions and
which pass or have passed in a form which qualifies for the estate tax
marital deduction from me to my said wife (the words 'pass or have
passed' shall have the same meaning as such words shall have under
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time of my
death) under other provisions of this will, by right of survivorship with
respect to jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements re-
lating to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under this fractional
share gift of my residuary estate (in computing the numerator, the
values as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes shall con-
trol); and the denominator of the fraction shall be the value of my
residuary estate (the value of my residuary estate shall be determined
on the basis of the values as finally determined for Federal estate tax
purposes).
CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 308 (Supp. 1964). To illustrate the fractional
share formula, assume an adjusted gross estate of $200,000 and those assets
composing the residuary estate as being valued at $170,000 as determined for
federal estate tax purposes. The numerator of Casner's formula is the
maximum estate tax marital deduction and is equal to $100,000. The de-
nominator of the fraction is the value of those assets composing the
residuary estate as determined for federal estate tax purposes. Here the
denominator is $170,000 and the fraction appears as $100,000/$170,000. In
determining the estate tax, when the fraction is applied to the assets com-
posing the residuary estate valued at federal estate tax values, the de-
nominator and the assets composing the residuary estate cancel out, leaving
a maximum marital deduction of $100,000; i.e., $100,000/$170,000 X $170,000
= $100,000. In making distribution, the above fraction is applied to the assets
composing the residuary estate valued at the date of distribution. Dane,
Marital Deduction Questions, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 112, 113 (1964). The
marital distributee will consequently share in appreciation and depreciation
of the estate under the fractional share formula. If the assets composing the
residuary estate have doubled in value by the time of distribution, the marital
distributee will receive 10/17 X $340,000 or $200,000. However, if they
have depreciated to half, the marital distributee will receive 10/17 X $85,000,
or $50,000. See Smith, Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 32 TAXES 15(1954). In addition to allowing the marital distributee to share in the ap-
preciation of the estate, the fractional share formula creates no capital
gains problem for the estate because no right to any specific dollar amount
is being satisfied. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 286; Casner, Frac-
tional Share Marital Gifts, Trust Bull., March 1960, pp. 42, 43. For a good
discussion of the fractional share clause see Durbin, Marital Deduction For-
inula Revisited, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES 545 (1963).
"Lauritzen, The Marital Deduction, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 318 (1964).
In re Campbell's Will, 144 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Surr. Ct. 1955) ; In re Lazar's
Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Surr. Ct. 1930); 3 SCOT, TRUSTS
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executor was given this power, he was required by law to value the
property so distributed as of the date of distribution unless a con-
trary date was expressed in the instrument.'3 And, if an appreciated
asset were used to satisfy the pecuniary bequest in kind to the marital
distributee, the estate would realize a gain in the amount of the
difference between the basis of the appreciated asset and the amount
of the bequest so satisfied. 4 When a specific bequest is left to the
surviving spouse, the pecuniary interest formula is considered to
create a bequest to the marital distributee of a specific sum, the sum
becoming fixed in amount when the amount of the adjusted gross
estate is established. When the executor is allowed to substitute
assets in kind in satisfaction of this specific amount, he is con-
sidered to have made a "sale or exchange" of those assets. The
estate's basis is the fair market value at the requisite estate tax
valuation date. Accordingly, when these assets, valued as of date
of distribution, are "sold" in satisfaction of the specific pecuniary
amount, any excess of this fictional "selling price" over their basis
is treated as recognized gain. To avoid the realization of this gain,
the executor came to be instructed in the instrument to satisfy the
marital bequest with property valued at its date of death estate tax
value."5 The last step in development of the formula, along with the
elimination of gain, opened new doors for the executor to engage in
post mortem estate planning.16 This is best illustrated by way of
example.
Suppose testator's will contained the following pecuniary interest
formula bequest :'r
I give, devise, and bequeath to my wife... an amount equal to
fifty per cent of my adjusted gross estate as finally determined for
§ 347.6 (2d ed. 1956); Lloyd, Background of Drafting Problems, 103 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 898 (1964); Zimmerman, The Effect of In-Kind Settlements,
N.Y.U. 22d INsT. ON FED. TAX 1111 (1964).
1" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Reed, 229 Mass. 267, 118 N.E. 333
(1918); In the Matter of Clark, 251 N.Y. 458, 167 N.E. 586 (1929).
", Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948); Kenan
v. Commisioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957) ; Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. BUL.. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270,
1956-1 CuM. BULL. 325.
Bronston, State and Federal Taxation, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 887(1957).
1 Goldern, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 536, 537 (1964).
" For a good discussion and several variations on the pecuniary interest
formula see Cox, Types of Marital Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15r INST. ON
FED. TAX 909, 926-30 (1957).
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federal estate tax purposes .... My executors shall have full au-
thority to satisfy this bequest, wholly or partly in cash or kind...
provided however, that any property so conveyed . . . shall be
valued for that purpose at the value thereof as finally determined
for federal estate tax purposes.
Assume that at date of death testator's adjusted gross estate is com-
posed of two blocks of corporate stock, Stock A and Stock B, each
valued as of that time at 200,000 dollars. Using date of death estate
tax values the formula would yield 200,000 dollars for the marital
distributee. However, by the time of distribution, some time after
date of death, Stock A had appreciated in value to 300,000 dollars
and Stock B had depreciated in value to 100,000 dollars. With dis-
cretionary power in the executor to satisfy the bequest in kind at
estate tax values, the executor would be able to transfer Stock B to
the marital distributee and Stock A to the residuary legatee.' Thus,
the decedent's estate obtains credit for the full value of the marital
deduction and would pay federal estate tax on 200,000 dollars. Upon
the subsequent death of the widow her gross estate would include
assets of 100,000 dollars, assuming that they had not been disposed
of during her lifetime and had not further changed in value. The
result is an aggregate taxable estate for husband and wife of 300,000
dollars, thereby allowing 100,000 dollars in value to escape inclusion
in either estate. It was practice of this nature which provoked the
Internal Revenue Service into issuing Revenue Procedure 64-19.1"
In Rev. Proc. 64-19, the Commissioner has asserted that he will
deny the entire marital deduction in the event of any pecuniary be-
quest or transfer to a surviving spouse unless, by applicable state
law20 or by the express or implied provisions of the instrument, it is
18 Smith, Marital Dediection. Values, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 16 (1951).
1" 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 30 [hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc.
64-19].
" The state courts have had a difficult time deciding whether the particular
language created a pecuniary interest or a fractional share formula and
whether the marital distributee would be allowed to share in the appreciation
or depreciation of the estate's assets. The greatest number of decisions come
from New York. In It re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d
897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 145 N.E.2d 872, 167 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1957)
and In re Estate of Inman, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct.
1959), the court treated what would appear to be a pecuniary bequest as if it
were a fractional share of the residue and held the marital distributee to
share proportionally in the appreciation and depreciation of the estate's
assets. Accord, In re Estate of Nickelsburg, 34 Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d
90 (Surr. Ct. 1961). In lit re Estate of Bing, 23 Misc. 2d 326, 200 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Surr. Ct. 1960), the marital deduction clause clearly indicated a frac-
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clear the fiduciary, in order to implement such bequest or transfer,
(1) must distribute assets, including cash, having an aggregate fair
market value at the date, or dates, of distribution amounting to
no less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer, as
finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes ....
or
(2) must distribute assets, including cash, fairly representative of
appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus
available for distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary be-
quest or transfer .... 21
If the bequest meets either of these tests the marital deduction will
not be denied. However, even if it is not clear as to the discretion
of the fiduciary, the deduction may nevertheless be allowed in all in-
struments executed prior to October 1, 1964, if the fiduciary and the
surviving spouse file agreements" with the Internal Revenue Serv-
tional share formula, but there was no direction to the executor to evaluate
the marital bequest at federal estate tax values. The court held that the
marital distributee would share in the appreciation and depreciation of the
estate's assets. A similar result was reached in In re Ossman's Will, 27 Misc.
2d 632, 209 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Surr. Ct. 1960). In It re Gilmour's Estate, 18
App. Div. 2d 154, 238 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1963), the court found a pecuniary
formula gift, thereby prohibiting the spouse from sharing in the appreciation
of security values from the date of death to the date of distribution. In
In re Estate of Mueller, 34 Misc. 2d 584, 228 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Surr. Ct. 1962),
the court found a fractional formula and in It re Schimenti's Will, 249
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Surr. Ct. 1964), the court said that the results of New York
decisions "indicate a constructional preference for the percentage or frac-
tional type of 'marital deduction trust'." Id. at 644. Accord, In re Penny's
Will, 251 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct. 1964).
In Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 172 A.2d 146 (1961), the Pennsylvania
court had before it the question, "whether the testator made a gift in a
dollar amount in the nature of a pecuniary gift equal to the maximum marital
deduction, in which case it would not share in the increased value of the
assets of the estate during its administration, or whether he made a frac-
tional share gift, in which case it would share in such increased value." Id.
at 414, 146 A.2d at 147. The court construed the language "so much of my
estate . . . [which] shall equal the maximum marital deduction," to be a
pecuniary gift. Id. at 414-15, 146 A.2d at 147.
In In the Matter of the Estate of Nicolai, 232 Ore. 105, 373 P.2d 967
(1962), the Oregon court stated that "the draftsman of a will who desires to
provide for a maximum marital deduction must tread lightly on thin ice."
Id. at 112, 373 P.2d at 970. The court held that the given clause created a
fractional share rather than a general pecuniary legacy. Contra, Maguire v.
Stirling, 317 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1963); King v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank,
103 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1958) ; In the Matter of the Estate of Kantner, 52 N.J.
Super. 24, 144 A.2d 553 (1958).
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02.
2 Sections 5.01 and 5.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 contain the applicable forms
to be executed by the fiduciary and the surviving spouse. As a practical
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ice to the effect that the division of assets so distributed between the
marital and the residuary distributees "will be fairly representative
of the net appreciation or depreciation in the value of the available
matter instruments created prior to October 1, 1964, should be revised. This
is true for several reasons: First, it has been held in North Carolina that a
codicil to a will amounts to a republication of that will with the result that
its date is that of the codicil. Hatch v. Hatch, 3 N.C. 32 (1798). Accord,
Young v. Williams, 253 N.C. 281, 116 S.E.2d 778 (1960); In the Matter of
the Will of Coffield, 216 N.C. 285, 4 S.E.2d 870 (1939); Battle v. Speight,
31 N.C. 288 (1848). See generally ATKInsoN, WILLs 427 (2d ed. 1953).
Thus if testator's will, published in 1954, comes within the prohibited lan-
guage of Rev. Proc. 64-19 and a codicil was executed in December 1964,
it would appear that the executor and the surviving spouse would be unable
to file the appropriate agreements. However, contrary results have been
suggested. Covey, The Marital Deduction: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and
Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317, 332 (1964). It has been suggested
that the agreements should be filed only when the testator is either dead or
incompetent and a new will cannot be executed. Colson, The Marital De-
duction & Revenue Procedure 64-19, Prac. Law., Oct. 1964, pp. 69, 78.
Second, there is the possibility that the spouse may be incompetent, or
refuse to sign, or die before having had a chance to sign. Third, there is
uncertainty under state law as to whether an executor would have the
authority to file such an agreement. Two pieces of legislation have been
proposed for North Carolina. Letter From F. Thomas Miller, Charlotte,
N. C., to Members of the Committee on Taxation of the North Carolina
Bar Association, Nov. 6, 1964. The purpose of the proposed legislation,
assuming that they are not proposed in the alternative, appears to be twofold.
First, to allow North Carolina executors to distribute assets to the marital
distributee fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation in value
of all property available for distribution and thus comply with section 2.02 of
Rev. Proc. 64-19. Second, to allow the executor to file the agreement under
section 5.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 with the Internal Revenue Service. The
first proposed statute provides:
SECTION 1. That whenever under any Last Will and Testament or
Trust Indenture the Executor, Trustee or other fiduciary is required to,
or has an option to, satisfy a bequest or transfer in trust to or for the
benefit of the surviving spouse of a decedent by a transfer of assets of
the estate or trust in kind at the values as finally determined for Federal
estate tax purposes, the Executor, Trustee or other fiduciary shall, in
the absence of contrary provisions in such Will or Trust Indenture, be
required to satisfy such bequest or transfer by the distribution of assets
fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation in the value of all
property available for distribution in satisfaction of such bequest or
transfer. (Emphasis added.)
It is suggested that the emphasized clause, "in the absence of contrary pro-
visions in such Will or Trust Indenture," prevents the proposed statute from
accomplishing its intended purpose. If the instrument does, as it well may,
contain contrary provisions, this statute will not save it from the grasp of
Rev. Proc. 64-19 and the marital deduction will be denied. The second pro-
posed statute provides:
SECTION 1. That the Executor, Trustee, or other fiduciary having
discretionary powers under a Last Will and Testament or Trust Indenture
with respect to the selection of assets to be distributed in satisfaction of a
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property on the date or dates of distribution. ' 23 If the fiduciary
fails to distribute according to the filed agreement, the surviving
spouse will be deemed to have made a gift to the beneficiary in whose
favor the failure occurs, unless upon first being apprised of the
situation, he or she seasonably objects. 24 For all instruments exe-
cuted on or after October 1, 1964, Rev. Proc. 64-19 states that the
marital deduction will be disallowed if the bequest does not meet
either of the tests noted in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In further explanation, section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 sets
forth several situations involving bequests to which it does not apply.
The substance of these is:
(1) a bequest or transfer in trust of a fractional share formula where
each beneficiary shares proportionally in the appreciation or de-
preciation in the value of the assets to the date of distribution,
(2) bequest of specific assets, or
(3) a pecuniary bequest (in formula or stated amount)
where:
a) the bequest must be satisfied solely in cash, or
b) the fiduciary has no discretion in the selection of the assets
to be distributed in kind, or
bequest or transfer in trust to or for the benefit of the surviving spouse
of a decedent shall be authorized to enter into agreements with the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue of the United States of America, and
other taxing authorities, requiring the fiduciary to exercise the fiduciary's
discretion so that the assets of the estate, both cash and other property,
available for distribution will be distributed between (i) the marital de-
duction bequest or transfer in trust and (ii) the balance of the estate
available for distribution in satisfaction of such bequest or transfer in
trust so that cash and other properties distributed in satisfaction of the
marital deduction bequest or transfer in trust will be fairly representa-
tive of the net appreciation or depreciation in value of the available
property on the date, or dates, of distribution. It is the purpose of this
act to authorize such fiduciary to enter into any agreement that may be
necessary or advisable in order to secure for Federal estate tax purposes
the appropriate marital deduction available under the Internal Revenue
Laws of the United States of America and to do and perform all acts
incident to such purpose.
The first proposed statute (minus the questioned clause) and the second
proposed statute are almost identical to two recent Mississippi statutes.
2 P-H WILLS, EST., TRUSTS, Miss. 2665 (1964). The North Carolina
statutes appear to accomplish the desired results. If the first proposed statute
is amended as suggested, quaere whether the legislature can "authorize" the
executor to go against the express provisions of the will without raising a
constitutional question.
23 Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.02.
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c) assets to be distributed in kind are required to be valued at
their respective values on the date, or dates, of distribution.25
One author2 6 has suggested that as a matter of law the premise
of the Commissioner in Rev. Proc. 64-19 was erroneous because
fiduciaries are required to act fairly and exercise their powers in
accordance with the basic principles of equity. This is undoubtedly
true, and where the spouse has received depreciated property and
the other legatees appreciated property and she objects, there is
authority2 7 for requiring the executor to deal fairly in apportioning
the property. However, it is suggested that the Commissioner was
primarily concerned with situations where there has been collusion
between the executors and the surviving spouse, the latter having
agreed to accept the depreciated assets. In such an instance there is
no one with standing, and incentive,28 to sue to compel the executor
to deal equitably in apportioning the property.
The approach of the Commissioner in Rev. Proc. 64-19 was
foreshadowed in his actions in Estate of Daniel Walsh, 2  a case
recently pending before the Tax Court. In Walsh a pecuniary in-
terest formula3 0 was employed containing features which were later
to be held objectionable by Rev. Proc. 64-19. In computing the
taxable estate, the Commissioner limited the marital deduction to
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01.
28 Lauritzen, supra note 10, at 318; Lauritzen, The Treasury Department
and the Marital Deduction Formula-Teapot Tempest in Washington, 7 TAx
COUNCELOR'S Q. 251 (1963).
"Hall v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1945); Carrier v. Car-
rier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919).
28 It would seem unlikely that the legatees who receive the appreciated
assets would object to the widow's receiving the depreciated ones.
"2 Estate of Daniel Walsh, Doc. No. 3433-63, pending T. C. (July 16,
1963), CCH TAx CT. REP. 1962-63 trans. binder 5650. See generally IRS
Mounts Attack on Formula Marital Deduction Bequests, 18 J. TAXATION
319 (1963); Trust Value Increase Added to Marital Deduction Trust, 13
J. TAxATION 382-83 (1960). As far back as 1951 Casner suggested that the
use of the legacy provision authorizing distribution in kind at estate tax
values may raise a problem with the marital deduction. Casner, Estate
Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trust, 64 HARV. L. REv. 582,
593-96 (1951).
20 The formula in Walsh reads:
such portion of my estate as will, but no more than is necessary to, pro-
duce the full allowable deduction ....
My Executors shall have full authority and discretion to satisfy this
bequest, wholly or partly in cash or kind.., however... any property so
conveyed ... shall be valued for that purpose at the value thereof as finally
determined for Federal estate tax purposes ....
Quoted in CCH, MARITAL DEDUCTION RULE 9-10 (1964).
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the value of the non-probate assets passing to the surviving spouse
outside of the will. A marital deduction of 330,936.33 dollars was
denied with respect to the pecuniary bequest."'
It is suggested that the Commissioner's approach in Walsh and
in Rev. Proc. 64-19 of denying the entire marital deduction will
not be sustained by the courts, particularly where, although the
instrument contains those features held objectionable by Rev. Proc.
64-19, the executor has, in fact, exercised his discretion fairly and
equitably in apportioning the estate's assets. A more meaningful
and less doubtful solution would be for the Commissioner to limit
the deduction to the amount actually received by the marital dis-
tributee. The upper limit would still remain one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate while the lower limit would be the fair market
value as of date of distribution of the property actually passing
to the surviving spouse. Then, if there were to be collusion between
the executor and the surviving spouse for the latter to receive de-
preciated assets, the estate's marital deduction would be limited to
the value of those assets; and the estate, not being able to take
maximum advantage of the marital deduction, would suffer an un-
necessary tax burden. The possibility of losing part of the marital
deduction should act as a sufficient deterrent to prevent the collusive
practice of the executor and the surviving spouse. A denial of part
of the marital deduction will increase the size of the taxable estate
and correspondingly will increase the amount of the estate tax to be
paid. The estate tax is generally held to be payable out of assets other
than those comprising the marital share.82 The possibility of the
legatee's having to pay a higher estate tax should act as a sufficient
incentive to assure that all property is apportioned fairly and equi-
tably. It has also been suggested 33 that the deduction could be limited
to the value at the date of distribution of the maximum assets with
which the bequest could be satisfied on the theory that this is all
the surviving spouse received from the decedent, the excess being
given to her by the executors. It is felt, however, that the latter
would create an unnecessary fiction in the law.
In the light of Rev. Proc 64-19, providence suggests that, unless
3" Ibid.
2 For a discussion of the law concerning the apportionment of taxes in
the various states, see Durand, Marital Deduction Litigation, 101 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 8 (1962).
"' Burch, supra note 9, at 647-48.
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the estate planner is prepared to litigate with the Commissioner and
risk the loss of his client's marital deduction, a form of bequest
should be employed which is acceptable under section 4.01 of Rev.
Proc. 64-19. If the estate planner still prefers to use the pecuniary
interest formula, it should be amended to comply with section 2.02
of Rev. Proc. 64-19 by adding: (1) a clause requiring the executor,
when satisfying the bequest, to distribute assets, including cash,
having an aggregate fair market value at the date, or dates, of distri-
bution amounting to no less than the amount of that bequest, as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, or (2) a clause
requiring the executor to distribute assets, including cash, fairly
representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all
property thus available for distribution in satisfaction of the marital
bequest. Consideration should also be given to the use of a frac-
tional share formula which complies with the provisions of section
4.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19. This formula has not received the at-
tention shown the pecuniary interest formula because of the com-
plexity of its administration. It was thought to require a fraction
of each asset to be distributed to each beneficiary.-"
It is suggested that whichever path is employed to escape its
thrust, Rev. Proc. 64-19 may achieve a beneficial result by inspiring
reviews of wills and testamentary plans, reviews which are often
long overdue.
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-Hospital's Liability-Standard of Care
In Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hosp., ac-
tion was brought by a patient to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly caused by the hospital's negligence. The court
held that, even though there was no deviation from the local
standard of care, the hospital was negligent for failing to adhere
to its own regulations which required that it provide qualified
physicians. The questions presented by the decision are whether
a court should allow hospital rules in as evidence of a higher stan-
dard of care and, if it does, would such rules impose an undue
burden on a layman administrator in requiring him to ensure that
" CASNER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 798.
1 200 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964).
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a physician is competent. Since the trend is to reject charitable im-
munity, it will be assumed for the purpose of this note that all
hospitals are liable in tort.
2
The liability of a hospital may be predicated upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior which holds the principal liable for the
tortious act of his servant if such act was committed while further-
ing a purpose of the principal.' Under this agency theory, the hos-
pital has been held responsible for the negligence of an elevator
operator,4 a nurse, an intern,' and a physician.7 In determining
whether a doctor or nurse is the servant of the hospital, most courts
apply the test of whether they are subject to the hospital's control
or right of control in regard to the work to be done and the manner
of performing it.' However, a physician or a nurse employed by the
hospital may become the temporary servants of a self-employed
2 At one time most jurdisdictions held that a charitable hospital was
immune from liability for the tortious acts of its employees. Illinois, the
jurisdiction deciding Darling, has repudiated the immunity doctrine. See
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950). Other jurisdictions
still hold that a non-profit hospital is exempt from liability, but even these
courts will vary as to whether such exemption is complete or partial.
Nevertheless, the trend is to reject complete immunity from liability.
See President & Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); PROSSER, TORTS § 127 (3d ed. 1964); Note, 37 N.C.L.
REv. 209 (1959); Note, 30 N.C.L. Rnv. 67 (1951).
'Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952). See generally
Southwick, Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 153 (1960).
'Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 173 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
'Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 216 Ala. 326, 113 So. 79
(1927) (failure of nurse to call doctor in time to deliver child); Goff v.
Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958) (failure to
call doctor when aware bleeding above normal); Pensacola Sanitarium v.
Wilkins, 68 Fla. 447, 67 So. 124 (1914) (burning the patient by leaving
hot water bottle in bed). In Byrd v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 202 N.C. 337,
162 S.E. 738 (1932), the court stated that a nurse has the affirmative duty
to exercise reasonable care, skill and judgment in the treatment of the
patient's case. This is generally the standard of conduct required of a
nurse.
'Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d 997 (1953); City of
Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942); Waynick v. Reardon.
236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952); Stuart Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Curry, 173
Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939).
'Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitorium Co., 224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S.W.2d
249 (1929); Brant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166, 8 P.2d 972 (1932).
See generally Southwick, supra note 3, at 153.
'St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 4
N.W.2d 637 (1942); Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820
(1929); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Rust, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 120 S.W. 249 (1909).
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doctor who then becomes responsible for their negligence.9 On the
other hand, some courts hold that respondeat superior is inap-
plicable between the hospital and the physician employee. The
rationale used in these cases is that a hospital can not control the
professional activities of a doctor because the hospital is not com-
petent to practice medicine.' ° When the physician is not a servant
but is an independent contractor, it is generally agreed that the
hospital is not liable for his malpractice under respondeat superior."
There is a concept of hospital liability that does not require
negligence of an employee or servant before the hospital will be
answerable in tort for injuries suffered by a patient. This legal
obligation to compensate arises from the negligence of the hospital
itself. Findings of corporate negligence have usually been limited
to administrative acts and omissions, such as not providing a nurse,"2
not furnishing proper and safe equipment,'" not exercising due care
in the selection and retention of a physician,'14 and not having avail-
able another physician when the patient's doctor is absent.' 5 The
court in Darling applied this concept of corporate liability to a situa-
tion in which the hospital was negligent for failing to ensure that
only qualified doctors were permitted to use its facilities.' 6
*E.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959). See
generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 872, 912 (1962).
"°Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Iterman v.
Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
"
1E.g., Bums v. Eno, 213 Iowa 881, 240 N.W. 209 (1932). In Smith
v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941), the court held that
a hospital, unless it was negligent in selecting a doctor for a patient, would
not be liable for the negligence of a doctor who was neither an employee
nor a servant of the hospital for the purpose of treating patients, but who
was a member of its staff.
12 Guilliams v. Hollywood Hosp., 18 Cal. 2d 97, 114 P.2d 1 (1941).
Baker v. Leland Stanford Univ., 133 Cal. App. 243, 23 P.2d 1071
(1933); Medical & Surgical Memorial Hosp. v. Cauthorn, 229 S.E.2d 932
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
" Edwards v. Grace Hosp. Soc'y, 130 Conn. 568, 36 A.2d 273 (1944);
Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953);
Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941); Hoke v. Glenn,
167 N.C. 594, 83 S.E. 807 (1914).1 In Yeates v. Harms, 393 N.W.2d 982 (Kan. 1964), a physician testi-
fied that a doctor would be negligent if he absenced himself from a case
without making arrangements for another doctor to look after his patient.
This same expert also testified that a hospital would be negligent if it
failed to have available another doctor when a patient's physician was absent.
" The plaintiff in Dayan v. Wood River Township Hosp., 18 Ill. App. 2d
263, 152 N.E.2d 205 (1958), was denied reappointment to the hospital staff
on the grounds that he had failed to keep abreast of current medical pro-
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In order to hold a hospital liable, it is necessary for a jury to
decide whether there has been a deviation from that degree of care,
skill, and diligence used by hospitals in that community. It is the
general rule that the standard of care for a hospital and a doctor
is established by the medical profession in the local area. The reason
for this reliance on the local standard, especially in the case of a
doctor, is the lack of a jury's medical knowledge and ability to
decide whether or not due care was exercised.' There are decisions,
however, that have held that the local standards concerning a hos-
pital are not always conclusive of due care when relied upon by the
hospital as a defense.'" This exception to the local standard rule has
generally been applied only to non-medical services that are usually
rendered by all hospitals regardless of locality. In these cases, the
fact that the administration merely utilized the means at hand in
the community will not exonerate the hospital from liability.'"
Besides being held to a local standard of care, a hospital may also
cedures and that he failed to call early consultation in difficult cases. In up-
holding the right of the hospital to deny the plaintiff the right to use its
facilities, the court stated:
A hospital is not an annex to every doctor's office where the same freedom
of practice as exists in the office continues. Nurses and other employees
of the hospital are under the direction and control of doctors from time
to time, and costly equipment and facilities are made available for their
use. Liability might well be made to fall upon the hospital if their person-
nel or equipment were permitted to be subject to the control of one lacking
in some of the necessary professional skills.
Id. at 270, 152 N.E.2d at 208. The New York court in Hendrickson v.
Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899 (1937), held the hospital liable on the
theory of corporate negligence for allowing an incompetent person to use
its facilities.
1" See MeCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 549, 605-09 (1959).
18 South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway, 233 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250
(1936) ; Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d
36 (1956); Bennett v. Punton Sanitarium Ass'n, 213 Mo. App. 363, 249 S.W.
666 (1923); Liebrecht v. Gotham Sanitarium, 284 App. Div. 781, 134
N.Y.S.2d 762 (1954).
"p In Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940), the court
applied the same rationale to a physician. It was stated in the opinion that
today, with the rapid methods of transportation and easy means of com-
munication, the horizons have been widened, and the duty of a doctor
is not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular
village where he is practicing. So far as medical treatment is concerned,
the borders of the . . . community have in effect, been extended so as
to include those centers readily accessible where treatment may be had
which the local physician.., is unable to give.
Id. at 349, 294 N.W. at 18.
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have to conform to a statutory standard of reasonable care.2" Most
courts have regarded a violation of a statute as negligence per se
or as a presumption of negligence. 2 ' The better view, but a minority
one, is that a statutory violation is only evidence of negligence.22
When the standard is not imposed by the state but is adopted by the
hospital itself, some courts have held that the private rule is ad-
missible as evidence of the hospital's standard of care.23 These same
decisions, however, have said that a private rule would probably not
be admitted as evidence unless all the hospitals in the community
have adopted the same regulation. The court in Darling did not
specifically say that all hospitals in the local area had to accept and
approve a private rule before it could be used as evidence. Thus,
the principal case indicates that a hospital may be held to a standard
of care higher than the local standard.
Should such a rule be admissible in evidence on behalf of a
plaintiff? A hospital should be allowed to prescribe rules con-
trolling those permitted to use its facilities. If the court allows
these rules to be introduced as evidence, it would seem that the more
cautious a hospital is by adopting regulations for the safety of its
patients, the more likely it will be held negligent in situations where
other hospitals not having similar regulations would probably not
be held negligent. Giving the private rule the effect of evidence
of the standard could tend to discourage a hospital from adopting
any rule.2 4 A fallacy in the argument against admission is the as-
" In addition to the private rules of the hospital, the plaintiff in Darling
was permitted to offer in evidence the rules and regulations of the Illinois
Dept. of Public Health promulgated under the Hospital Licensing Act of
1953, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11132, §§ 142-157 (1954).
2 Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 193 At. 877 (1937); Reynolds v.
Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954).
22 Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co., 197 Ark. 425, 122 S.W.2d 597
(1938) ; Simpson v. Wood, 260 N.C. 157, 132 S.E.2d 369 (1963).
2 Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952); Judd v.
Park Ave. Hosp., 37 Misc. 2d 614, 235 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct.), ajfd,
235 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1962); Corwin v. Univ. of Rochester, 147 N.Y.S.2d 571
(Sup. Ct. 1955). In Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963),
the court held that an adopted rule promulgated by the American Psychiatric
Association could be introduced as evidence of the standard of care a
psychiatrist should adhere to. This case was cited in Wilson v. Lowe's
Asheboro Hardware, 259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963), which held that
an advisory safety code voluntarily adopted by the defendant was admissible
to establish negligence. For discussion of these two unprecedented cases, see
Torts, 11th Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv.
721, 727-28, 736-37 (1964).
", Although a hospital was not involved in Tonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71
19651
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sumption that any violation of a rule will automatically result in
liability. Actually, such rules would not be an absolute standard,
but would only be evidence to be considered by the jury. Thus, a
hospital would be free to introduce evidence to show that a viola-
tion of its rules was not negligence. If the rule calls for more than
is reasonable under the circumstances, it should be excluded by
the court. Therefore, since no absolute standard is imposed by a
hospital rule, the result reached in the Darling decision should be
followed by the courts.
But, since the administrator was a layman, did the court in
Darling impose an unreasonable responsibility upon him to see that
only competent physicians were allowed to use the hospital facilities?
It is this writer's opinion that under the facts of the case no un-
reasonable obligation was placed upon the administrator. Not being
a doctor, the administrator would be held to the standard of what
a reasonable man would have done under the circumstances, not to
what a doctor would have done. The plaintiff's evidence clearly
showed that the administrator had not exercised reasonable care
to ensure that the hospital's doctors were qualified. He requested
neither the medical staff nor the governing board to examine the
competency of the physician who treated the plaintiff. Under the
facts presented, the court rightly held that the administrator had
failed to exercise reasonable care in supervising the conduct of the
hospital and the competency of its personnel.2"
The principal case is a departure from the idea that all hos-
pitals in the community must adopt the same rules before a hospital
regulation will be admissible in evidence. It is submitted that the
result of the Darling case should be followed, since by the admission
of the hospital rules, the jury would not be bound to decide negligence
Minn. 438, 74 N.W. 166 (1898), the reason advanced by the court for not
admitting the defendant's rules in evidence was that a person should not be
penalized by the admission of self-adopted rules requiring greater care than
the law requires.
2 Most hospitals in this country have been approved by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals and have agreed to follow the rules
promulgated by the Joint Commission. If the particular jurisdiction will
allow the defendant's rules to be admitted in evidence, the establishing of the
administrator's obligation to see that consultants are called may be made
easier in that the accreditation standard may specifically place the responsi-
bility upon the administrator to ensure that consultations are called. Several
standards are presented and their possible effect on the hospital are discussed
in Ames, Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a Medical
Malpractice Suit, 12 VAND. L. Rzv. 649, 652-57 (1959).
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solely on the basis of the local standard but would have a choice as to
whether the local standard or the hospital rules were reasonable
under the circumstances.
WILLIAM GLENN BOYD
